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Abstract
The discourse surrounding the "war on terror" is dcnsc with possiblc quilting
points in need or analysis. While the theorization orthe "war on tcrror" has been
continuing for a decade now. both "suicide bombings" and attacks on Muslim
populations have increased dramatically. Thus. while theorizing about thejihad and
popularizing the figure of thejihadisl has become commonplace. hundrcds of thousands
of people across the world are still suffering from the effects of real contlic!. It can be
argued that this condition demonstrates a deep dislocation betwcen First World theory
and reality. and that as this dislocation grows the gap of interlocution grows wider. This
thesis attempts to highlight this disjuncture and ofters suggestions as to how genuinc
contrapuntal discourse might begin in radical criticism.
In this thesis I will argue that the temptation to theorizcjilwd. and especially to
appropriate the figurc ofthcjihadisl. offers a fertilc area from which to launch a
discussion about the limits of current theory. particularly regarding the role of Muslim
interlocutors in interpretation. the limits of secularism as the founding doctrine of
postcolonial theory. and the oncn opaque debates focused on Islam's challenge to
modernity. Thejihadisl has been employed by First World theorists as a tool to engage
in selfreneetion on the state of the democratic project in Western countries. while
Muslim interlocutors have become central to making visible the specter ofthejihadi,I/.
playing the role of "good" Muslims in translating the motifs of the "bad" Muslims.
Simultaneously. the "bad" Muslims havc developed thcir own forms and discourses to
represent themselves. without the mediation of interlocutors. This leads to a vastly
heterogeneous discourse which both arlirms and rejects dominant idcologics. producing a
multi-dimensional "'Muslim" response. This thcsis discusscs what thcsc hctcrogcneous
discourses ofTel' to theory.
The introduction establishes the methodological approach ofthc theis: its
contrapuntal and cross disciplinary approach towards a "'dcmocratic criticism."Chaplcr
One argues that while drawing on predominantly Muslim countries as the sourcc matcrial
for his theory. Said avoidcd Islam's radical critique of humanism. furthcr isolating Islam
from the growing field of postcolonial studies. Chapter Two focuscs on thc various
forms of Oriental isms, from the neoconscrvatives and the Icft. that havc arisen post 9/11
and the role of Muslims. either advertently or inadvertently. in supporting thesc
Oriental isms as the cultural logic for the militarization of Muslim countrics. It studies
thc works of popular, bUl diverse, Muslim writcrs such as Irshad Manji Azar Nalisi .
Khalid Hosseini. and Yasmina Khadra. Chaptcr Three further explorcs how the conccpt
ofjihad migrates or "travels" in theory to fit bOlh the discourses of rcform and revolution.
This chapter compares the works of liberal reformists such as John Esposito. Oliver Roy
and Imam Feisal Abdu Raufas well as those ofwcll-known radical thinkcrs. such as
Slavoj Zizek and Terry Eagleton. to Islamic reformcrs. such as Ziaddiun Sardar. J\nouar
Majid. and Tariq Ramadan. Chapter Four explicitly examines the intcntionality oljih(/(I
by employing a contrapuntal approach that includes fiction and critical analysis to
compare fictional representations ofthejihadist to biographical rcconstructions of
famousjihadists as interpreted by various sociologists and historians. John Updike's
Terrorist: Don Delillo's Falling lv/an. Slimane Bena"issa's The Last Night oj" Dall/ned
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Soul. Mohsin Hamid's The Reluctant Fundamentalist and Orhan Pamuk's Snml' arc
discussed. Chapter Five examines the intentionality ofthejihadistli'om his own
perspective, through the direct interventions by infamousjihadists. such as Osama bin
Laden, Adam Gadhan, Mohammed Siddique Khan, and Shehzad Tanweer. raising
questions about the dialogic relationship between thejihadist , his audience. and thc
media. Arguing thatthejihadistmaintains both a performative and political stancc by
establishing a relationship between thejihadist and a community of responsible victims,
these articulations are compared to those of noted interpreters such as Hcnry Giroux and
Faisal Devji. The concluding chapter theorizes what jihad can contribute to contcmporary
theory, particularly to postcolonial studies, and positions the concept of jihad itsclfwithin
the postcolonial tradition. The thesis concludes that by reclaiming the roots of
contemporary jihad theory as a part of a postcolonialtradition,jihad can makc a makc
valuablc contribution to the future of theory, which includes Islamic discoursc in a
serious debate on postcolonial ism. particularly in the contcxt of the ongoing 20 I0-20 I I
Arab revolutions.
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Introduction
HO/l/o /s/amiclIs: Beyond "Good" and "Bad"
The events that occurred on Septcmber 11,200 I, commonly refCrred to as 9/ II.
magnified. accelerated and popularized the engagement ofthcory with Islam. Since the
1978 publication of Edward Said's seminal Orienta/ism. the issue of the
misrepresentation of the Arab world and Islam has tenuously cntercd the domain of
theory. Said had argued that the Occident had created thc imaginary Oricnt through a
scries ofstercotypical images or binary constructions that reanirmed the Occidental sell".
Thcse constructions. Said noted. were the cultural accompaniments 10 colonialism and
imperialism. Certainly. the events following 9/11 reinvigoratcd this discussion as well as
cxtcndcd an analysis on thc usefulness of theory and its secular bias. thc limits of
democracy, and the metaphysical challenge of Islam. It can be argued that until the
rupturous event of 9/11 therc had been a minimal engagcmcnt of popular culture and
theory with Islamic concepts. outside Orientalist and arca studies. and that 9/11
popularized a field tha\.thus far. had remained largely insular. academic and textual.
Sincc then. with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in play. and dramatic and spectacular
allacks on previously unreachablc targets in London and Madrid. human rights
catastrophes ofGuantanamo Bay and Abu Gharib. the ongoing siege ofGaza. and the
"Arab Spring", media and culture industries have cashed in on thc contlic\. producing a
necd for viable cultural translators and commentators. This tlurry of activity has
spectacularized the differences between the "world of Islam" and thc Wcst.
'
and issucs
such as freedom of expression. women's rights. political reform. and radicalism havc
made lerms such as apos/a/e. hijah. ij/ihad andjihad part orthc popular. globallcxicon. 2
The "war ofideas..J has become the subject ofcvcryone's conversation and thc products
produced from the batlles rapidly consumablc.
Simplified categorics have been invented to describc the multiplicity of
perspectives within divcrsc Muslim cultures and within the West itself. Islam.
particularly. has been compressed into a monolith when convcnicnt and becomc
synonymous with "fundamentalism." As Edward Said wrote in his 1997 Introduction to
the revised Vintage edition of Covering Islam. published originally in 1981:
'Theterms Islam and the West have become hopelessly inllammatory.lnlhisstudythcyarcuscd.
not to agree with the geographical references 10 which lhesewordsusually refcr, but as imaginal')
ideologicalconstrucls. MuchofthisthesiswillemphasizelheinslabililyoflhesignofIslam and
pal'licular~lyJihad
- All explications of Islamic lerminologyused in this lhesis are lakenfl'OmJohnL.Esposito, n",
OxfiJl'd Dieliallarl' o{/swm (Oxford: OUP, 2003)
.'/pO.l'Ia.l',I': "Renunciation ofone'sreligion ....Theschools vary 0 nlhequcstionor whclhcrornot
anapostale may be allowed. encouraged. or disallowed to repent, as wcllasontheaposlatc'spropCI'l) alic,
dealhorbanishmenLbultheyagrecthatlhemarriageofanaposlateisvoid"(22).
I/ijah:"Traditional Muslim women's head. tacc.orbodilycovering, ofnumcl'Ous varicticsacl'Oss
timcandspace, olien referrcd toaslhe"veil."/-/ijahisasymbol of modcsty, privacy and moralily" (I 12)
/ili/lOd: "Islamic legal term meaning "independenl rcasoning:' as opposed to laqlid (imitation)
One of lour sourccs orSunni law. Ulilized where the Quran and Sunnah(lhe lirst lwosources)arcsilcnl.lt
rcquires a lhorough knowledgcorlheology,revealedtcxtsand Iegallhcory(usulal-liqh):asophislicatcd
capacity lor legal reasoning: and a thorough knowledgeorArabic"(134)
Jihad: ''From the Arabic roolmeaning "to strive:'''to excrl:'''to lighl": cxaclmeaningdcpcnds
onCOlllext. Maycxprcssstruggicagainstonc·sevilinclinations.allcxc.:rtiontoconvcrlunbclievcrs.ora
struggle lor the moral bettermcntofthe Islamic community. Todayolien used wilhout any religions
connotalion, with a meaning more or less equivalent tothe Englishwordcl'II.\'iIde"(160)
'Thewarofidcashasbecomeacommonplacctodcscribclhcpropagandawarbetwccn lhc Unitcd
Stales government and Islamic radicals, and li'cqucntlyappcars in policysludies such as various RAND
imprints and worksbylhc Washington-based Slralegic Sludies Instilulc. Examples of how this
tcrminologyisusedtodescribelhebinarybelwecnjihadanddemocracycan be lound in David Kamicn.
The MeGraw-/-lill I/ome/andSecllril,l' /-lam/hook (New York: McGraw-llill. 2006) and Walid Pharcs, n",
lVaroj"ldeas:Ji/llldismAgaillsIDemocrae\'( ewYork: PalgraveMacmillan,2008)
It is simply false to try to tracc all this (referring to terrorism) back to something
called Islam, no matter how vociferously polemical Orientalisls-mainly active in
the United States, Britain and Israel-insisted that Islam regulates societies from
top to bottom, that dar aI-Islam is a single coherent entity, that church and state
are really one in Islam, and so lorth." (xvi)
This tendency to see Islam as a unitary entity is reversed. however. when the occasion
calls lor it. After 9/11. for example. President Bush made reference to "good" and "bad"
Muslims - the" bad" ones being responsible lor the 9/1 J attacks and the "good" ones
bcing anxious to disassociate themselves li'om the "bad" ones. clear their namcs and
support America (Mamdani, Good A4uslim. Bad Muslim 15). Throughout periods of high
alcrt. Islam and Muslims are routinely denigrated and stercotyped as encmies of fi'eedom
and civilization, victimized as potential holders of threatening ideologies. and even
tortured to satiate the public need lor perceivcd sccurity. Other times. philosophers and
politicians fragment Islam into convenient differentiations between various .. types" of
Muslims: the progressives. moderates. fundamentalists. neo-fundamentalists. and
iihadisls. In fact, those antagonistic to Islam and those sympathetic to it olien end up
making the same arguments. It has become commonplace to theorize that Islam and the
West hold different epistemological frameworks: this assertion comcs from the right and
the left alike. with neoconservatives such as Samuel Huntington. leftists such as Slavoj
Zi2ek, and Osama bin Laden all singing in the same choir. The politics of representing
Islam and Muslims is highly unstable and as Douglas Kellner notes. "media spectacks
are subject to dialectical reversal as positive images give way to negative ones" (lvledia
Spectacles and the Crisis ojDel11vcracy 78).
Jihad has become a central terminology in this "war on terror." Theorists and lay
people alike discuss the nature oI'jihad, until recently an obscure concept about which
only theologians would converse outside Islamic cultures. In fact. an entire public
discourse onjihad has developed, and jihad itselfhas becn shaped and redelined into
various configurations: as a radical revolutionary energy. an agent lor peaceful social
change. an inner struggle for peace and reconciliation. or a barbarian dcstructive instinct
that opposes civilization and culture.
To be fair, even among theologians.jihad has held ambiguous meanings. not only
in contemporary times, but throughout history. Volumes haves been written in Islamic
scholarship about the doctrine ofjihad, and only some of these discussions can bc explorcd
here:' i\sma Afsaruddin has noted that throughout the lirst three centuries of Islam.jihad
developed a multiplicity of meanings largely related to struggling in the path of God. whieh
could mean embarking on the pursuit of knowledge, an inner battle lor spiritualism. and a
military struggle in defense of Islam. Sohail Hashmi has traced that li'olll the eighth to the
lourteenth centuries of Islam, considered the classical period. legal jurists ordainedjihm/ as
a divine struggle in a world divided into dar 0/1.1'/0111, a Muslim state led by ajust ruler. and
dar a/ harh.the land of war. where Islam did nOl prevail. During Ihis period. many scholars
aimed at bringing Islamic civilization to dar al harh. under strict conditions. thus developing
a code as to how these activities were to take place. This led to the development ofa further
discourse ofjihad not only as a defensive struggle against intrudcrs but as a means of
spreading Islam to non-Muslim areas. The teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
developed in the middle of the cighteenth century on thc Arabian peninsula in direct
response to the colonization of Arabia by the Ottomans. havc expandcd the boundaries of
political Islam by positioningjihad as a tight against colonialism.' Modern concepts of
jihad largely developed li'om these historical differentiations. as evidenced in thc work of
Sayyid Qutb which grew out of the postcolonial Egypt ofGemal Abdel Nasscr6 Scholars
of Islam had traditionally distinguished between two typcs ofjihad - a/~jihad-al-akhar (the
greaterjihad) and a/~jihad al asghar (the lesserjihad). The greaterjihad was considered to
be the inward struggle of the selfagainst weakness. The Icsscrjilwd was directed outward
toward selfdefense, prcservation. and justice. However. as Mohammed Fadcl notcs. Qutb.
largely seen as the intellcctual forefather to radical Islam. diflercntiatcd three typcs oljilw(/
al asghar: defensivejihadto ward otT persecution to Muslims.jihadto assure li-ccdomlO
preach Islam without pcrsccution. and armcdjihad as a means of achieving univcrsaljustice.
Further development of the differentiations of the Icsserjilwdand thccodes lor its
'Nul1leroussoureesattel1lpleithertoconslructordeconstructtheeonneclion between Wahabisl1l
and AI Qaeda. as well as Ihe Al1lerican involvement inthefoundingofalQaeda. Forexampleconsidet
Lawrence Wright, The Loollling Tower: AI-Qaeda and the I?aad /09/11 (New York: Knopl: 2006): Alw;111
AbdeiBari, 71,e Secre/I-Iis/orl' o/al Qaeda (Berkeley, CA: University of Cal ilornia Press, 2006): Pcter
Bergen, /-101" War. Inc: Inside /heSeG-re/ Worido/Osallla hin Laden (New York: Frce Press, 2001): Petet
Bergel1, {he ()sallla hin Laden I Knoll': An ()mll-IiS/l!lT o/al Qaeda's Leader (Ncw York: Free Press.
2006): Johl1 L. Esposito. Unlwl\' War: Termr in/he Nallle a/Islalll (New York: auI'. 2002): Marc
Sageman. Unders/l!nding Termr Ne/lt'orks (Philadelphia: University ofPel1l1sylvallia Press, 2004)
(, Sec, lor example, Sayyid Qutb. Ma'alilllfi ai-Tariq or JIIiles/tI1les. (Cairo: Kazi PlIblicatiolls.
1964). Web. 12 Mar. 201 I. <http://maialla.orglbooks/2005/qutb-nilestone.pdf>
engagement are relatively modern. African scholar Mahmood Mamdani accentuates this
reality: "After the first centuries of the creation of the Islamic states. there werc only four
widespread uses ofjihad as a mobilizing slogan- until the Afghan jihad of thc 1980s" (Good
MII.l/im.!JadMII.llim51).
It is the lesserjihadthat is most sharply debated today. Johnl:sposito in"Jihad:
Holy or Unholy WarT' summarizes some of the key Islamist positions in this dcbatc. Hc
obscrves that notable religious leaders, such as Sheikh YusufQaradawi. Sheikh Ahmad
Yasin. the founder of Hamas, and Akram Sabri, the Mul1i of Jerusalem. have allowedjihad
only as sel I' defense in occupied Muslim predominant countries, including thc killing of
civilians in these militarized zones. Ilowever, Sheikh al Sheikh. former Grand Mulii of
Saudi Arabia, has condemned all suicide bombings as un-Islamic. Sheikh Muhammad
Sayad Tantawi, Grand Imam ofal-Azhar Mosque and Grand Sheikh ofal-A7.har Univcrsity,
has drawn a distinction between acts ofself~sacrifice and self-defense and strongly
disallowed the killing of noncombatants. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. on thc
othcr hand, have argued thatjihad can include attacks upon military and nonmilitary targets
inside Muslim countries that are physically occupicd by forcign powers. attacks on military
installations in Muslim countries that are not formally occupied. as well as attacks within the
occupying countries themselves.
To further complicate the discoursejihad is packaged as "good" and
"bad. The greaterjihad, which is inner and spiritual in nature. is considered benevolcnt.
while the lesserjihad. which can take various forms of struggle for social justice. is branded
as much more malevolent. It is this struggle for social justice which is largely the object of
public scrutiny. "Good" Muslims accentuate the inner spiritual journey and work within
existing institutions to achieve social justice nonviolently. They. thcrefore. presentjihm{ as
compatible to Western neo-liberalism. The category of "bad" Muslims can include all those
who locus on the social clement of jihad. whether it involves radically conrronting injustice
through active social and polticial organization or through violent struggle. This group or
"bad" Muslims is diverse. and as Olivier Roy and John Esposito argue. wrongrully groups
politicallslamists. who aim to institute Islamic political systems. withjihadi.l'I.I'. who attempt
to disrupt global order through suicide attacks. 7 In all cases. both the "good" and"bad"
Muslims appropriate the code of jihad and translate it to a largely uninlormed audience.
Further. as this thesis will demonstrate. even non-Muslim theorists. with a limited
knowledge oI'jihad. have adaptedjihad as a potential revolutionary force that can disrupt
nco-liberalism and offer hope for a radical global democracy.
Muslim interlocutors have become central to making visible the specter or the
jihadi.l'/. and as such are an important focus or this study. The stubborn curiosity to
understand the actions of thejihadi.l'/.I' propelled those already engaged in ongoing
discussions about Islam and its epistemology prior to 9/1\ into the media spotlight. At the
same time. "authentic" Muslims. usually Western Muslims with origins in pn.:dominantly
'Forcxamplcsccavariclyofworksbythesctwoauthors:JohnL.Esposito.lsI0Illic7hrl'0/:iI!l·/h
or Hl'olin'? ( cw York: OUP. 1999): John L. Esposito. and John Voli. il!okas o/COlI/elll!'orwT Is/wI/
(New York: OUP. 200 I): John L. Esposito. VI//W/I' Wor: Terror il/lhe NOllie OOS/Olll ( cw York: OUP.
2002) and Olivier Roy. The Chaos o/Polilics il/lhe Midd/e Eos/ (New York: Columbia University Prcss.
2008): Olivier Roy. 0/ohalised Is/alii: n,l' Search/ilr a Nell' Vllllllah (London: l!earst and Company.
2002).
Muslim countries, or Western converts to Islam. were solicited as native informants.x For
the most part, their audiences lie in the West, not in predominantly Muslim countries. and
their messages are articulated in Europcan languages, primarily English and French.
These intellectuals are tasked with the difticult mission of explaining thcjihadi.l'l. making
him just familiar enough to understand. but exotic enough to fascinate. while keeping a
distance from the analysis, ensuring that they in no way express admiration lor him. In
short. they play the role of "good" Muslims explaining the motifs ofthc "bad" Muslims.
Simultaneously, the "bad" Muslims have developed their own torms and discourses to
represent themselves. without the mediation of the native intormants. This leads to a
vastly heterogeneous discourse which both affirms and rejects dominant idcologies.
producing a multidimensional "Muslim" response.
The "good" Muslims have gained incredible value by having knowledge of both
the cultural capital of Islam. especially thejihadi.l'l. and the discoursc of First World
media and academia. It is useful here to recall Pierre Bourdieu'sdescriptionofcultural
capital in The Field oj'Cullural ProduClion. Hc argued that capital refers to objects.
artistic imagery. texts and music that have meaning and interest lor those who posscss the
code; religious capital. tor exampic. is specitic to the religious ficld and is associated with
specialists who guard the corpus ofknowledgc (9\). Orthodoxy and hcresy. tcrms openly
borrowed from the religious field. are deployed by Bourdieu to describc thc struggle lor
power within any field. It is the contention of this study that Islam can be viewed as a
field within which there is immense competition for both symbolic power and religious
capital. Field specialists, theologians, and other cultural interpreters define thc ficld and
the code of membership. Describing the codes of the field of Islam, which have ruptured
into popular culture, particularly the code of jihad, has been the role of a new-found
group of Muslim writers and intellectuals who are in competition with their increasingly
articulate radical counterparts, thejihadi.l'/.\'. This often problematizes thc conccpt of
Muslimness itself: with the "good" Muslims claiming orthodoxy to an Islam which has
been "highjacked" by hereticaljihadists. Thejihadi.\'/.\', on the other hand, dismiss the
"good" Muslims as heretical pawns that want to reform Islam to compatible with the
goals ofneo-liberal globalization.
It can be argued that in First World academic institutions and cultures the value of
Muslimness is high ifone is considered a "good" Muslim, but diminishes signilicantly if
the interlocutor takes an unpopular position on the right tojihad, in which case she is
quickly herded into the group of "bad" Muslims. The instability of this binary of"good"
and "bad" Muslims has been demonstrated by Mamdani in his discllssion on how the
Taliban and AI Qaeda were constructed and how the perception of ally and enemy shilied
rapidly in global politics. Muslim interlocutors are acutely aware of this binary and the
indiscriminate way they can be allocated to the latter group. Therefore, their
interventions ollen remain ambiguous, with an obsessive autobiographical drive to prove
both their authenticity as Muslims and their credentials as Western theorists. The
moderate interlocutor positions herselfas both familiar and exotic, in order to establish a
dual credibility in the West and in predominantly Muslim communities. While she
maintains credibility inthe West. and is perceived asa representative of Muslims. she is
olien unknown in predominantly Muslim countries. She also has to take particular care in
situating her political allegiances since "good" Muslim has come to mean "moderate" and
nco-liberal and "bad" Muslim has come to mean "radical" orjihadisl. Consider by
notable example the persecution of Swiss scholar Tariq Ramadan whose case became a
human rights issue when he was denied a visa by the United States government to lake up
a post at the University of Notre Dame. Ramadan was accused ofsupporling
fundamentalism because he recognized the legitimacy ofjihad as the right to light
oppression and social injustice. The international debate regarding Ramadan's case
became so heated that Ramadan wrote What I Believe, a book outlining his beliels
clearly. in order to avoid charges of doublespeak; that is, presenting one face to the West
and another to Islamic audiences. Documenting his work belore 9/11, Ramadan notes thal
because he has overtly positioned himselfas a Muslim. he has come under suspicion.
even though he is espousing the same ideas and conducting the same work he dicl
previously as a teacher with no obvious religion (What I Believe 210).
Thejihadists. on the other hand. with their spectacular aels of violence, clo nol
worry about ambiguity ancl clearly speak their messages to specilic audiences. Ilowever,
these messages arc continually mediated by others ancl even stripped of intentionality in
the process of being re-presented. In predominantly Muslim countries. their messages
resonate and seem clireet and obvious, even if they are olien rejected. while lor Western
theorists they remain the rantings of madmen speaking in an idiom that cannot be
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translated. Firmly located in the group of "bad" Muslims. thcji/wdist raises serious
queries regarding how he has been represented. playfully cngaging in bantering and cvcn
comedy to deconstruct his image as a manic medievalist. isolated from Western doctrinc.
In his compelling work Cilohali::.ed Islalll. the French scholar Olivicr Roy points out that
today'sjihadists have a lot in common with the leli-wing cxtrcmists of thc 1930s and
I960s. and are the sort of utopian rebels modern societics have long produced. Ilc argucs
that ideologically. Islamic nco-fundamentalism occupies the samc militant spacc lhat was
once occupied by Marxism. bUlthejihadists idcntify thcmsclvcs. not with the languagc
ofthc leti. but with the language offaith and religion. Roy argues that rathcr than
delerring to custom. the modern forms oI' jihad have no justilication in orthodox Islam
and. in lact. many ofthejihadists are rebels. going against local authority ligurcs.
rejecting their parents' bourgeois striving and moderatc vcrsions of Islam. Thcy havc also
dcmonstrated. particularly with thc2005 start-upofl\sSahab.thcal Qaedamcdia
production company. that they are eager and ablc to reprcscnt themsclves. As-Sahab
provides English translations lor AI-Qaeda's broadcasts and also prcscnts bilingual or
English productions. including thosc leaturing Adam Gadahn. thc Amcrican convcrt.
whosc interventions arc onen prefaccd by Zawhiri's Arabic comments (Dcvji Terrorist in
Search o/Hulllanity III). Such devclopments problcmalize onc of thc ccntral qucstions
upon which postcolonial criticism hasbcenccntercd-canthesubaltcrnspcak?
II
In her seminal essay,9Gayatri Spivak raised two points that are directly relevant
to this discussion. Spivak critiqued the efforts of the subaltern studies group, a project Icd
by Ranajit Guha that had reappropriated Gramsci's term "subaltern" (the economically
dispossessed) in order to locate and re-establish a "voice" of collective agency in
postcolonial India. Although Spivak acknowledged the violence done upon Indian
subalterns, she suggested that any attempt from the outside to ameliorate their condition
by granting them collective speech invariably would encounter both a logocentric
assumption of cultural solidarity among a heterogeneous pcoplc and a dcpcndcncc upon
Western intellectuals to "speak for" the subaltern condition rathcr than allowing thcm to
speak for themselves. As Spivak argued, by speaking out and reclaiming a collective
cultural identity, subalterns would re-inscribe their subordinate position in society. The
second point of interest in Spivak's article is thc discussion on the suicide ofa young
Bengali woman that indicated a failed attempt at self-representation. Because her attempt
at speaking outside normal patriarchal channels, through suicide, was not understood or
supported, Spivak concluded that the subaltern cannot speak. Spivak's point about the
burning widow is not that the subaltern does not cry out in various ways, but that she is
incapable of dialogue because she has been excluded from the political economy. She
posited the subaltern as a silent, unrepresentable excess outside the labor relations,
circulating instead in a discursive circuit in which "the figure of the woman disappears,"
according to Spivak, "into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the
'third-world woman' caught between tradition and modernization," and thus concluded
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..there is no space from which the sexed subaltcrncan speak" (307); "the subaltern cannot
speak" (308).
To begin with the first consideration, by means of simple extension, any attcmpt
to posit a Muslim discourse on the issues orjihad and its challenge to latc capitalist
configurations would be counterproductive, since the discourse would ultimately bccome
a group of intellectuals speaking on behalfofa disembodied and disgruntled Muslim
mass, which itself is heterogeneous and global. It would also run the risk either or
inadvertently supporting or including the voices ofthejihadisis themselves, the radical
discourses of the Islamists, or of completely leaving thcm out bccause their literature
itselfis deemed dangerous. 10 As Akeel Bigraimi has warned. moderate Muslims must
resist the absolutist tendencies of radical Muslim discourses which, though a product ora
certain history or subjugation and condescension, have not been ablc to move outside the
complexes of colonial victimization; yet, he also noted the limits or activities of
reformers, mostly First World intellectuals. who are dislocated from Islamic tcxts in
generating the discourse or resistance. The seemingly irresolvable truth is that the
discourse of First World Muslim interlocutors is not validated in predominantly Muslim
countries and the discourse of Islamist thinkers isnot heard in First World institutions.
Therefore. the conditions ror hearing do not exist. Thus. Muslim intellectuals have to
resist the absolutist collectivity orsubalternity, resist rundamentalist discourse and yet
reruse to be silent. Further, thejihadisl has to formulate his discourse inside First World
secular frameworks in order to be decipherable. At the same time, the ability or"good"
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Muslims to articulate a new discourse is severely limited by the lack or ramiliarity with
their own texts which serve as the core of this point ofarticulalion. The ability or the
"bad" Muslims to articulate a new discourse is also severely limited by their insistence on
Islamic terminologies and the elaboration of historical particularities that are not
understandable or taken seriously by the secular biased West. Therefore. both the "good"
Muslim and the "bad" Muslim are in a double bind.
The "good" Muslim cannot appear as ifshe is actively supporting thc radical
discourse of violence ofthejihadi.l'/.I'. so she must maintain a certain disengagement rram
them. or else risk becoming the target or Campus Watch. I I At the samc time. she must
assert her Muslimness as a real value, which requires a familiarity with radical theology
and theory. Balancing her need to maintain credibility in a First World intellectual
discourse and her need to claim credibility in a separate discourse that directly and
violcntly challenges her position, she vacillates as mediator, becoming neithcr one nor the
othcr, and reprcsenting nothing. The "bad" Muslim is doomed to play out violent acts or
transgression as her only way of being heard. Refusing thc sccular debate or nco-
liberalism, her words are thc ravings or a madwoman. Only hcr dcath and thc death or hel
victims leave an echo ofa message that remains indecipherable. The subaltcrn, Spivak's
victim or suttee who becomes reprcsentative of oppressed pcoples. clearly cannot spcak
and so her suicide is her only act of rebellion. which ends in the silcncing herself. Thc
casc ofthejihadi.l'l is different. As this study argues. thcjihadi.l'/.I' arc engaging in thc
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very discourse they are committing violence upon: directly addressing their victims.
while refusing to be victimized. They use spectacular media performances to display their
death, and they violently reassert lhat through their death. and the death of others. they
are inscribing a message. which they hope will convince the community of victims to join
them in their revolutionary, ifperhaps. anarchic, project. Unlikc Spivak's subaltern. the
iihadisls are in fact speaking, and are aware of the difficulty of having their message
heard. It would appear that thejihadisl. at least, is not a Spivakian subaltern.
But ifthejihadisl is speaking, is there anyone listening or, better yet, why can he not be
heard? It can be argued that just about everyone is trying to explain and speak for the
iihadist. despite the ability ofthejihadist to speak for himself. The question that has
dominated cultural studies "Can the Subaltern SpeakT'displaces the more pressing
questions: What are the historical, matcrial, and ideological conditions required lor
hearing?
In fact the theorization ofjihad and the appropriation or the figure ofthejihadisl.
offers a fertile area from which to launch a discussion about the limits of current theory.
particularly regarding the role of interlocutors in interpretation and the limits or
sccularism as the founding doctrine of postcolonial theory. The discourse surrounding
the "war on terror" is dense with possible quilting points which can be analyzcd further.
I\s Marc Redfield in The Rheloric oj"Terror notes.
Thcre is a strange density to the September II tragedy and the discoursc 01
on terror" that emerged in its wakc. So many over determined and overheated
areas of modern Western culturejostle like tectonic platesal the intersection: the
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power of simulacra, media imagery, aesthetic spectacle; the return of religion
piggybacking on an increasingly global if persistently unevcn distribution of
quasi-sovereign powcr, the proliferation of ambiguous war zones, and the
emergence orthe charged, abjected figure of the .. terrorist" in the U.S. dominated
late twentieth century world order, (2)
This "abjected figure orthe terrorist" which has emerged to "haunt' neoliberal Westl.:rn
society, to use a Derridean term originally employed to discuss the specieI' of
communism, reeds on an intense fear for one's personal and is generated from a
""fundamental dependency on anonymous others" (BUller, Precarious Lil'e.I" 46). i\
hunger to know those anonymous others, to theorize their intentions and perhaps eVl.:n to
humanize them and make them visible makes the value of Muslim int relocutersevl.:n
more critical.
Arguably one of the most useful contributions to naming and describing thl.: ligurl.:
of the terrorist has been generated by Georgio Agamben, with his discussion of the
concept orthe Homo Sacer. which has provoked considerable response in critical circles
Agamben argues that under the spectacle orterrorism a new kind of authoritarian is111 is
created; citizens willingly give up hard earned civil liberties in order to be protected from
the {{Oil/() Sacer-the sovereign-less terrorist, who is seen as less than human, a holdl.:r of
"bare life," who can be killed without consequence. In Beyond the Specwc!e oj
Terrorism: (j/oha/ Uncertainty and the ('ha//enge o(the Nell' Media. Ilcnry Giroux
agrees with Agamben that the lear of the {-{omo Sacer has resulted in the privatization of
institutions (or the public good and that as a result the functions orthe state have shilkd,
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leading to a withdrawal into private space in Western society. lie also adds to
Agamben's formulation. noting that thejihadists situate the body as both an objcct of
torture (beheading videos) and site of resistance (suicide bombers) (55). While they are
the object of indiscriminate killing. they are also the perpetrators. Kellner elaborates that
the process of dehumanization. necessary to sustain thc threat of the HOII/o Sacer. occurs
on both sides of the war on terror:
The terrorist crimes of September Illh appearcd to be part of this Jihad. and show
the horrific consequcnces of totally dehumanizing an "enemy" as so evil that even
innocent membcrsofthc group in question deserve to be exterminated. (Media
Speclacle and the Crisis o/Democracy 33)
Evcn though bin Laden may have been dehumanized for thc Wcst. and even though he
dchumanized the West in turn. Kcllner astutely observes that "bin Laden has become a
"revolutionary myth:' looked upon with awe by millions throughout the world (39).
Slavoj Zizek also makes a controversial contribution to this dcbate about the
11011/0 .'lacer by accusing theorists. such as Giroux. Kellner. and Butler. of emptying
Agamben of his radicalness in order 10 appropriate thc figure of the HOII/o .(.,'acer lor the
goals ofa more inclusionary radical democracy. Like Kellner and Giroux. Zizek notes
that though the Homo Sacer is the man over whom all men are sovereign and can be
killed without consequcncc. he can also declare a war that is spectral in nature-
therclore. making him an "cnemy outlaw" or the "double of American style sovereignty"
(We/come to the Desert olthe Rea/G5). lie adds. however. that it is essential to
supplement the concept of the stateless HO!l1o Sacer with thc knowledge that he is also
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the recipient of humanitarian aid. since the dehumanized 1101/10 Sacer is both the object
of the West's torture and pity. To make this point Zizek draws attention to the fact that
both bombs and food baskets were being dropped on Afghanistan at the same time.
making the HOl/1o Sacer at once a "privileged object of humanitarian biopolitics"
(Welcome to the Desert olthe Real 91) and a terrorist. Therelore. Zizek argues.
There is no place in Agamben for the "democratic" project 'renegotiating' the
limit which separates full citizens from Homo Sacer by gradually allowing their
voice to be heard; his point is rather that in today"s 'post-politics' the very
democratic public space is a mask concealing the fact lhat. ultimately. we arc all
1-lon1o Sacer. (Welcome to the Desert oFthe Real 100)
As this rather brief review indicates. the figure of thejihadist as Ilo/l/() Saccr has
been employed by First World theorists as a tool to engage in selfrelleclion on the state
of the democratic project in Western countries. All theorists mentioned steer away from
noting the religious nature of thejihadists' intentions and refer to him as .. terrorist"· rather
thanjilwdist. robbing him of the particularity of his position and refusing to name him by
the name he assigns to himself. Second. they do not ground thejihadists' stance as a
response 10 the particularities of his own oppression (with the exception ofZizek). and all
present him as a reactionary figure without a clear political agenda. There is virtually no
discussion what jihad might contribute to the envisioning of future global democratic
projects. except as a means to rellect to the West its own inconsistencies and injustices.
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It is useful here to recall Maxime Rodinson's much earlier postulation ofthc tcrm
Humu Is/amicl/s which specifies the Islamic nature of Homo Sacer much more
transparently than contemporary theorizations:
The Oriental may always have been characterized as a savage enemy. but during
the Middle Ages. he was at least considered on thc samc level as his European
counterpart. And. to the men of the Enlightenment. the ideologucs ofthc frcnch
Revolution. the Oriental was. for all his foreignncss in appcarance and drcss.
above all a man like anyone else. In the nineteenth ccnlury. howevcr. hc bccamc
something quite separate. sealed offin hisownspeeitieity.yct worthyofa kindof
grudging admiration. This is the notion of the Ho/l'lo Is/amicl/s. a notion widcly
accepted even today. (60)
In tact. the theory of Homo Sacer. as a means of engaging with thejihadisl. empticsjilwd
of its own rich theoretical position. thereby employing an old Orientalist turn of using thc
Orient to serve as a mirror of the Occident. II' the Homo .'lacer is an object of both lCar
and pity. the Homo Is/amicl/s is often the object of both violent oversimplication and a
"grudging admiration" tor nostalgic utopian project. The tigurc of Homo /s/amiclls
allows for a more equal dialogue with a full recognition ofthejihadisl as not men:ly an
image in the Western mirror to allow reflection on the failed democratic project. but as a
tigure with his own rich tradition of resistance and diversc oppositional discourscs. I\s
Mufti argues when discussing the lack ofcontrapunlality in cultural studies
... it can be granted thaI "they" have literatures and other modes of cultural
expression that are worthy of consideration. but only "wc" have lheory. the
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inclination to think in abstract and conceptual terms about language, culture and
the world and about the conditions of possibility of such knowledge itself. (123)
Therefore throughout this study the term Homo 1.I'IamicllS is used to reter to the sign of
thejihadi.l'/ and the category of"bad" Muslim "sealed offin his own specificity".
It is impossible to deny the startling fact that while the figure ofthejihwfi.l'/ is
being theorized, the reality of suicide bombing and anti-Muslim policies is also
growing. '2 While the theorization of the "war on terror" has been continuing for ovcr a
decade now, and despite hopes that the "Arab Spring" may decrease the signilieanee of
thejihadis/. both "suicide bombings" and attacks on Muslim populations have increased
dramatically. For example, despite all the inter-religious dialogues and the selfretlection
of European theorists. Muslims represent a disproportionate percentage of prisoners
throughout Europe, providing conditions for even further radicalization. Ilundreds of
thousands of people across the world are still suffering from the el'lects of real eontlict in
Iraq and Afgahnistan. It can be argued that this condition demonstrates a deep dislocation
between First World theory and reality, and that as this dislocation grows the gap of
""Suicidebombers"conducted658attacksaroundtheworld in 2008, including 542 in U.S
occupied Afghanistan and Iraq--more than double the number in anyofthepast 25 years. 01'1.840
incidents in the past 25 years. more than 86 percent haveoccurred since200t. and the highest annual
numbers have occurred since 2004. (See Robin Wright. "Since 2001. A Dramatic Increase in Suicick
Bombing." Washington Post. 18 April 2008. Web. 15 October 2009.< http://www.washingtonpost
com/wp-yn/content/article/2008/04/17/AR2008041703595.html». Meanwhile. the United Nations
Commissioner for Refugees (UNI-ICR) estimates that between 40.000 and 50.000 more Iraqis arc being
displaced every week and the United Nations mission in Afghanistan recorded about 1.500civiliandcaths
in the lirstsixmonthsof2009.a24 percent increase over the previousyearandarecordintheeight-year-
old war. (See Bill Van Auken. "The US War and Occupation in Iraq- the Murder ofa Society." thc World
Socialist Wchsitc. Web. 12 October 2008. < http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/may2007/iraq-
mI9.shtml».ln Europe.welloverhalfthetotalofthosearrestedonterrorisl11charges in 2007 were
Muslims. Muslims make up only about 12percentofFrance'spopulation~butaccountforli'om60to70
percent of all inl11ates in thecountry'sprisons.(See Neslllox.cUIII. 28 April 2008. Web. 10 Novclllber2009
<http://newsmax.com/lnsideCover/French-Prisons-muslil11s/2008/04/29/id/32355 I»
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interlocution grows wider. This thesis will attempt to explore how we can set conditions
for listening to diverse Muslim voices. including the HOl/1o Isla/lliclIs. through a call lor
"democratic criticism".
In his widely influential works Clllillre and Imperialis/II and HIII/wlli.\·/ll (Iml
De/llocralic Crilicisl/1. Said made an impassioned plea for a contrapuntal approach to
reading the world and understanding the "worldliness" of texts. Claiming that "we
cannot deal with the literature of the peripheries without also attending to the literature of
the metropolitan centers." Said also argued for reading across disciplines. connecting
texts and societies. while not perceiving texts as mere reflections of historical events
«('lIlll1re and Imperialism 318). Instead. Said offered a global and comparative approach
to understanding texts, placing texts of diverse forms and cultures into a common lield.
and. in other words. appreciating the genealogy of texts. This approach requires a
capacity to read various texts alongside each other. outside their traditional disciplinary
fields. in order to contextualize their "worldliness":
But this global. contrapuntal analysis should be modeled not (as earlier notions of
comparative literature were) on a symphony but rather on an atonal ensemble; we
must take into account all sorts of spatial or geographical and rhetorical practices
- inflections. limits. constraints. intrusions. inclusions. prohibitions-all of them
tending to elucidate a complex and uneven topography. (Culillre and I/Ilperialis/ll
318)
Therefore. any study orthe ligure oflhejihadisl in theory and literature must necessarily
dcry the boundaries oftradilional disciplinary or nalionallitcrature studics. First.
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globalization and terrorism studies, which cross the boundaries of humani tics. literalUrc
and lilm. much the way that cultural studies have donc. all engage with study of the
jihue/isl and therefore necessitatcs a cross disciplinary responsc. Second. thcjihadisl is a
global figure, not tied to any country or particular geographical spherc. and as such any
study ofthejihadisl dcfics the approach of traditional area studies. either in literalure or
theory. Third. since the figure ofthejihae/isl has deeply permcated popular culture ancl
literature. as well as political. postcolonial and radical theory. an attempt to ditkrentiate
betwcen "high" and "'low" culture or adhere to thc limit of gcnre studies would not allow
lor a thorough analysis of how cultural hegemony reproduces acadcmic thcorization in
popular cultural configurations ofthejihadisl. Finally. this thesis encourages a dialogic
relationship bctween the works of Muslim and non-Muslim writers in order to cxplorc
fully thc positionality of Muslim interlocutors in the debate on the ligure ofthe/illl/disl.
In claborating on Said's concept of contrapuntality. Aamir Mufti calls for a
"comparativism yet to come" (115). an "opening up ancl crossing ovcr" (I 14) of texts
from different cultures and timc periods as a way to elaborate thc complcxity of
conccpts-in short. a dcconstruction of cultural autonomy. lie lucidly argues.
We comc to undcrstand that socicties on either side of the imperial divide now
live dceply imbricatcd lives that cannot bc undcrstoocl without reference to each
other. It begins to cncode a comparalivism as of yet to come. a global
comparativism that is a determinatc and conerctc response to the hicrarchical
systems that havc dominatcd cultural life sincc the colonial cra. (115)
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Following Said's ambitious example. my thesis situates texts of"eulturaltheory.
sociology. philosophy, and fiction alongside each other. along with lilms, videos, and
political treatises and speeches. It also places works f"romthe peripheries. I"rom diverse
Muslim writers, in dialogue with each other and with thosc ol"notcd First World theorists.
As such this thesis crosses disciplines, genres, and "high" and "low" culture to ol"tCr a
contrapuntal reading of" the figure of" thejihadisl.
This thesis argues that a reassessment ol"the secular bias in theory is required to
hear the voices 01" the Muslims speaking in indigenous vocabularies 01" l~lith. Sven
Uilticken, in "Monotheism and the New Image Wars:' asks can religion I"unction as a
critique. Can it be anything other than criticism of"other religions (52)? Certainly. the
marked theological turn in theory. as evident in the works of" Terry Eagleton and Slavoj
7.izek, demonstrates a resuscitation of" religious concepts in opposition to purely secular
interpretation. The works of"Muslim leltists such as Tariq Ramadan. Anouar Majid and
Ziaddiun Sardar also attempt to insert Islamic concepts into the I"ormulation 01" I"uture
theory. The various voices of" the Arab Spring and the articulations 01" Islamisl parties
that have long becn silenced will no doubt ofkr new vigor to thc debate. For certain. any
discussion on post- secular criticism neccssarily begins with thc seminal work 01" Edward
Said. Chapter One argues that though Said is eonsidcred as one ol"the major lorbean:rs
01" postcolonial theory. and although he based his work on a casc study ol"the Arab world.
he largely left Islam out of" his lormulation of" colonial and postcolonial representation.
Morc to the point. Said's secular humanism and the decisive role he allotted to the secular
intcllcctual have greatly affected thc reception of" works in the West by Muslim writers
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and established a kind of secular humanist criteria for evaluating their contributions.
Thus, whilc the ccnter was displaced and populated with traditions from other cultures
and traditions, such as Africa and the Indian subcontinent Islam remained outside the
new paradigm.
If Said's work leli Islam out as I show, then the recent debates on globalization
have reinserted Islam as a metaphorical site of resistance to globalization. Chapter Two
specifically focuses on the various forms of Oriental isms, from the neoconservatives and
the leli. that have arisen post-9I11 and the role or Muslims. either advertently or
inadvertently. in supporting these Oriental isms as the cultural logic for the militarization
of Muslim countries. There has also been a concerted effort to reconstruct the binaries
of Islam and the West using the evenls 01'9/11 as evidence of this ancient antagonistic
relationship, most notably in the works or Bernard Lewis and Samuel Iluntington. as wdl
as a nco Orientalisttendency to celebrate the excess of violence in Islam as a
transformative revolutionary energy by writers such as .lean Baudrillard and Slavoj Ziz.ek.
In the dcbatc as to whether Islam and the West are compatible or not Muslim
interlocutors demonstrate a fervent need to synthesize, condense and decipher Islam lor a
panicked and befuddled audience. Explanations ol"jihad by popular. but diverse. Muslim
cultural critics, such as Irshad Manji. and writers of fiction. such as Azar alisi. Khalid
Ilosseini. and Yasmina Khadra. are discussed and compared, particularly illuminating
how their worksjustiry the increased militarization or Muslim lands.
The similarity between neo-Orientalist and liberal and various theories from the
new leli is startling and, thus, Chapter Three further explores how the concept oljilwd
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migrates or .. travels" in theory to fit both the discourses of reform and revolution.
Chapter Three compares the works of liberal reformists such as John Esposito, Oliver
Roy and Imam Feisal Abdu Raufas well as those of well-known radical thinkers. such as
Slavoj Zizek and Terry Eagleton, to Islamic reformers, such as Ziaddiun Sardar. Anouar
Majid. and Tariq Ramadan. The travelling of the theory of jihad to iililwd marks a
continuum as to how one is measured as a "good" or "bad" Muslim in this hyperscnsitive
political debate. Further, this chapter argues that the debate abouljilwd is deeply related
to issues of statehood. citizenship and postcoloniality, as well as to the resurgencc ora
theological turn in contemporary theory that asserts the role of the nonsecular in
transforming global capitalism.
Chapters Four and Fivc cxtend the argumcnts of the second and third chapters by
explicitly examining the intentionality ofjihad as rcpresented in contemporaryjilwdisl
studies and acclaimed and widely read fiction by Muslim writers. Employing a
contrapuntal approach that includes fiction and critical analysis by Muslim and non-
Muslim writers. the chapter explores various attempts to construct and deconstruct an
intentionality lor thejihadisl, ranging from religious to secular motives. I compare
fictional representations of thejihadis/to biographical reconstructions of famousjilwdisis
as interpreted by various sociologists and historians. The fictional intentions or successful
and failedjihadisis are explored in novels as diverse as John Updike's Terrorisi. Don
DeLillo's Falling Man. Slimane l3ena"issa's The Lasl Nighl II/Damned SII/I!. Mohsin
Ilamid's The Rel/lclanl F/lndamenlalisi. and Orhan Pamuk's Snll\l'. The chapter
concludes that while there are marked differences between portrayals by Muslim and non
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Muslim writers, numerous intentions. that reproduce popular knowledge of jihadisis
prevalent in sociological and psychological analysis, is reproduced in thc popular terrorist
novel.
Chapter Five examines the intentionality of thejihadisl li'om her own
perspective. comparing these articulations to interpretations of noled intellectuals such as
Henry Giroux and Faisal Devji. I argue that thejihadisl maintains both a perlormative
and political stance by establishing a relationship between thejihadisl and a community
orresponsible victims. and I question the various postmodernist intcrpretations that the
jihad is a "new" kind of terrorism. mainly perrormative and not political. This chaplcr
examines the direct interventions by infamousjihadisis. such as Osama bin Ladcn. Adam
Gadhan, Mohammed Siddique Khan, and Shehzad Tanweer, raising questions about the
dialogic relationship between lhejihadisl and his audience and the media.
The concluding chapter attempts to theorize how discussions abouljihad can
contribute to contemporary theory, particularly to postcolonial studies, and it positions
the concept of jihad itself within the postcolonial tradition. It reasscrtsjihai! into this
tradition by accentuating howjihad presents a challengc to the secular bias of
contemporary criticism and how discussion of"good" and "bad" Muslims undermincs
some of the underlying assumptions upon which postcolonial theory is based. espccially
regarding the subaltern and mediation. It also highlights that jihad raises dircct qucstions
as to the role of violence in radical theory as an instrument lor socio-political
transformation. concluding lhat by reclaiming the roots of contemporary jihad thcory as a
part or a postcolonial tradition.jihad can make a valuable contribution to the futurc of
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thcory. which includes Islamic discourse in a serious debate on postcolonial ism and
radical change.
The multiplicity of voices li'OI11 Muslim cultural critics and writers of liction that
populate thc pagcs of this study require some qualification. What cxactly do we mean by
Muslim writers? In this study. Muslim fiction docs nol rcfcr to religious liction. Instead.
I use the term Muslim to mcan practicing Muslims. or those born into Islam by birth. or
those who have converted to it by choice. and it covers a widc range of allegiance to
Islam as a faith. fi'om practicing Muslims to atheist Muslims. To this cxtent. I adopt the
criteria which Amin Malak outlincs in Muslim Narralives and Ihe Discourse.I' oj'Eng/is/i:
Accordingly for the flexible purpose of our discussion here. the term
Muslim narratives suggests the world produced by the pcrson who
believes firmly in the faith of Islam; and/or via an inclusivist extension.
by the person who voluntarily and knowingly refers to herselL lor
whatever motives. as a "Muslim" whcn given a sclection of identarian
choices; and/or yet another generous cxtcnsion by the pcrson who is
rooted formatively and emotionally in the culturc and civilization of
Islam. (7)
Similarly. the termjihad is not discussed as a theological concept. but as a
cultural configuration that is being circulated in an endless semiotic circuitry in the "war
on terror". On occasionjihad is relerrcd to as a "quilting point" in relCrenee to Laean's
concept of "point de capiton". an illusionary stablc signilier that holds together numerous
unstable signiliers (Bowie 74). Lacan's buttons. drawn from thc imagcry of upholstery
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buttons that hold fabric together. are unstable signifiers ( butlons can rail oft). but at the
same time they present the illusion orstability (they hold rabric together and prevent it
li'Dln moving about). Likewisejihad. as I have previously discussed in this introduction.
has had a historically unstable meaning. while at the same time. it has bccomc anehorcd
to signifying violence in the discourse on the "war on terror". In this thesisjilwd is
viewed as a quilting point from which one may query how a radical reimaging or the
ruture might look in a postcolonial world. Further. the emphasis in this thesis is on al
jihad al asghar ( the lesser jihad). rather than aljihad a/ akhar (the greater jihad).
because it is with its contentious claim or the right or violent resistance to oppression that
a/jihad al asghar challenges radical theory. particularly postcolonial theory. to examine
its anti-imperialist roots. I argue that eonsideringjihad as a cultural conliguration invites
cxploration as to how the "war on terror" has raised issues or urgent importance to
intclleetuals- particularly issues on representation and interpretation and the role or
violence in socio-politicaltransformation.
Because the subject of this dissertation is largely representation and the role or
diverse Muslims in rcpresenting thc varied manifestations oljilllld. it is only 1~lir that I
position my own subjectivity in this debate. Though my name docs not indicate it. I can
litmyselfinlo Malak's categorization of Muslim as one "who is rooled emotionally in thc
culture and civilization or Islam" and consider mysclrpan ora community thai sccs ncw
valuc in what faith-based belier systems. can olTer a radical eritiquc or global capitalism.
At the samc time. I am filiativcly and alliliatively bound to my Irish Catholic upbringing
in an exiled island community ofTthc coast or Canada which arguably. crcatcd its own
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tenuous identity on an imaginary Irishness. No doubt. the views I express in this th..:sis
are strongly affected by all of these identities. perhaps even more so than the intellectuals
to whom this work refers.
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Chapter One
Leaving Islam Out: The Legacy of Edward Said's Sccular Cosmopolitanism
The seminal work of Edward Said had a dramatic cneet on the evolution of
postcolonial theory and the tield of Oriental ism. Though a sustained critiquc of
Oriental ism. from the cultural and political cconomy point ofvicw. was alrcady well
underway. particularly as cvidenced in the works of Brian Turner. Anouar Abdcl Malck.
and A.L. Tibawi. it was Said's 1978 Orienla!ism that reinvcntcd the debate andmadc it a
subject of public diseoursc. Zachary Lockman rightly notes that Oriel7/{{!islll signilicanlly
influenecd the future of Orienta list and area studies, particularly Middlc Eastern Studies.
resulting in an entirc gcneration ofncw Orientalists who deconstructed colonial discoursc
on the Orient and produced numerous case studies validating Said's thesis. I Ilc also
contends that Orienta/ism gave birth to the field of postcolonial studies. particularly by
shifting the pre-Saidian emphasis on political economy to the issue ofreprcsentation
(210). In a posthumous tribute to Said. the giants of postcolonial theory. Ilomi Bhabha
and Gayatri Spivak. both writc about the enect of Said on the lield ofposteolonialism
and on their own developmcnl. 2 Though Said onen dcmonstrated impaticncc with the
I Examples include Carol A.Breckenbridge.and PetervallderVecr.Oriell/alisllllllldfile
!'os/coioniall'rediwlllellf: l'erspeGfi"esollSoulhAsia (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
1993). which applies Said's theory to South Asian societies; Rana Kabbani. IlIIperilll Ficliol/S: EU/'(}IW's
AiI'lils ojDrie/1/ (London: Pandora. 1988): Reina Lewis. Cielldering Oriell/ulislll: Rllce. Felllillilli/I' alld
RepreSell/llliOIl (London: Routledge. 1996) and Meyda Yegenoglu. ('olollial Fiulfllsies: TOIl'ard, a
Felllillis/ Reading o/Orientalism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP). 1998. Kabbani. Lcwis and Ycgclloglu all
olTer Icmillist cOlltributions to thc debate.
, Ilomi Bhabha. "l\dagio."Edll·ard Said: CO/llillaill? II,e ('o",·ersa/ioll. cd. Ilomi Bhabha and
W.J.T Mitchell. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005).7-16. Gayatri Spivak. "Thinking AbOlli
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obtuse language of postcolonial theory. his work on representation. particularly the role
of the intellectual in taking oppositional stances. became a foundation for theorization on
the postcolonial subject and the complexitics laced by Third World intellectuals in
representing peripheral communities. In lact. Orienta/ism articulated questions thal had
an impact far beyond the study of the Orient itselfand even jar beyond literary and
postcolonial studies. Said's questions, even more so than those of his contemporaries and
prcdeccssors. raised epistemological concerns about the issuc of cssencc and. hcncc.
about the entire humanist tradition, the nature of representation and anthropological
research, and the institutional functions of the intellectual and theory. His stubborn
probing into the relationship between imperialism and culture has had a profound impact
on current studies on the relationship between spectacle and politics as demonstrated in
the works of Giroux and Kellner. His insistence on the relationship between academic
institutions, hegemony. and intellectual integrity has inspired theorizations on lhc
usefulness of theory by Eagleton and Butler.
Said always insisted that theory could not be separated from practice, as was
evidenced in his own involvement with the Palestinian cause about which he wrote :.IIld
was actively involved. The Palestinian issuc lor Said was foundational as a case study in
fonnulating his theories of power as well as developing his theories on thc role of the
intellectual and the insistence on a secular criticism. As lIan Pappe notes.
Once you read Said's writing specilically on Palestine. you realize thal his
theoretical deconstruction of power bases of knowledge and exposure of the more
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sinister interests behind Western knowledge production on the Orient would havc
lacked impetus and zeal had they not been motivated by his strugglc lor thc
Palestinian cause. (84)
Certainly, Said's legacy is colossal. Especially since 9/11, when the relationship betwecn
Islam and the West was radically inserted into the historical moment, the general public
and intellectuals alike have been struggling to understand the emergence or"radieal"
Islam. the challenge of jihad, the nature of Muslimness in a global world, and thc
mediating role or Muslim intellectuals. The questions Said articulated over a quartcr or a
century ago have been given a new urgency. Who are Ihey and who are liS? What delines
Ihem and liS? What do Ihey want? How can Ihey be understood? Who has the authority
to interpret Ihem? Who is the mediator between thejihadisl.\· and liS? Is mcdiation
possible? Or, simply put. why do Ihey hate IIs?J In fact, a massivc new culture industry
has cmerged to answer these questions: from the neo-Orientalists, such as Bernard Lewis
and Thomas Freidman, to the terrorist and globalization studies or Samucl Iluntington. to
the postmodernist interpretations of .lean Baudrillard, and the leftist spcculationsor
Slavoj Zizek. While area specialists, like John Esposito, have gained celebrity status.
other scholars (or even those not so scholarly), with roots in Islam, have becn catapultcd
into stardom. Numerous Muslim "intellectuals" of various ideologics havc come lorward
to explain Islam to bewildered audiences. The question as to who speaks lor Islam has
'ZiauddinSardarandMerryl WynDavicstakeupthisquestionarticulatedolicnbyPrcsidcnt
Bush. various politicians and commentators in their book Whl' Do People HOle Allleriw (Cambridgc. UK
Icon Books. 2002)
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become so pressing, that conferences are arranged internationally and annually to
consider this very question 4
Arguably, the public debate around Islam and Islamism has seen the reassert ion of
old Orientalist doctrines that had been displaced by the disputes following Said's
Orienla/ism. However, it would be foolhardy to assume that Said's work, and the
offspring of the schools of thought that were engendered from it. arc having lillie impact
on public and academic discourse, which has. instead. reverted to old Orientalist models
to describe the current crisis. For example, the discussions about "reforming" Islam
presume a secular religious binary which is not only present, but forms the central
metaphor of all of Said's work, up to the latest works belore his death. The perceived
bailie between progressive secularism and backward Islam, the debate on the role of
"good" and "bad" Muslims, and the role of Muslim reformers, is rooted in Said's work
on the role of the secular intellectual. The disdain {or Islamic political radicalism and
iihad is evident in many of Said's interviews and overtly political texts. The positing ofa
multicultural solution to the issue of Muslimness, especially in Europe, is also
loreshadowed in Said's work on the cosmopolitan intellectual and the role of exiles in a
global world. In this chapter, I argue that the very shape of the current debate exists
because of the framework already staged for this newly formed discourse, a displaced
Oriental ism that became rooted in posteolonialism, contained within the work of Said
I The government of Malaysia has organized two conferences on IVIIO Speaks/ill" Islalll. WIIO
Speaks/i,!" the Wesl since 2002; the United Nations organized a Iligh Level Group with the support of the
governments of Spain and Turkey. procluced reports and establishedaspeeialseeretariat intheSccrctary
Gcneral's ofliee to explore the issue. offered programming and hosted dialogues; the governmcnts of
Canada and Britain have working groups to advise on Muslim relations; and nlllllcrous Middle Eastern
stalcs have hosted eonferencesand inter faith dialogues which addrcssthcscveryissucs
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himsclf. By a close reading ofsevcral of Said's works, this chapter argues that thc legacy
of Said's secular humanism and cosmopolitanism formed the framcwork lor both how
Islam is studied in a post-Orientalist world and the development of postcolonial thcory's
engagement. or lack of engagement, with Islam-particularly wherc Islam offers a
radical critiquc to power-jihad. Said is the cntry point through which wc can clarify
how the limits of his complex, and olien ambiguous. secular humanism have restrained
radical critiquc from truly engaging with Islam.
Said's olten contradictory cngagement with the humanist tradition has been the
subject of much discussion and debatc. particularly on OrienlU!islIl. Aiijaz Ahmad's
most useful observation is that Said places representation over alllorms of human
activitics and never really answers why representation must interiorize the Other. Is it the
rcsultofimperialism? Ahmad asks if this represcntationofOrientalism is representation
in the postmodernist sense. having no connection with thc rca I Oricnt. or is it willful
misrepresentation produced in the West in the pursuit ofpowcr (In Thellr\" 292). Ik
notes that a theory of intentionality was not developed in Said's work because from a
discursive point of view rcpresentation is regulated by the power of diseoursc. and so
rcprcscntation docs not correspond to an external truth. subjcctivity. or a purpose, but
only to the regularity of discourse itsclf. Likcwise. .lohn M. MacKenzie questions Said's
binarics of East and West as he extrapolates the issue of intentionality. Using cx.amples
from arts. architccture, design, music and theatre. MacKenzie concludes that Said was
incorrect to posit the West as a closed world immune to thc inlluenee of the Other. ancl,
in 1~ICt. it is virtually impossible to differentiate between what is Sclfand Othcr. since
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both are locked in a process of mutual modi Ii cation. He adds that this proccss of
heterogcncity and instability is highly related to market forces:
Ever since oriental carpets. ceramics and fabrics had bcgun to arrivc in Europc
(and indeed earlicr in othcr parts of Asia) thc nced orthc markct had produced
their inevitable modi fications. The interaction of Europcan tastc. dcmand. markct
forces and commodity production had operated through a proccss of natural
selection to crcate an appropriate cast. Producer and consumcr wcrc wholly
complicit in this process. (328)
lIe also notes that the Eastern arts are olien embraced by artists. dcsigncrs. and musicians
who are unsympathetic to dominant political ideologies and that a fascination with
Oriental ism is as likely to be oppositional as conscnsual in relation to thc cstablishcd
power structure. .lames Clifford has written about Said's ambiguous rclationship with
Foucault and the humanist tradition. applying discoursc analysis and inscrting authorial
signaturcs when useful. To Clifford. this practicc dcstabilized Said's methodological
approach.
Thcse thrcecritical points have been bricfly mcntioncd toarguc that thc issuc of
methodology and intentionality bccomc critical whcnunderstanding thc thrust ofSaicrs
arguments and. indeed, the Icgacy hc left for area studies and postcolonial ism. Thc
argumcnt herc is that secular humanist methodology and a vaguc. olicn lacking. theory of
intcntionality had a significant impact on thc rcpresentation of Islam and 1/1111111 Islwlliclis
in Said's works and in subsequent inclusions/exclusions in postcolonialist and
globalization studies.
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In this regard. we can position Said as both a "founder of discursivity" and an
"enuneiative modality" in a Foucauldian sense. Foucault was interested in the role of the
author in reproducing discourse and used the tcrm "enunciative modality" to reprcseIll the
various subject positions one can occupy when speaking (The Archae%g." o{/\I1II11'/edge
5-1-55). Said, though he offcrcd a sustained critique of humanism. was also an avid
supporter of the bases of the secular humanist tradition. and so he occupied various
subjcct positions. His final work. /-IlI/l/anism and Democratic Criticism. attempted to
clarify his multiple positions as an "enunciative modality" whose critique is from inside
humanist discourse. Foucault's notion of the "founders of discursivity" recognized that
authors are both produced by and produce knowledge. spcaking within the archives of
their times. but also reshaping these archives to produce new possibilities for discourse.
Foucault drew heavily on the examples of Marx and Freud (The FO/lca/l/t Reader 116).
Said was produced within the humanist tradition and in turn produced knowledge which
led to the growth of the field of postcolonial ism. which critiques humanism.
Ilowever. it is important to note that as a founder of discoursc Said cannot he held
responsible for the direction which postcolonial discourse took. As W.T..I. Mitchell notes.
Said was "endlessly chastising his would- be followers and younger colleagucs lor being
slaves of fashion and for writing barbarous. jargon-ridden prose (5). Mitchell elahorates.
For me. the characteristic gesture of both his cullUral and political writing (which
despite his claim to lead "two lives," always seemed to me all ofa piece) was the
lUrn li'omthe straight. predictable path. the reversal oflield. the interrupted
itinerary. So that. having by many accounts founded the entire lield of what is
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called postcolonial studies, he immediately set about to critique it. to qucstion its
emergent complacencies and received ideas. (3)
As Spivak succinctly puts it, "I think he often though I was a fool, to be so persuaded by
theory" ("'Pages from a Memoir" 161). It can be argued that postcolonial studies migrated
from its home outside centers of power in resistancc to colonialism to a new home inside
centers of power, separated from indigenous lraditionsofaclivism. such as, but not
limitcd to, Islam. This can be illuminated more clearly when one considers how two of
Said's central ideas. secular criticism and the role of the secular critic in radical critique.
form the very foundation of the contemporary debate about the Islamic contribution to
radicalism, the nature of its representation, and the position of the Muslim intellectual in
the contemporary socio-politicalmarket place.
To begin, it is revealing to note the theorists that Said leli out of his contrapuntal
discourse. When he wrote Orientalism, Said simply did not recognize the rich body of
work already underway by various Arab and Muslim writers. A.L. Tibawi. S.II. Alatas.
Anouar Abdel Malek. and Abdallah Laroui had all made valuable contributions to the
assault on Orientalism. What appears unusual is that Said made either no or merely
passing reference to this tradition in Orienta/ism. This curious fact opens the door to an
inquiry as to why Said did not engage himselfwith the already existing anticolonialist
critique which broadly fell into two camps: either leftist or Marxist criticism from a
political economy point of view. or Islamic scholarship. It appears Said kit equally
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uncomfortable in both camps'> The issue as to the intentionality of Oriental ism lor the
Marxist camp was quite elear-ideologieal"covering" of reality to sustain the aims of
capitalism. For faith-based Islamic scholarship. the intentions ofthc Orientalists wcre to
discredit the "real" Islam and replace it with a deformed version of Christianity.
secularized and reformed. Said could accept neither. He rcmained unsure ahout the
existence ofa "rea'" Orient or a "real" Islam. and concerned himselfwith how the Orient
and Islam were represented. This is especially evident if we look at the intersections of
Said's work with that of two of his Arab contemporaries whom he ignored: Ahdel
Malek's "Oriental ism in Crisis" and Tibawi's "English-.)/Jeaking Orientalisis "
Anouar Abdel Malek. an Egyptian who studied Sociology at the Sorhonne and
taught at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. situated his work in the leftist
tradition of Third World resistance literature. lie argued that aner the Second World
War. the resurgences of African, Asian and Latin American national liberation
movcments made a new understanding of the Orient necessary. The intention of
Oriental ism for Abdel Malek was clear; in fact. there was a transparent relationship of
missionaries. university dons and military men "whose only objective was to garner
intelligcnce in the area to be occupied, to penetrate the consciousncss of the people in
ordcr to better assure its enslavement to European powers" (49). nlike Ahdel Malek.
Said was much more conscious about drawing a direct line of intentionality: fiJI' him.
'ForrllllcrdisclissiononSaid'slackorengagcmcntll'ithMarxismrcICrlo Ilarry IlarOOllInian.
"ConjeclliraITraces: Said's Inventory'" Edll'ordSaid: ('olllill//illg lite ('Oll\·er.l'olioll. ed.llorni I3habhaand
W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: The University orChicago Prcss. 2005) 68-79: and Tirnothy Brennan.
"Resollilion'" Edll'ard Said: ('Olllil7//ill)!, lite ('lIIl1'ersalioll. ed. I-Iorni Bhabha and W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago
The UniversityorChicagoPress,2005)43-55
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Oriental ism remained "a created body of theory and practice. in which. lor many
gcncrations. there has becn considerable material investment" or an "acccptcd grid lor
liltering through the Orient into western consciousness" (Orienta/islII 96). For Said.
Oriental ism operated as cultural hegemony. not as a capitalist or imperialist plot to
control the Oricnt. However. Said and Abdel Malek agreed on the nature ofOrienlalism
itselfas a humanist failure. Abdel Malek noted that the Oriental was an objecl of study
stamped with a "constitutiveotherness, of an essentialist character:' as opposed to the
dynamic and progressive European. humanist man of action (50). In other words. the
rational. progressive. democratic West was constituted on the existence of an essential
Olher. the irrational. regressive totalitarian East. This point. of course. would lormlhe
basis of Said's theory that the West was constituted on the Othering of the Orient and that
the Orient only existed as a construct of the West. Abdel Malek also spent considerable
time describing the methods of the Orientalists. particularly the dehistorieization and the
exoticization of the Orient. He claimed that in order to sustain the discourse of essence.
the history of the Orient had to be erased and rewritten. Instead. the Orient was
positioned as static and Ii xed. and so study and research locused on the past as the
prclcrred period. especially in cultural aspects of language and religion as "detached from
social evolution" (51). Asa result. everything that happened in the present reappeared as
an emergence ofa static history. unable to adapt to the dynamics of modern lile: ··that
which re-emerged appeared as a prolongation of the past. grandiose but extine\. From
historieizing, history became exotic" (52). Said noted this same point in OrientalislII. as
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well as in Coverinj; Islam and The Quesliun oj"Palesline, which he considered all part of
the same trilogy.
The second intcllectual or intcrest to this argumcnt is A.L. Tibawi. a lellow
Palestinian. who in a scries of three articles fi'om 1964-1980 cngagcd in a dcbate with
English-speaking Orientalists whom. he claimed. essentialized. Otherized and
dehistoricized the Orient. As a Muslim. Tibawi's target was Islamic Oriental ism. Ilis
work focused on the relationship between Oriental ism and missionary activity. noting
that the hope of the early Orientalists was that "Islam might be transformed through
Westernization or modernization or rerormation" ("English Speaking Orientalists" 26).
lie noted specifically that two techniques were deployed to discredit Islam. First. its
doctrines. specifically the Quran, were held up as not unauthentic. actually a refashioning
of Hebrew documents and pre-Islamic literature; second. the authenticity or the Prophet
Mohammed was questioned by assigning to him profit-oriented rather than spiritual-
centered goals. Tibawi. in fact. asserted that the failurc of Orienta lists was an inability to
understand the role Islam plays in the lives of Muslims. lie spoke harshly or token
Muslims who are used by Oricntalists to validate their views of the Orient and Islam in
particular:
Encounters between dirrerent cultures did and do produce alienated individuals.
denationalized and deeulturalized. who try to live in both worlds at the same time
but are at peaee in neither: someorthe persons named do not write in Arabic.
others avoid speaking it, and some are neutral or silent on Arab or Islamic
questions. ("On the Orientalists Again" 60)
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For Tibawi, the Muslim exiled from his culture is no Saidian "specular intellectual." the
exile on the margins of society, interpreting both, but is a conAicted and pathetic
individual. robbed of his heritage and stripped of his identity, engaged in a discourse that
the Orientalists want to hear or else remaining silent. Far from Said's utopian border
intellectual, Tibawi posited and predicted the rise of the figurc of Ibn Warraq, the
unknown apostate, interpreting Islam for the world, intent and insistent on its relorm,
perhaps on its destruction.
Various critics have noted Said's conspicuous decision to ignore Tibawi's work.
MacFie. for example, noted that
Said did not recognize the work ofTibawi because Tibawi. a Palestinian Arab.
succeeds in breaking theOricntalist rules identified by Said that since thc Orient
is incapablc ofrcprcsenting itselfit must be represented. Far from being
intimidated by the West, in his two critiques of English-speaking Orientalists
Tibawi. writing from an Islamic point of view, succeeds in mounting a
devastating critique of English-speaking Oriental ism. idcntifying in considerable
detail what hcbelicvesto bc its major faults. (99-100)
Or could it be that Tibawi represented an Islamic point of view with which Said did not
wish to engage, a point of view mockcd by his contemporaries who considered the
assertion of Islamic beliefas contradictory to a critical stance on Orientalism? These
biascs can be seen in the responses of Said's contemporaries to Arab and Muslim
critiques of Oriental ism. For example. in his litcrature rcview. Donald Little argucd he
would ignore the vast body of work written in "Islamic languages" as thc more important
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work is directed at a foreign audicnce and that Arabs writing in Western languagcs "havc
embraced Western methodology and a Western approach to thc Arabs and Islam which is
virtually indistinguishable from that of non Arabs" (134). Evcn MacFic. in an othcrwise
balanced account of the assault on Oriental ism, commcnting on the argumcnt bctwccn
Little and Tibawi, noted that Tibawi's work "betrays strcngth of feeling out of place
pcrhaps in an academic debate" and concluded that ..the argument illustratcs all too
clearly the difficultics inherent in any attempt made to bridgc thc gap bctwecn a Muslim
and a Christian/secular view ofknowlcdge, rcligion and thc world" (108). It is clcar that
assertion of Islamic belicfs was considered by revicwcrs, and pcrhaps by Said himself: as
contradictory to ajudicious debatcon Orientalism.
To be fair. Said did rectify his dismissal of Arab sourccs in his latcr works, most
notably in Cul/ure and ImperialislII. However. Said's rcsponsc to the Arab criticism and
translation ofOrien/ali.\·1II in the "Afierword" appendcd Ii'om thc 1994 edition onwards is
telling, indeed. He commcnded the translation into Arabic and was particularly satisfied
with thc translation of words such as "discourse. simulacrum. paradigm or code" into the
"classical rhetoric of the Arab tradition." noting that thc translator attcmptcd to place
Said's books "inside onc fully formed tradition. as if it wcrc addrcssing anothcr from a
perspcctivcofcultural adcquacy and cquality" (338). Yct. hc noted that despite this. the
book was experienced as "an aflirmation of warring and hopelessly antithetical
idcntities" (338). lie cxplained that he had intcndcd his book to launch a study of
Otherness. as had happcncd in curopc, the United Statcs. Australia. India. Ireland,l.atin
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America and Africa. The Arab world, however, appeared to be the exception in
responding to Said's challenge in Orienta/ism:
That does not seem to be the case in the Arab world, where, partly because my
work is correctly perceived as Eurocentric in its texts. and partly because ... the
battle for cultural survival is too engrossing. books like mine are interpreted less
usefully, productively speaking, and more as defensive gestures either lor or
against the "West." (339)
And so. according to Said, the Arab rejection of his book was not because of the text
itself, his lack ofa theory on intentionality and his avid secularism, but because "decades
of loss, fi'ustration and the absence of democracy have affected intellectual and cultural
lile in the Arab region"(339). And lor Said these culturally backward intellectuals were
best exemplified inthe Islamic intellectuals, such as Tibawi. WhiledelCndinghimself
against the accusation that he was a delender of Islam, Said clarified again thal he was
not interested in a "real" Islam or "real" Orient:" I have no interest or let alone capacity
lor showing what the true Orient or Islam actually are" (331).
The above discussion about Said's engagement with Arab sources and his
avoidance of similar Islamic debates on the same issues serve as a useful point or
departure upon which to illuminate Said's secularism and humanism. including his lack
of clarity on intentionality, throughout his work. Tibawi noted that
The first essential prerequisite lor any successful change (or reform) is therefore
native initiative, independent of foreign control or suggestion. The second
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prerequisite is that all change must be acceptable to learned orthodox authority.
("'English Speaking Orientalists" 73)
Said would definitely disagree with the second condition: in fact. he would asserl that an
intellectual must remain oppositional and defiant to authority. in other words maintain a
"secular" stance. For Said. the kind of critical distance necessary to be a critic and
intellectual could only be obtained ifone could maintain a distance from religion and
ideology, which he considered inherently doctrinal.
Perhaps the most thorough look at Said's relationship with religion and ideology
is William D. Harl's Edward Said and /he Religiolls Efree/olC 'III/lire. Commenting upon
the strong seeular/religious thematic in Said's work. Harl notcs that Said was not
indifferent to religion. nor did Said not want to engagc with rcligion, but he was in fact
antagonistic to it. For Said, an antagonism to religious criticism was ncccssary to being a
genuine intellectual who spoke truth to power: in fact. it was cssential to "resist the quasi
religious authority" of culture. the "authority of being comfortably at home among one's
people. supported by known powers and acccptabic valucs. protccted against the outside
world." (The World. Text and /he Cri/ic 15- J 6).
Hart critiques Said's views concisely:
Said is not a religious thinker. But this does not mean that he is indifferent. On
the contrary. religion is something that he can neither tolerate easily nor leave
alone. Religion is an issue lor him unlike those who are indifferent. whom we
mistakenly call secular. Secularism in this respect isa particular kind of
relationship with religion. It is skeptical. wary. or hostile interest. Secular
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thinkers are preoccupied with boundary-drawing and boundary-maintcnancc. with
where secularism ends and religion begins. (10-11)
Hart continues to assert that for Said secular criticism is. in this sensc. thc "Othcr"' or
religious criticism: "'without the counterpoint or religious criticism. it has no point"· (12).
In order to illuminate this. he examines two ofSaid's central concepls lirst dcveloped in
The World. The Texi. and The Crilic: liliation/ al'filiation and worldliness. Filiation is the
natural or cultural relations (family). and affiliation contains those relations which
compcnsate for filiation failurcs. such as prol'essional associations. For Said. an
intcllcctualmust resist the systems of culture to which hc is bound liliativclyand the
systems he acquired affiliatively and only then can he avoid "religious criticism" in order
to speak truth to power. According to Said. religious criticism blocks the road to inquiry
and is irrational. organized. collectivc. vague. csoteric and secrct. On the other hand. the
secular intellcctual is skcptical of cultural filiation and systems aniliation. Ilart notes thai
lor Said nationalism and religion dcter secular criticism and so does any kind or sense or
belonging to a prol'essional cult. In short. Said believed that religiosity had rcturned under
a secular guise and that criticism itscl I' had bccome rcligious: hence. his criticism or
criticism. particularly nationalist discourse and deconstruction ism. Sccond. Ilart notes
thai Said's concept of worldliness was developcd in counterpoint to what hc pcrceived as
the othcr-worldliness of religion. In rcligious discoursc. worldliness is a profane
preoccupation with thc here and now whilc other-worldlincss dcals with the more noble
goals of the imagined future. Ilartnotcs that Said appropriatcd and revcrsed these terms.
Worldliness became a desired goal and other-worldliness became obscure. Hart makes
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thc astute observation that particularly in Orienlali.l'lI1, Said reproduced the Orientalists'
distinctions bctween East and Wcst as applied to sccular/religious: "Said rcjccts thc
Orientalists' distinction between Wcstcrn rationality and Eastcrn mysticism only to
rcadmit and valorize this distinction under the rubrics of secularism and rcligion" (86), It
is. in fact. ironic that secularism displaced Oricntalism in Said's tcrminology-as Ilart
'religion and secularism are East and West in Said's imaginativc gcography" (86),
Said's secular/ religious distinctions have bccn noted by a numbcr of othcr critics.
bcsides Hart. though nol all agrec that this new binary rccreated a kind of displaccd
Oricntalism.6 Peter van del' Vccr points out that thc
distinction between sccular and religious is a product of the Enlightenmcnt that
was uscd in Orienlali.l'lJI to draw a sharp opposition betwccn unnatural rcligious
behavior of the oriental and thc rational sccularism which cnablcd thc Wcstcrncr
to rulc the Oriental." (qtd in Robbins 74)
Othcrs in thcsubaltern studiesgroupconnectcd sccularism to postcolonial nation-
building. with Guha linking the argument of Western Oriental ism to thc secular
indigcnous elites and Chakrabarty claiming secularism as an act of appropriation.
particularly in India (Robbins 75), On the other hand. Bruce Robbins argucs that Said
uscd the term secular criticism not to oppose religion but to opposc nationalism. and the
actual subjectofcritiquc was nationalism itsclf:cvidcnccd in Said'santi-!\mericanstance
"Two vcry userul essaysoutlinc sOllle orthe arguments ora numberortheoristsrelcrred here
Bruce Robbins. ·'Secularism. Elitism, Progress and Othcr Transgressions." Cllililral Readill,~,\' "/
IlIIperialislII: Edll'ard Said and Ihe Crt/viti' "II-lislorl', ed, Ansell Pearson. Kcith. Benita Parry and Judith
Squires. (London: Lawrence. &Wishart. 1997) 67-87; Gauri Viswanathan.. "Secular Criticism and the
Politics or Religious Dissent." Cllllllral Readings o/llIIperia!i.'·III: E{hl'ard Said and Ihe (,'ra,'il" o/IIisIIWI'.
cd. Ansell Pearson. Keith. Benita Parry and Judith Squires (London: Lawrencc. &Wishart. 1997) 151-172.
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as an American intellectual during the Gulf War and his critical stancc as a Palestinian on
the Palestinian issue (74). W..J.T Mitchell insightfully points out the secular limit in
Said's work can be directly traced to Vico's asscrtion that we cannot know things that wc
havc not made ("Secular Divination" 102) This disallowed Said fi'OI11 engaging with any
kind of sacred knowledge or recognizing ..that sphere of thc uncontrollable and
inexplicable that. at the same time, has an immense power over human thought and
action" (104). Mitchell directly links this view ofthc sacrcd to Said's "blind spot" and his
scnse of self-admilled "panic" whcn engaging with the domain of the visual arts and thc
Imaginary (104-105). Viswanathan, on the other hand. argucs that Said's secularism has
been interpreted too narrowly and that it is intended to demonstrate the competing
affiliations faced by the intellectual:
So that while Said seems to be polarizing terms like secular/religious,
critics/cleric, human history/scared time, worldly/mystical/his insistencc that
culture is a site for hegemonizing tendencies, open to co-optation by the statc lor
its own purposes ... places dissent in a much morc complex adversarial relation,
not only to rcligious orthodoxy but also to slate hegemony. ("Sccularism,
Criticism and the Politics of Religious Dissent" 153)
In a later article, Viswanatahn argues against Hart's observations of Said's hostility to
religion and asserts that iI' one considers religion to include orthodox and hetcrodox
clements, Said was sympathetic to heterodox elements of Islam ("Said, Religion and
Secular Criticism" 164). Ilowever, Viswanathan docs not provide a close reading of
Said's texts to prove this point.
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Whether or not one accuscs Said of using inappropriate Enlightcnmcnt
terminology as van del' Veer does, reinvents the meanings of secularism and nationalism
to extrapolate Said's binaries (Robbins or Viswanathan), highlights secularism as a blind
spot (Mitchell), or focuses on Said's theoretical inconsistencies (Hart), two points arc
clear. FirsL for Said, religious criticism was a metaphor. that is, any system which binds
an individual to it and compromises his critical distance. Above aiL Said argued tor a
critical distance for the intellectual in line with Vico's "rational civil theology" (Mitchell.
"Secular Divination" I07). Religious affiliations, which may include actual religion, hut
arc not limited to iL do not allow such distance. according to Said. Second. even if Said
intended the term religious criticism as an all-encompassing one, including, but not
limited to religion, he surely was aware of the effect of his usage of"secular"
terminology, particularly when describing Muslim societies. YeL he insistently cmployed
these terms throughout his work--that is, until his last book, in which secular criticism
was replaced with the term "democratic criticism." To demonstrate the development of
Said's ideas over the years as the tield or postcoloniality grew undcr his tutelage, it is
fruitful to trace his cngagements with Islam and the role or the secular intellcctual
throughout some or his major works. I will explorc whether Said's democratic criticism
can contain criticism which draws on rcligious and sacred sources, or whether dcmocratie
criticism is merely a new designation lor secular criticism. in an historicalmomcnt of
incrcased sensitivity to the matter. Can humanistic democratic criticism reallyacccpt
divcrsc multicultural critiques, even if they arise from within religious traditions?
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Viswanathan would argue, yes, especially ifit is heterodox, since it is orthodoxy
and dogma which Said critiqued, not sacred knowledge itself("Said, Religion and
Secular Criticism" 164-166). However, particularly in the field of Islam, the labels of
orthodoxy and heterodoxy are highly unstable, with the neoconservatives considering the
jihadisls orthodox and Muslim authorities considering them heterodox. And it is
revealing to divine how Said felt about the resurgence of Islamic orthodoxy/ heterodoxy
(depending on one's interpretation) as exemplified in thejihadisl. Viswanathan has
argued, with reference to Said's interview with Tariq Ali, that Said showed some
understanding of Islamic militancy by referring to his remark that they are "creatures of
the moment [for] whom Islam is an opportunity to protest the current stalemate, the
current mediocrity and bankruptcy of the ruling party" (qtd in Viswanathan, "Said,
Religion and Secularism Criticism" 164). i\. more nuanced reading is required in order to
assess whether Said placed any faith in Islamic resistance, or Islamic intellectuals, to
affect social change.
In ('overing Islam, his most explicit book on Islam, Said positioned himselfas an
intellectual, not affiliated with the left or the right. speaking truth to power about Islam:
Yet there is a consensus on Islam as a kind of scapegoat for everything wc do not
happen to like about the world's new political social and economic patterns. For
the right, Islam represents a kind of barbarism; for the lell, medieval theocracy;
for the center, a kind of distasteful exoticism. In all causes, however, there is
agreement that even though little is known about the Islamic world there is not
much to be approved there." (v)
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Said took great pains to emphasize that "far fi'om being a defense of Islam- a project as
unlikely as it is futile for my purposes-the book describes the uses of Islam for thc West
and lor many Islamic societies" (vi). As in Orientalism, Said made it clear that "real"
Islam was not his subject: the representations of Islam were. Ironically, Said never
investigated how Muslims themselves represent Islam. In a telling criticism of .Judith
Miller's work. Said noted. "She seems never to have heard of Mohammed Arkoun. 01
Mohammed EI .Jabri, or George Tarabishi, or Adonis, or Hasan Hanali, or Ilisham Diat"
(('overing Islam xxxix). Though he seemed to have heard of such intellectuals, Said did
not deem their representations of their own society that important since he did not
elaborate upon their arguments, except to show that they exist.
Though the first volume was published in 1981. ('overing Islam was reprinted in
1997 and Said had some time to reconsider how he had left Muslims out of the
representation of their own society in his theorizing. Of course, there have been
numerous attempts made by Muslims allover the world to explain Islam, describc it.
make its philosophy understandable, somc of the scholars being acculturated Americans
or Europeans like Said 7 However. Said remained silent on aillhese contributions. On
the other hand, his response to Islamic revivalism was startling. Said took no interest in
examining the possibility that political Islam might serve as an effective opposition to
imperialism, nor did he provide a nuanced historical reading of the development of
various types of political Islam ism. His criticism was direct: "it [politicallslaml has
plainly caught the West off balance. especially when Islamic religious fervor and political
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objective join to create violent results" (Covering Islam xix). He continued by portraying
a dreary history of political Islam: in Algeria. ··thousands of intellectuals. journalists.
artists and writers have been killed"; in Sudan. he referred to Ilassanal Turabi as"a
brilliantly malevolent individual. a Svcngali and Savonarola clothcd in Islamic robes"; in
Egypt he wrote of the Muslim brotherhood and the Jamat Islamiya. as "one more violent
and more uncompromising than the other"; in Palestine Hamas and Islamic Jihad "have
mctamorphosed into thc most feared and journalistically covered examples of Islamic
extrcmism" (xiii). All in all, Said's list of Islamists was not a very promising group of
activists who could affcct rcal social change. Absent from his lists were notable and
articulate leaders such as Hassan AI Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood. Rashid
Ghanoushi of 1\1 Nahda. and Khalid Mashael of I-lamas. all respected intellectuals in
their own rights. In fact. lor Said therc could not be a religious intellectual. and so no
hope for resistance arising from rcligion itself.
This is especially evident in the attitude and the language Said used to refer to
llamas. Consider his first written reference to Hamasin 1993:
In 1992 whcn I was there. I brictly met a few of the studcntlcaders who represent
I-lamas: I was imprcsscd by their sense of political commitment but not at all by
their ideas. I found them quite moderate when it came to accepting the truths of
modern science. for instance ... their leaders neither especially visible nor
impressive. their writings rehashes of old nationalist tracts, now couched in an
"Islamic" idiom. (The Politics o/Dispossession 403)
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It is clear Said had lillie 1~lith in I-Iamas' intellectuals. and his comment. "(found th<:m
quite moderate when it came to accepting the truths of modern science," revealed his
surprise that young Islamic activists could somehow accept contemporary scientific
realties. As I-Iamas gained in momentum throughout the I990s. Said warned.
I know that the organization is one of the only ones expressing resistance .. Yet
lor any secular intellectual to make a devil's pact with a religious movement is, I
think. to substitute convenience for principle..' (Peace and lIs Disconlel7lS III)
Later. he would call their resistance "violent and primitive ... You know, what
Ilobsbawn calls preeapital. trying to get back to communal lorms. to regulate personal
conduct with simpler and simpler reductive ideas" (Power, Polilics, and ('lIlll1re 416). In
yet another interview. also printed in Power Polilics and CIIIllIre, Said responded to the
question of whether or not it bothered him that his work was olien cited by Islamists:
Certainly, and I have frequently expressed my concern on this subject. I find my
opinions misinterpreted. especially where they include substantial critiques of
Islamic movcments. first. I am secular: second. I don't trust religious movem<:nts
and third I disagree with these movements' methods, means. analyses and valu<:s.
(437)
Clearly. even though Said defended Islam from imperialist and nationalist allacks. it was
dirlieult tor him to see any progressive alternatives in Islamic resistance movements. i\s
Majid notes. there is a "dismissal of religiously inspired discourses as serious alternatives
to capitalist relations" (Unveiling 7!-adiliol1.\' 24). Further. it seems impossible that a
religious intellectual could ever obtain the necessary stance (0 be includcd in Said's elite
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group of cosmopolitan secular critics. Notable is that Said never positioned his work in
the rich tradition of' Arab debate about secularism and political Islam: Muslim scholars.
such as Ahmad Lufti AI Sayyid. Muhammad Kurd Ali. Ali Abd al Raziq and Taha
Hussein. all made valuable contributions to this complex debate and Said did not cvcn
givc them a passing reference. Said never once highlighted thc contcmporary debatc
which connects nationalism and secularism. nor did he explore the connection betwcen
failed nationalism and pan Islamism. In all of his discussions on Foucault and lor all his
use of Foucault's terminologies he never once mentioned Foucault's own Oricntalism.
Instead, he dedicated pages upon pages in his work to the exilic secular humanism or his
heroes: Vico, Adorno and Auerbach.
Various critics have noted the two very diverse hero/intellectuals Said chose in
constructing his "secular critic"-Antonio Gramsci and .Julien Benda. Sarcc Makdisi
notcs.
From Gramsci, Said accepts the notions that intellectuals composc a largc and
variegated social body, connectcd to classes, movements and traditions and
fulfilling all kinds of'social roles. including thc production and reproduction or
official ideologies and worldvicws. But at the same time hc finds dceply
compelling Benda's much more rcstricted notion or the intelleclual as a mcmbcr
or a small, cmbattlcd, morally driven group spcaking out against prcvailing
opinions regardless or the consequence to themselves. (54)
Said delined the role of'the intellectual in both the Gramsci-style collectivc actor and also
thc lonely stance or the heterodox cleric like Bcnda: "The propcr rolc oflhc intellectual.
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then, according to Said, is to maintain intellectual and political integrity, and to spcak oul.
like one of Benda's lonely clerics, against all odds, and despite all costs to himsell"
(Makdisi57).
In Represen/ation.\' olthe In/ellectual, the Reitch lectures of 1993 - 1994, Said
wrote directly of his intellectual heroes, and outlined how the figure ofthc intcllcctual
has been represented by various thinkers. In the introduction to this series oflecturcs,
Said clearly connected intellectual vocation to the secular tradition which to him "is a
spirit in opposition rather than in accommodation" (xvii). It is evident lor Said that
secular was a metaphor lor independence and freedom rather than merely acquicsccncc to
secularism itself: and that the secular critic had to stand apart from his society and apply a
single standard of humanity to all. None of the heroes in his pages espoused a
particularly 'religious" point of view. In fact, in "Holding Nations and Traditions at Bay,"
he argued thatjust as Arab intellectuals must reject nationalism, they must also reject
Islamic dogma. He postulated the type of Arab-Islamic intellectual that might be
considered eligible lor entry into his flock of secular critics in the embodiment of Adonis,
the Syrian poet and intellectual. who is involved in "the revival of ijlihad, pcrsonal
interpretation, and not sheep like abdication to politically ambitious ulell1C1 or charismatic
demagogues" (40).
For Said, then, the exemplary Muslim intellectual was Adonis, who relcrredto
himselfin a 2008 New York Tirne.l' interview as "a pagan prophet," selt~admittcdly sccn
as a "rcncgade and anti -Muslim''(''lnterview by Adam Shatz'} Certainly, Adonis
qualifies as one ofYiswanathan's heterodoxic subjects. In "Intellectual Exiles:
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Expatriates and Marginals..' also in the Reith Lectures, Said oncc again turned to thc
cxample of another Muslim intellcctual to demonstrate the adversarial stance. Rcfcrring
to V.S. aipul as a starting point. another interesting choicc since his book AII/ollg ,!I"
B,,!i"I'ers was hailcd as a shallow and derogatory account of Muslim socictics cvcn in
Salman Rushdie's estimation in III/aginary HOII/eland,·. Said posited thc statc of
metaphoric cxile, wherc onc remains attached to but stands outside one's own bounds.
Later, in "Spcaking Truth to Power'" Said posited Rushdic himselfas a prototypc of his
sccularintellectual:
In the secular world-our world, the historical and social worlds madc by human
effort-the intellcctual has only secular means to work with; revelation and
inspiration, while perfectly feasible as modes for undcrstanding in private life, arc
disasters and evcn barbaric when put to use by lheorctically mindcdmcnand
women. Indeed I would go so far as saying that the intcllectualmust bc involved
in a lifelong disputc with all the guardians of scarcd vision or text. whose
depredations are legion and whose heavy hand brooks no disagrccment and
certainly no diversity .... This is why the defense of Salman Rushdic's 5;{//(Il1ic
l'erses has been so absolutely central an issue'" (88 -89)
And so. Rushdiejoincd Vico, Gramsic. Auerbach. and Adonis on Said's list as admirable
secular intellectuals.
Said's support lor Rushdie as a metaphoric exilc. thc ultimate cxamplc of a
secular intellectual, demonstrated an unwillingncss to discuss thc Rushdic alhlir in thc
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context or the worldliness of the event surrounding his exile.x Said's defense of Rushdie
remained squarely based on the freedom-of-speech argument. one used frequently since
to discredit Islam and prove its barbarity.9 By asserting a universal. cosmopolitan
existence for the metaphoric exile. Said had become dangerously disconnected from the
worldliness or the debate. In a rather disappointing gesture. Said did not usc the incident
to renect on the rhetoric or freedom of specch as an example of the type of hypocritical
double standards or which he often wrote: nor did he usc the moment to reneet upon the
positioning of the Muslim intellectual in today"s world. particularly focusing on the
relationship between Islam and Empire and globalization. In his linal words on lhe value
of the intellectual. in the last chapter in Democralic Crilicis/II and 1-III/lwnis/II. Said noted
that in the post-9f11 world there has been more and more or a need lor and a reaching out
to intellectuals. both in the American and Muslim worlds: ··the spccial symbolic role of
the writer as an intellectual testirying to a country"s or region's cxperience. thereby
giving that experience a public identity forever inscribed in the global discursive
agenda."' and again he cited Salman Rushdie as a living example of speaking truth to
power (127).
x Various cxccllcnt discussions ofthc Rushdie aftair and the assertion ofth~ s~cularistmast~r
narrativccan be found in AhmcdAkbar.I'os/lIIodernislllomllslolll: l'redicOlllell/omll'rolllise.(l.ondon
Routlcdg~. 1992): Anouar Majid. Unveiling Tmdi/ions: I'os/coloniol IslolII in a !'o"'centric World
(Durham: Duke Univcrsity Press. 2000): Graham Huggan. Tlie !'os/ Colonial E.rotic: Morke/ing /lie
Margins (New York: Routledgc. 200 I) : Timothy Brennan. Sollllon RlIsllllie 11111/ tlie 7hird World: M"/lis 01
/lie No/ion (New York: St Martin's Press. 1989): and Amin Malak. Moslilll Norm/i"e,,' al/(I /lie Disco/ll'se
o/Engiisli (New York: Statc University of New York Press. 2005)
'j Recent examples include the Danish cartoon crisis in 2005 and the Sudanese teddy b~ar incid~nt
in 2007. all decontextualizcd to position the freedom of expression debatc as th~ antithesis to Islamic
totalitarianism.
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The example ofSaid's stubborn allegiancc to Rushdie. in face ofa complex
political and historical moment. surely highlights the limits ofSaid's theory. First. Said
rcmained a secularist but he never tricd to explain thc many meanings of secularism.
certainly not the ongoing interplay of the concepts from the earliest of Islamic traditions
until now. For Said. the object of radical criticism was religious criticism. which
contains religion and nationalism and other professional allegiances. but detinitely
always contains religion in its multitude of manifestations. Said's inability to give up the
secular religious dichotomy which formed the basis of his own imaginative limits
disallowed him from engaging with rich Islamic traditions in anything more than a
cursory mention. This is particularly evident when we compare Said's opportunistic
deployment of Muslim thinkers in his last book. J-!l/lI1ani.\·1I/ and Dell/ocratic CriticislI/. to
its intellectual predecessor The World. The Text. and 7'l1e Critic. published over twenty
years earlier.
To be fair. however. Said's terminology did become more nuanced in IIl/lI/anislI/
and Dell/ocratic CriticislI1; clearly. the post-9/I) world changed Said's terminology but
not his central position. that of defending Islam li'om a secular point of view. but not
cngaging deeply in the contribution it could makc to scholarship. Indecd. therc arc
occasions when Said makcs a considercd effort to inject Islamic discourse into his theory,
as he did in The World. The Text. and The Critic. but thcse crlorts remain mere window
dressing. a kind of intellectual tourism. to prove a point about the necessity ofa
decentcrcd humanism. For examplc. in The World. the Text. and the Critic. to cxplain his
concept of worldliness. Said used the example of the linguistic interpretative theory ofa
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group of Andalusian linguists called the Zahirites (36-39). In lact. he drastically
simplified a group of obscure medieval Arabic linguists to makc thc point that the
meaning of the text is not in the text itself. but a product ofa time. an author. and a
reader:
I have very quickly summarized an enormously complex theory for which I
cannot claim any particular influence in Western European literature since the
Renaissance and perhaps not even in Arabic literature since the Middlel\ges.l3ut
what strikes us forcibly about the whole theory is that it represented a
considerably articulated thesis for dealing with a text as a signilicant form. in
whieh- -and I put this as carefully as I can---worldliness. circumstantialities. the
text's status as an event having sensuous particularity as well as historical
contingency. are considered as being incorporated in the text. an infrangible part
of its capacity for conveying and producing meaning." (39)
Revealingly. Said's recourse to Ibn Ilazm. an Adalusian jurist. theologian and
philosopher. and the Zahirites. was followed later in the same book by assigning the
metaphor of religious '·to all totalizing theories: ... what is more to the point is a dramatic
increase in the number of appeals to the extra human. the vague abstraction. the divine.
the esoteric and secret" (291). Certainly. scholarship such as Ibnllazm'sappealed to the
Divine, and yet Said. a few hundred pages bclore, praised it as a "considerably articulated
thesis," Still a few pages later, he lamented that "religion has returned in other ways,
most explicitly in the works of lormerly militant secularists lor whom it now seems that
the historical social world of real men and women is in need of religious assuagement"
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(291). Thus. while at the beginning of The Wurld. T'l1e Texi. and The C'rilic. he credited
Islamic scholarship with a contribution to interpretation. by thc end he was exasperated al
the impossibility of religious criticism and its lack of contribution to critiquc.
1\ similar contradiction emerges in /-IlI/l/anislI1 and Delllllualic CrilicislII. though
here Said distanced himself li'OITI his earlier terminology of secular and religious
criticism. Instead. he began by clarifying his humanism by commenting upon what
Clinard had interpreted as a methodological weakncss or inconsistcncy in OrienwlislII.
that of combining foucaultian and humanist analysis. In IIIIINani,11II and Delllocrolic
Crilicisl'I1. Said defended his position as a purposcful cxtcnsion of humanism:
Although I was one of the first critics to engage with and discuss french theory in
the American university, Clifford correctly saw that I somchow remained
unaffected by that theory's ideological antihumanism. mainly because I think I
did not (and I still do not) see in humanism only thc kind of totalizing and
essentializing trends that Clinard identified. (10)
Said clarified that his work was always intended as a critiquc. but not abandonlllent. or
humanism and defined cogcntly what humanism meant lor him: "the core or humanislll is
the secular notion that the historical world is made by men and women. not God. and that
it can bc understood rationally" (II). By making this connection. Said reinserted
secularism into his delinition or humanism; in lact, thcy were inscparable. Throughout
1I/ll1Ianisl'I1 and Del1loualic Crilicisl'I1. Said reasserted that "humanism is the achievement
or form by human will and agcncy" (15). anclthat the humanitics concern "secular
history" (15). However. rather than set secular and religious criticism as binaries. Said
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examined the tendency within humanism to align itself to ideologies such as Orientalism
and nationalism. Rather than refer to these trends as religious. as he had in his earlier
work. he placed these oppositions within a transformed humanist tradition: "a varied and
complex world with many contradictory. antinomiam and antithetical currents running
within it" (45). which instead of collapsing under the strain of postmodernism was being
transformed by critiques which are "non European, genderized. deeolonized and
decentered" (47). This view posited hope for a democratic criticism as a replacement fix
secular criticism. since Euroeentric or nationalistic humanism, of the kind Said
previously had equated with religious criticism. could not be sustained in the postcolonial
world where new spaces for democratic dissent had opened up.
The question remains. however. as to whether this democratic criticism can
contain religious criticism, of all sorts. considering that the binary between orthodoxy and
heresy is so unstable, as we have noted. Unfortunately. Said did not explore this issue in
depth in /-II/man ism and Democratic Criticism. For example. when writing about
philology in HI/manism and Democratic Criticism. Said turned to the Islamic tradition
and introduced his readers to the Islamic interpretive system of interdependent readings.
isnad. personal effort and creativity (68). In fact. he asserted that the Islamic tradition
has much to ofTel' interpretation. but it is "so little known amongst Eurocentrie scholars
all too busy extolling some supposedly exclusive humanistic Western ideal" (68). lie had
made this same argument over twenty years before. by relerring to the Zaharite
interpretive community in The World. The Text. and The Critic. And like its progenitor.
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/-Iumanism and Democratic Criticism praised Islamic scholarship and then quickly
condemned"religious enthusiasm" as a dogma entirely separate I"rom this scholarship:
Religious enthusiasm is perhaps the most dangerous 01" threats to the humanistic
enterprise, since it is patently anti-secular and antidemocratic in nature. and in its
monotheistic forms as a kind of politics about as intolerably inhumane and
downright unarguable as ean be. Invidious commentary about thc world 01" Islam
afier9/11 has made it popular wisdom that Islam is by nature a violent. intolerant
religion, much given to raving I"undamentalism and suicidal tcrrorism. Thcrc has
been no end of experts and evangelists repeating the same rubbish. aided and
abetted by discredited Orientalists like Bernard Lewis. It is a sign 01" thc
intellectual and humanistic poverty 01" the times that such patent propaganda (in
the literal sense of the word) has gained such currency and. even more
disastrously, that it is carried on without the slightest rel"erence to Christian.
Jewish andl-lindu fundamentalism. which, as cxtrcmist political ideologies. have
bccn at least as bloody and disastrous as Islam. All these enthusiasms belong
cssentially to the samc world. teed off one another. emulate and war against one
anothcr schizophrenically. and--most seriously-are as ahistorical and as
intolerant as onc anothcr." (51)
This passagc has bccn quoted at some Icngth to clarify Said's late position on religion
and particularly Islam, which often seems contradictory. There remains a dichotomy in
Said's work. perhaps an elitist onc. between the productivc contribution 01" Islamic
scholarship to democratic criticism as opposed to the destructivc cflect ol""cnthusiasm"
61
or radical political thought and action. which is inspired by Islamic doctrinc. This
dichotomy is what Viswanathan. I bclieve. correctly. has identitied as Said's reinvention
of secularism by including heterodoxy in his secular criticism as opposed to dogma. The
dilliculty. however. lies in the fact that heterodoxy and orthodoxy are deeply unstable
categories. changing positions lluidly according to the rhetoric of the war on terror. The
orthodox today can be the heterodox of tomorrow. or perhaps even beller put. what is
considered as an Islamic orthodoxy in the West can be considered as heterodoxy in
Muslim countries. and vice-versa. It may be more useful to consider Said's ambiguity as
a reticence to stake a claim on the role of violence in affecting ehangc. especially
violence rooted in religious belief.
This is especially evident in Said's reworking of Fanon's theory of violence in
"Travelling Theory Reconsidered· in Representation.\" olthe Intellectl/al. I\s Mohammed
Tamdgidi notes.
Fanon in particular has come to be known for his more explicit advocacy of
revolutionary physical violence in reaction to global racism and colonialism
particularly in the Algerian and African contexts. Said. more ambivalent 011 the
use of physical violence in the context of the Palestinian nationalist struggles
amidst the I\rablIsraeli eonllict. seems to have been inspired in part by a more
intimate (not cruder and caricatured) reading of Fanon's discourse on
revolutionary violence in historical context, while dedicating his lite to waging
more of an intellectual struggle against the underlying ideological. especially
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Orientalist, structures of knowledge fueling the West's global violence of
colonialism and racism. (115)
For Fanon. violence played a critical role in the reconstruction or sci I' and nation. but it
accompanied an epistemological revolution which pitted the colonizcr directly against the
colonized. Said reread Fanon's Wretched oFthe Earth to show how Fanon considered
resorting to violence. while being aware that violence itself would not be suffieienl lor
tOlalliberation. Said argued that the essential point or The Wretched o(the Earth. rather.
is to note how anticolonial struggle must necessarily take upon a broader. and more
radical. global human emaneipatory dimension in order to suecccd.
It is no accident that Said considered Fanon an intcllcctual hcro, evcn irhe was
not as enthusiastic about thc role of violence in revolution. I\s a forel~lther or postcolonial
theory. Fanon shared a grcat deal in common with Said. Bhabha notcs that the similarities
bctween the two thinkers arc striking:
Committing himself to the "undocumented turbulenec'" orthe wretched or the
earth of our times. Said echoes Franz Fanon's descriptions or the '"occult
instability'" orthc deeolonizing consciousness in the mid-twentieth century wars
of indcpendenee. Both Fanon and Said died of leukemia. almost hal I' a century
apart, in hospital bcds on the East Coast of the United States. only a rew hundred
miles from each other. Both of them produccd last books beckoning the world
towards an aspirational "'new" humanism. Fanon, howcver. wrote (or so he
thought) with his loot on the thrcshold ora Third World or nations. on the verge
of '"starting over a ncw history of man.'" Said could be persuaded or no such
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humanist haven. The"unsettled energy"of the times. or what he describes
elsewhere as .. the implacable energy of time and displacement." provides him
with a double vision of history in which tragedy and transition. incarceration and
emancipation seem to be parl or the same unraveling thread orevents. CAdagio"
14)
Interestingly. Fanon. like Said. resurrected as one of the lounders or postcolonial theory.
had a similar relationship to Islam and Islamic thinkers. The indigenous eullllre in Algeria
was seminal in Fanon's work on revolutionary violence. As Fouzi Slisii notes. "There is
an elephant in The Wretched olthe Earth. It is Islam and its anticolonial tradition in
Algeria" (n.pag). Slisii argues that while Fanon continuously cited and exalted this
tradition. he defined it as an indigenous culture. not a Muslim one: in other words. I:anon
explained Algerian acts of resistance and applauded the culture of Algerian peasants. bUI
he did not name this resistance for what it was-the tradition or Islamic resistance to
colonialism. Slisii examines the work of the Suli brotherhoods and the Association or
Muslim Scholars. as well as Algerian responses to Fanon. and argues that because Fanon
was writing to a primarily atheistic and Western audience. he reshaped any rclcrcnces to
Islam to rererto tradition and culture. rather than to Islam itself. and used Marxist
terminology of spontaneity and organization as a suhstitute lor a distinctly Islamic
anticolonial tradition that. by lhe timc Fanon was writing. had been in existence lor over
a century. Though a secular revolutionary. Slisii notes. Fanon edited thc FLN's paper f/-
MII/ldjahllid. therehy basically championing a revolulion that was articulated asjilllld. In
a leI leI' to Ali Shariati. lhe intelleclual behind thc Iranian revolution and translator of both
64
Che Guevara and Fanon, Fanon expressed concerns that religion could becomc an
obstacle to Third World unification but also encouraged Shariati to exploit the resourccs
of Islam for the creation of a new egalitarian society: 'breathe this spirit into thc body of
theMuslimOrient"(qtdinSlisli).
It can be argued that the absence of Islam from Fanon's work has allowed him to
occupy a seminal position in postcolonial studies. with works that were written in and
about Arab Muslim experiences, without ever putting Islam at the center ofthc
postcolonial experience. Ironically. the same can be said lor Said. another of postcolonial
theory's founding fathers, whose ideas, which beeamc the loundation ofmodcrn
postcolonial theory, were formulated out of his engagement with Muslim culturcs.
particularly thc predominantly Muslim Palestine. It is indeed a great irony that thcse two
fathers of postcolonial criticism. whose work was nurtured in Muslim environmcnts.
never fully addressed the ehallcnges of Islam.
Is Islam an invisible ..trace" in postcolonial theory') Since the major lorbearers of
postcolonial ism theorized from examples of Muslim cultures. it can bc argucd that Islam
has been at the formation of postcolonial ism. How then can it rcclaim its placc in thcory'?
What is the role of the intellectual in leading and reflecting on this radical change'? All of
these questions spring from Said's valuable contributions, but first we must discard his
insistence on not fully engaging with "religious" criticism.
AnouarMajid has noted that Islam has not bcen involvcd inthedcbatcon thc
subaltern namely bccause this debate is based on the sceular prcmiscs of scholarship that
have increased ..thc rcmoteness of Islam:' and as such has imposed limitations on
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theories of inclusion and prolonged the belief that global harmonics remain elusivc not
bccause of capitalist relations but bccause of culture conllicts (Unl'eilin~ hai!itio/1s 3).
He argues that the fact .. that postcolonial theory has been particularly inattentivc to thc
question of Islam in the global economy. exposes its failurc to incorporate ditkrcnt
regimes of truth into a gcnuinely multicultural global vision" (19). Unlcss thcory accepts
indigcnous discourse. including religious discourse. and thoroughly intcrrogates it. a
gcnuine dialogue with Islamic concepts will rcmain futilc. and tcrminologies such as
ii/wi!. tor example. will continuously be reappropriated and rccirculated to servc the
nceds of First World theorctical formulations. In ordcr tor a gcnuine engagement to
occur. critics need to deconstruct thc sccular underpinnings of postcolonial ism and
undcrtakc a full metaphysical cngagcment with Islamic concepts.
In Precariolls Lil'es.ludith Butler argues that criticism has bccnmade morc
impcrativc. not obsoletc. by thc 9/11 attacks and that a qucst tor undcrstanding. rooted in
ethics. in a response to the grief and the empathy onc feels at thc violence inllictcd on
tellow humans. is urgent. As Butler warns in hcr preface. thc "Ioreclosurc orcritiquc
emptics the public domain ordebatc of democratic contcstation itself: so that dehatc
bccomcs the exchangc orvicws ofthc like-minded. and criticism. which ought to be
ccntral to any dcmocracy. bccomes a rugitivc and suspcct activity" (xx). Tcrry Eaglcton
has also joincd the debatc, placing the ruturc of thcory in a dclinitive thcological turn.
particularly with the publication of Unholy Terror and Reason, Faith ([nd Revo/lltiol/,
Perhaps the most vocal and controversial intcrvcntions havc bccn by Slavoj Zizek. who
has scI his sight on claiming the spirit of Islam for an impcnding communist rcvolution,
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Interestingly. these various interventions by three contemporary stars of cultural theory
have involved a forefronting of their credentials for engaging in the post-9I11 debate.
with Butler using her Jewishness to mark how charges of anti Semitism loreclose
criticism; Zizek asserting his knowledge as a Siovenian neighbor of Muslim Bosnians;
and Eagleton as a Roman Catholic. reclaiming common clements of liberation theology
andjihac!. For all. however, as I will argue in this thesis. the engagement with the concept
ofjihac! is spectral; none ever engages in an intellectual analysis on the theory oljilwd
itself or the role of Muslim societies in generating postcolonial theory.
If theory is not dead. as Butler, Eagleton and Zizek argue. where can it go and
what contributions can Muslim theorists make toward its rebirth? In other words, what
canjihac! offer theory? With the advent of the termjihac! in contemporary discourse,
various theorists and fiction writers of both non-Muslim and Muslim backgrounds arc
converging to discussjihac! and thejihadis! and its meaning for both liberal humanism
and radical critique. The role of Muslim intellectuals will be critical in this new
contrapuntal discourse. The following chapters will explore the implications of these
discussions.
To this end, the chapters which lollow attempt [0 extend Said's critique by
analyzing secularism as the cultural capital of globalization. and connecting the debate of
jihad. through literature, popular culture and the spectacle of terror. to materialist and
military agcndas. The lollowing chapters question Said's legacy of secularism and
intellectual leadership in mobilizing social change and explore howjihac! seriously
challenges both these notions. Finally, the chapters attempt to demonstrate the usefulness
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01" contrapuntal rcadings as a method 01" encouraging much needcd cngagcment bctwccn
Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers. To this end. I hope that the major contribution ol"this
thcsis is an encouragement 01" the kind of democratic criticism Said began to cnvision in
his last book.
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Chapter Two
PUlling Islam In: Globalization, Oriental isms and the Value of Muslimness
The major criticism of Said's sccularism and cosmopolitanism brought forward in
the last chapter was related 10 his inability to engage fully with the substancc of Islamic
theory or with Muslim intellectuals in postulating the role of the dislocated intcllectual in
the postcolonial world. This position did not allow him to explore Islam as a complex
site of complicity and resistance to thc cultural hegemony which he so olien allacked. I
have also argued that his cosmopolitanism did not permit a thorough discussion of the
variety of responses of Muslim intellectuals to globalization. and that Said's discourse
and deletions set the ground for the growth of postcolonial discourse on Islam. and jihad,
in particular. post-9II!.
Aftcr9/11 it became impossible to leave Islam out of theory. It can be argued
that the globalization debate implodcd with 9/11, and that Islam has occupied centre stage
in this discourse. It became increasingly clear that globalization was not proceeding as
smoothly as predicted by neo-conservativessuch as Francis Fukuyama in The F;ndo!
HiS/lilY. Various theorists. on thc right and the leli. arose either to condemn or to praise
Islam as the arch-enemy of capitalist globalization. This has resulted in an obstinate effort
to insert Islam into cultural analysis. either by reactivating the old Orientalist absolutes to
justify militarization ofpredominanlly Muslim countries. or by presenting Islam as the
last hope against globalization; reforming Islam and Western democracies to meet neo-
liberal capitalist goals; or by configuring Islam as a site on which to seriously challenge
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current postulations of democracy and multiculturalism. This has rcsulted in multiple
meanings being assigned tojihad in nco-libcral and Idiist radical reform projects.
Somc qualification is needed at this point to differentiate the strains of
Orienlalism to which this chapter refers. and hcncc the usc of the tcrm Orientalisms. In
('ulture and Imperialism. Said had noted that cultural imperialism went hand in hand with
colonization and that in the case of the Middle East. Oriental ism was the cultural companion
to imperialist designs on the region. assured by a growing militarization. Likewise. in
various notable essays after 9/11. 1 Said continued the argument in light of the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the flourish of rhetoric that was producedli'OI11 the war on terror.
In many of his post-9/11 articles. Said attempted to place reasoned arguments into thc
debate about the violent nature of Islam, arguing that historical situations and politics of
the day have to be considered in interpreting the tragic events2 lie also spoke out morc
Icrvently as an American about the dangerous rebirth of evangelism and nationalism 3 In
this regard. perhaps the most interesting of Said's late articles is "Dreams and
Delusions:' published in AI Ahrom. his last article belore his death. In this charged piece,
Saidlamenledthe bigotry and Orienlalization thaI is sweeping American socicty.
summarizing the derogatory view of Arabs spouted by Francis Fukuyama. Thomas
Friedman. and Fouad Ajami as too ridiculous to be taken seriously. He then examined the
I Edward Said.··lslamand the West arc Inadcquatc Banncrs'" TheOhsen-er. 16Seplember2001:
27: Edward Said. "The Appalling Consequences of the Iraq War arc now Clear'" ClllllllerplIllch. 22 April
2003. Wcb. 29 September 2006 < http://www.eounterpunch.org/said04222003.hlml'>
Edward Said. "Give Us Back our Democracy. COllnlerplIllch. I April 2003. Web. 22 October
2006http://www.counterpunch.org/said04212003.html
, Perhaps the best example of this is Said's rcsponseto Huntington in"ClashofDelinitions" in
Rejleclillllslln Exile (London: Granta.2001)569-590
.1 Edward Said. "Thoughts About Amcrica." Al-Ahl"lllll Week'" Ollline 575 (28 Feb. - 6 March
2002): n.pag. Web. 10 Aug. 2005<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/575/op2.hlm>.
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terminology that was hypocritically being employed to justiry the Iraq war. such as
democracy, liberalism and secularism and spoke directly to Arab and Western
intellectuals whom he believed had a common aim:
As Arabs. I would submit. and as Americans we have too long allowed a IC\\'
much-trumpeted slogans about "us" and "our" way to do the work of discussion.
argument and exchange. One or the major failures of most Arah and Western
intellectuals today is that they have accepted without debate or rigorous scrutiny
terms like secularism and democracy, as ifeveryone knew what these words
mean. ("Dreams and Delusions" n.pag)
In that same article, he made an emotive appeal for the intellectual and citizen alike:
I urge everyone lojoin in and not leave the field of values. dclinitions, and
cultures uncontested. They arc certainly not the property ofa few Washington
officials. any more than they are the responsibility ofa tCw Middle Eastern rukrs.
There is a common field of human undertaking being created and recreated. and
no amount of imperial bluster can ever conceal or negate that fact. (n.pag)
Said continued to emphasize the imporlance or culture as a site lor the current militarization
of the world, particularly the war in Iraq. and placed hope in intellectuals and citizens to sec
through the rhetoric. Ilowever. his argument was limited on two li·onts. First. Said never
cogelllly extrapolated a theory of globalization beyond his notion of cosmopolitanism.
where marginal thought and intellectuals decenter the centers of power. It remained unclear
whether globalization is an unstoppable, homogenizing lorce or a dialectical process
through which the global is transformed as it interacts with local pat1icularities. Second. as a
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result of this lack of clarity on the nature of globalization itsclf: Said ncver fully theorized
the role of Third World intellectuals. as argued in the previous chapter. In the case of
predominantly Muslim countries. intellectuals were cither absent from any kind of counter-
response to global imperialism. or complicit with it as native informants. In the specilic case
under discussion here of Oriental ism as the cultural justification of the militarization of the
Middle East post-9III. Said's theorization did not allow lor thc complex and diverse
discourse which has arisen from MLlslim interlocutors.
Clarke has convincingly argued in Oriental En/ightel1/J1em: the Encounter
hetween Asian and Western Thought. that Oriental ism has had various oppositional
strains. sometimcs collaborating with power and onen times going against it:
Oriental ism. cannot simply be identified with the ruling imperialist ideology. for
in the Western context it represents a countcr-movement. a subversive entelechy,
albeit not a unificd or consciously organized one, which in various ways has onen
tended to subvert rather than contiI'm the discursivc structures of imperial powcr.
(9)
In f~lCt. post-Said. Oricntalism has bccome a derogatory term. delineating anti-Arab and
Islamophobic scntimcnts hiddcn under the objective rationale of scholarship. Ilere. like
Clarkc. I argue (or a more nuanced reading of Oriental isms whcn discussing the post-WI I
world because accusations on all sides can immediately shut down dialogue. Surely.
American eritics of U.S. military policy in thc Middle East have sulTered from
condemnations of being brandcd anti-America or anti-Semitic and this has constrained
the debate post-9I11 rcgarding responsibility for the continuing violence. Likewise.
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writers who try to explainjihad, Muslim and non-Muslim. arc otien mocked lor their lack
of theological knowledge and accused of being patronizing to Muslims. For my purposes
here. Oriental ism isnot intendedasajudgmental term to demarcate anti-Islamic thinkers.
racists or Islamophobes. It is used to demonstrate how inclusion and exclusion of Islam
is used to serve different. and often opposing. political objectives.
A wide and diverse range of social theorists have argued that today's world is
organized by accelerating globalization and increased mililarization.~ Douglas Kellner has
persuasively theorized globalization as a highly complex. contradictory. and thus ambiguous
set of institutions and social relations. as well as involving !lows of goods. services. ideas.
technologies. cultural forms. and people. resulting olien in what At:jun Appadurai calls
"relations of disjuncture.'·'There is no doubt that within these "relations of disjuncture."
Islam has occupied a particular place for at least the last decade. 9/1 I and its alierm<lth has
revealed that globalization both divides the world and unities it: it produces dominant
cultural hegemony and counter discourses that contradict it. As Kellner notes.
The experience of September II points to the objective ambiguity of globalii'.ation.
that positive and negative sides are interconnected. that the institutions of the open
society unlock the possibilities of destruction and violence. as well as democracy.
1 Fora thorough and thoughtful overview of globalization theory see
Douglas Kellner. "Theorizing September II: Social Theory. Ilistury. and Globalization:' Web. 12
OCI.2010<http://www.gseis.ucl<l.cduJracully/keliner/>.
Douglas Kellner. "Globalization. Terrorism. and Democracy: 9111 and its i\tknnath:' Wcb. 12
Sept 20 10 <hllp://www.gseis.ucla.edu/laculty/keliner/papers/GLOBOTY2003.htm/l ednl '>
Douglas Kellner. "Dialectics of Globalization: From Theory to practice." Web. 19 Octobcr 2010
<..http://gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kcllncr/essays/2007_KclIner_DialecticsGlobaltoPrac07'>
Roland Robcrtson. Glo/)(/!i:alioll: Social Theon' al7d G/ohal C/lil/lre (London: Sagc. 191)2).
,Bg::I~Jal~r~c~·iln(::':i~.I_;::;~~:.;I~i;'~;~;;~~~·~~~':~11l~o~·(~h~:~;~~:;L~i:~~111~.~~~1~tl~(II~~~ii~~t~~n..
12 Octobcr2010< hllp:/Iwww.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kcllner/>.
73
free trade. and cultural and social exchange.... Some see terrorism as an expression
of "the dark side of globalization." while I would conceive it as part of the objective
ambiguity of globalization that simultaneously creates friends and enemies, wealth
and poverty. and growing divisions between the "haves" and "have-nots.
(""Dialectics of Globalization" n.pag)
In short. the evenlS of 9/11 and their aftermath highlight some of the contradictions of
globalization and its dialectical functions. both as a homogenizing lorce of sameness and
unilormity. and a source of heterogeneity, difference, and hybridity. They also reveal
globalization as a contradictory mixture of democratizing and anti-dcmocratizing
tendencies. which allow more and more voices to be heard. while simultaneously escalating
attempts to curb civil liberties. Grasping that globalization embodies these contradictory
tendencies at once. thaI it can be bOlh a force of homogenization and heterogeneity is crucial
to understanding the current manifestations of Oriental isms as both the cultural logic in
militarizing the Middle East, and cultural antithesis to the progression of global capitalism.
as well as to the duplicitous role of Muslim interlocutors.
Both the nco conservatives and the left have positioned Islam as the antithesis to
globalization with the assumption that the "Islamic world view" is violently challenging the
current path of secular humanism. On all sides of the debate. contemporary Muslim cultural
theorists have rallied and have gained a new stature. raising questions of the role of native
inlonnants in interpreting the relation under consideration. This importance is largely
connected to their perceived ability to interpret the code of jihad. secn as the driving force
behind Islam's eonli'ontation with modernity and globalization.
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The diverse politics of Oriental isms relate largely to the militarization or the
Muslim world and the curbing of civil liberties in the West: a nco-conservative
Oriental ism directly supports the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Patriot Act. and
lenist Oriental ism opposes these wars and the attack on civil liberties. Ironically. though
politically opposites. both manipulate the figure or the !lO/1/0 IslallliclIs to support their
political agendas. In The Anarchy o(Elllpire in Ihe Making o( u.f;.,' Clllillre. Amy Kaplan
demonstrates the link between domestic and foreign arfairs in imperial proj..:ets and
discusses the role of the metropolitan postcolonial intellectuals in discrediting their native
culture of resistance and winning the hearts and minds of domestic American voters. It
can be argued that the works discussed in this chapter. advertently or inadvertently. serv..:
this agenda. Particularly in the current debate about "bad" and "good" Muslims. Muslims
strategically position themselves in a discourse that presents jihad. in particular. as the
antithesis to modernity and in doing so both the ""good" and "bad" Muslims declar..: their
orthodoxy. Muslim "rclormers" onen refer to "reclaiming" an Islam that has b..:en
"hijaeked" by the jihadisis. asserting their recourse to an authentic and orthodox Islam.
'fhejihadisis also make a similar claim about returning to an authentic Islam. outside the
corruption of Western and Middle I:::astern rulers. While both make a claim to orthodoxy.
each side considers the other heterodox. In this hotly contested field. the orthodox and
heterodox change places radically. depending on one's view or one's rok. Whatever the
status of one's self determination, the decoding of terminology and th..: positioning of
oneself as an authentic interpreter or the jihad is what gives the mod..:rate Muslim
relormercultural value.
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The first point of entry into this cultural fascination with jihad might be marked by
examining the surge of literature which focuses on the justification provided to a Western
audience lor the militarization of predominantly Muslim societies. The old Orientalist
arguments, which Said deconstructcd so wcll, have been upgraded to take into account
technology and the transfer of Muslim populations into the West. The line runs roughly like
this: Muslims are jealous of the freedom and technological advantages of the West. Their
society has been in decline after their scientific advances of medieval Europe. Instead, they
try to usc the West's technology against itself. Whether airplanes, viruses, or chemicals,
Muslims have appropriated science for the purposes of terrorism. Consider for example
Thomas Friedman's assertion that
... terrorists can hijack Boeing planes, but in the spiritless monolithic societies they
want to build, they could never produce them. The terrorists can exploit the U.S.-
made Internet but in their suffocated world of one GoeL one truth. one way. one
leader, they could never invent it. (46)
According to this narrative, not only have Muslims appropriated the technology of the West
for this ballie. they have also appropriated its citizenship and territory. with European
Muslims particularly presenting a grave challenge to democratic processes. Of course. this is
a rather simplified version of the narrative. but it does highlight two central points around
which the globalization debate circulates. First, the history of Muslims is presented as on a
direct course ofconfi'ontation with the West. requiring an erasure of the inlluence of Muslim
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inlluenees on the development or modern thought in Europe.6 This requires that the role or
Muslims in European history be actively erased and repositions the contemporary Muslim in
a parasitic posilion- feeding olT Western ingenuity, and plotting to destroy it. This argument
weaves through the work of diverse sources: Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, and
Muslim ··reformers.'" such as Irshad Manji. Second. the debate about Muslims and their
roles as citizens in Western societies has placed Muslim thinkers under a microscope.
challenged to prove their Americanness or Europenness over their Muslimness. This deball:
is, or course. part or a much larger discussion around identity. statehood. citizenry and
globalization.
The major perpetrators of the argument that Muslim history has been on a
collision course with the West and that Islam is basically incompatible with Western
progression have been Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis. It should not be
overlooked that while Huntington popularized the Islam versus the West debate. his
major source book was the work or Said's nemesis, Bernard Lewis. In Lewis' 1990 7he
Roots oj"Muslim Rage, he warns ora resurgence orMuslim rage rooted in lourteen
centuries ofconllict with the Christian tradition and thc humiliation ormodcrni,.ation
which bypassed the Arabs. He eoncluds that the risc oranti-American ideas is a lllixlUre
or Marxism and Muslim rage-the inability for Muslims to accept domination. Soon
alicr 9/11. Lewis endorsed thc U.S. overthrow or the Saddam regime and sct out his laler
version of Islamic history in What Went Wrong? Western Impact and l'vliddle Easlern
"See paniclIlarly Anollar Majid. Freedolll olld Or/llllllox\"." IslolII 01111 Di/Terellce ill/he I'IISI
.·llIdolllsiwlAge(Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2004)
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Response. As Lockman notes, though the book was written bcforc 9/11. it oflCrs a
distressed American audience and policy makers cxplanations and rationale lor their
rcsponsc (250). Here, Lewis virtually ignores the impact of colonialism and thc
complcxities of Muslim responses to it. and claims that Muslims have failed to respond to
modernity, remaining rcligiously inclincd to authoritarianism. Thc postscript hc attachcs
to the book afier 9/1 J describes the attacks as "the latest phasc in the strugglc that has
bccn going on for more than 14 centuries" (What Went Wrong 164). and argucs lor
policies in the "cause of freedom" that will "triumph" as they did "over thc Nazis and the
Communists" (165). In another book. The Crisis ollslam: Holy War and Unholy Terror.
written afier 9/11. Lewis rehashes his arguments about the failure of Islam to modcrnize
and insists on the nccessity and rightncss of Amcrican forcign policy, articulating that it
is American's role to lead thc Arabs to democracy.
Lewis' companion, Samuel Huntington. lays out his vision lor thc post communist
world order in his widely quoted The Clash olCivili::ations and the Remaking ol World
Order. Huntington maintains primarily that conflicts would not be ideological or
economic but cultural, and he identifies various major civilizations: the West; Slavic
Orthodox (Russia and Eastern Europe); Islam; Confucian; Japan; Hindu; Latin America;
and "possibly African civilizations." arguing that it is precisely where the civilizations
mcct wherc conflict would occur. He also predicts an emergence of Confucian-Islamic
civilizations against the West and advises the West to increase its military superiority.
possibly including Latin Amcrican civilizations within its quest lor superiority.
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The combined work of Lewis and Huntington has been in the forcli'ont or the
American loreign policy agenda in the Middle East over the past decade. It is the vicw
that is supported by mainstream media. For example, the New )fork Times columnist
Thomas Friedman's Lonxillides and Allillides extends these arguments and rurthcr
divides the Islamic world into medievalists and modernists. Aside from writing lictional
"kick ass" letters from Bush to bin Laden, Friedman follows up on Huntington's
recommendation to exploit the interior differences and conflict among Confucian and
Islamic States. To do so, he advises strengthening moderate and secular Muslims in the
war against the radicals, raising direct questions about the role of Muslim intcllcctuals in
today's debate.
The lell presents very different arguments. but surprisingly betray some very
similar assumptions about jihad. In The Neill (Jrienla!isls, Ian Almond critiqucs somc or
thc major postmodern thinkers, particularly those who have offered a critiquc or
modernity and capitalism in French culture and often make recourse to Islam as a way or
"obtaining some kind or critical distance f"om onc's own society" (2). Tracing thc
Islamic references in the works or Nictzsche. Foucault, Dcn·ida. Kristeva. Baudrillnrd,
Zizck and othcrs, Almond notes that many of these writers employ thc Islamic Oricnt to
relocate Western modernityandcritiqucit; thcywant to rc-evaluatemodernity'stcncts
but also evoke an Islamic/Arab Other in doing so (2). In this way, postmodcrnity
inherits, in a more subtle manner, thcOricntalist/imperialist tropes that had bccn so
prevalent in modernity (4). On Nietzsche. lor cxamplc. whom I\lmond posits as thc
progenitor of Zizek, he notes that "Islam forever hovers in the background or Nictzsche's
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writing. both published and unpublished.. ietzsche's interest in Christianity's
combative Other appears to increase as the years pass by (8). Foucault. Almond argucs.
afier conducting a review ofrelcrences to Foucault·s time in Tunisia and to ovcr halra
dozen articles on Iran. employs Islam to critiquc the Euroccntric vicw. in thc proccss
positing Islam as the Other and reanirming this Otherncss (22-23). The idca orthc
Iranian revolution allowed Foucault to focus on the madness or Islam: as an encrgy that
rcsists thc control and containment of the West and revcrses history. This allows Almond
to conclude that "the Islamic Orient Foucault finds in Iran isthcsamc Islam wc lind in
The Antichrist and thc Genealogy o(Mora!.\·" (41).
In an interesting extension. Almond connects thc works or .Jean Baudrillard and
Slavoj Zizek as part of thc Nictzsche/Foucault tradition. For cxample. Baudrillarcrs
admiration of Saddam Ilusain is based on seeing in himthc transparcncy orpowcr or an
Oriental despot. and like ietzsche and Foucault hc connects thc Oricntal to a "morc
authentic premodcrn understanding of power" (161). For Baudrillard. Arabs havc no
problcm with "being playthings in the order or somcthing larger than thcmsclvcs"; thcy
can accept the rolc orobjcct and Baudrillard admircs thc object status. an unckrstanding
or our place in thc world or things. which is superior to thc Occidcntal view (162).
Almond argues that in this scnse The GIII( War Did Not Take Place is the "postmodern
Oricntalisttcxt parexccllcncc" (163) in which Baudrillard produccs a discourse about thc
Iraqis but never includcs them in his discussion (164). Ilc cogcntly points out
l3audrillard erases the rcalityofthc Arab perspcctivc and cxpcricnccand adds that it is
dinicult to imaginc what would happen if Baudrillard had writtcn a book callcd 9/1 I Did
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Not Take Place (165). Although Almond's critiques are justifiable and well-argued. hc
does not elaborate carefully enough the difference between the Oricntalism of Baudrillard
li'om that of Lewis. Huntington. and Friedman. While the Oriental ism of such neo-
conservatives is used tojustify the waron tcrrorand particularly the attack on Iraq.
Baudrillard's perspective was oppositional to dominant political discourse; lor example,
hc occupied an adversarial position on the Iraq War. While he did not really cngage with
jihad itselfas a specifically Muslim response and used Islam symbolically in his
discourse, Baudrillard did show sympathy with Muslim victims. It is nccessary to
cmphasize the double track of Baudrillard's engagement with Islam and we can brielly
extrapolatc this by noting his comments onjihad in the Spirit o/Terrori,I/II along with his
thoughts on the Abu Ghraib scandal.
Clearly in Spirit o/Terrorism, as Almond argues, Islam is merely a mctaphor lor
the implosion of globalization's excess, a metaphor ofooanti- powcr." a substitute lor
communism, a "ghostly enemy ... infiltrating itself... from all the interstices orpower"
(Baudrillard Spirit o/Terrorism 15). Later. in The Intelligence o(Evil. Baudrillard
repeats morc orthe same:
Terrorism operates at a highcr level of radicalism: it is not a subject orhistory: it
is an elusive enemy. And if the classes struggle generated historical events.
terrorism generates another type of event. Global power (which is no longer quite
the same as capital) finds itselfin direct confi'ontation with itselLltisnowlento
deal not with the specter of communism. but with its own specter. (128)
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Alier 9/11. Baudrillard was forced into a position where he had to delend himself from
accusations that such reflections constituted anli-Americanism or the legitimation or
terrorism. He claims.
I do not praise murderous attacks-that would be idiotic. Terrorism is nol a
contemporary form of revolution against oppression and capitalism. No ideology.
no struggle lor an objective. not even Islamic rundamentalism. can explain it. ... 1
have glorified nothing, accused nobody. andjustilied nothing. One should not
confuse the messenger with his message. I have endeavoured to analyze the
process through which the unbounded expansion of globalization creates the
conditions for its own destruction. (""This is the Fourth World War" n.pag)
Therefore, Baudrillard did not place hope injihud to radically transform the trend of
globalization. but merely saw it as a disruptive force contained in globalization. an
excess. very similar to what Kellner has argued in regards to the nature of globalization
itself. It can be argued that Baudrillard can be accused of too llippantly employingjilwd
to make a point. but his position was not a case ofOrienwl enchantment or romanticislll.
The point is that he usedjihud as a selfrelleetive mechanism to theorize about the nature
of globalization. not about the nature ofjihud itselr. This. when coupled with his article
on thc images of Abu Ghraib. gives us a clearer idea or l3audrillard's stance. In "The
Violence of the Global," Baudrillard argues that the Abu Ghraib images were a parody or
violence and the Iraq war itselrin which the "reality show" or the "the liberation or Iraq"
became an"Ubesqueand inrantile" farcical speetaeleorthe impotency of American
power. He notes the racist and colonial degradation. evident in the images. lor which the
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entire West is responsible: "it is the whole of the West that is prescnt in thc sadistic
smiles of the American soldiers. just as it is whole ofthc Wcstthat is behind thc building
ofthc Israeli wall." ("The Violence ofthc Global" n.pag)
Zizek's case is slightly more contentious. For Almond, Zizek's post-9I11 work is
a continuation of Baudrillard's argumcnt. Hc argues that for Zizck. Islam has a fanatical
rcvolutionary energy and also serves a transitional function toward an unactualized
socialism (179). His Iraq. as shown in Iraq: the Borrowed Ke//le. which Zizck admits is
not a book about Iraq. is rcminisccnt of Baudrillard's The (J/llj' War Did No/ Take Place
In fact. Iraq is used to elaborate his Lacanian theories and Zizck rcpositions and relocates
the war as the first war betwcen the USA and Europc (Almond 180-181), Zizck's call lor
I:urocentricism is not an apology for imperialistic arrogance, but a dcsire lor social
justicc and a li'ustration with (he way capital has used idcntity politics to distract and
manipulatc that dcsirc; at thc samc timc. it pushes Iraq to thc margins of his book
(Almond 182-183).
Besides thc marginalization of the socia-political reality of Iraq. Almond contends
Zizck cclebrates what he perceives as thc violence of Islam. which he describes in
lVelcome /0 the Deser/ oj'/he Real as primarily an explosion of lethaljo/lis.\'Wlce (I X5). In
Welcome /0 the Deser/ oj'/he Real Zizek hopes that Islam can be articulated into a
socialist projcct bccausc of its irreduciblc characteristics that arc the cxact l'eatures that
makc it the Other: its anti modcrnity. its sense of collectivity and its rcsort to radical
violence. Islam lics in an intcrmcdiary stage as somcthing to bc uscd. Almond concludes
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that Zizek's Muslims are not real Muslims but 'beings for others--other countries. other
causes. other projects" and his Islam has a kind of"dehumanized functionality"· (192).
Certainly. it is true that Zizek's positioning ofjihad as an instrument to be used as
a way out of the paralysis of postmodernism and post politics is evident in many of his
works. For Zizek. thejihadis! is a challenge to the ietzschean deadened last man who is
consumed by the post political society:
Is not this antagonism the one between what Nietzsche called passive and active
nihilism? We in the West are the Nietzschean lasl men. immersed in stupid daily
pleasures. while the Muslim radicals are ready to risk everything. engaged in the
struggle even up to their own self-destruction. (We/collle!o the Oeser! o(lhe Real
40)
Thus. for Zizek. thejihadis!. in his excessiveness. may serve as a hope to start from a
"completely alternate position which changes the very coordinates of discourse" (-W). lie
provocatively romanticizes:
What if we arc really alive only if we commit ourselves with an excessive
intensity to that which puts us beyond mere life'? What is when we locus on mere
survival. even ifit is qualified as having a good time. what we ultimately lose is
life itsell'? What if the Palestinian suicide bomber on the point of blowing him-
or herself(and others) up is. in an empathic sense. more alive than an American
soldier engaged in a war in li'ont of a computer screen? (Welcollle !o the Oeser! oj"
the Real 88)
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This romanticism is the core of what bothers Almond in regard to lizek's approach to
Islam and specifically jihad. However, it otten appears as a dramatic flourish in lizek's
work and is counteracted with a harsh critique of Muslim societies, which we will
examine in more detail in the following chapter. The important point is that 2iz,ek is
disappointed in the Western response to the excess ofthejihadisl, which hc sees reflected
in two ways: a reassertion of conservative dialogue about the Other and a restriction on
the expression of dissidence by accommodating it to liberal multiculturalism in mfive
gestures of superficial inclusion. These gestures. such as the debate over the Danish
cartoon crisis, are "patronizing:' lizek argues.
What. however, about submitting Islam-together with all religions-to a
respectful. but for that reason no less ruthless, critical analysis? This and only this,
is the way to show true respect for Muslims: to treat them as serious adults
responsible far their beliefs. (Violence 139)
It is this "ruthless, critical analysis:' along with his occasionally provocative bad taste,7
that opens lizek for charges of racism and Oriental ism. However. a close reading
demonstrates that Muslims basically remain on the fringes ofZizek's lal'mulalions, but so
does the entire Third World. Zizek's call for Eurocentricism posits Europe as a site of
resistance to American hegemony, and, far Zizek, the real catastrophe 01'9/11 was that of
Europe, since America's hegemony was strengthened and Europe lost power:
It is a unified Europe, not Third World resistance to American imperialism. that is
the only feasible counterpoint to the USA and China as two global super powers.
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The Left should unashamedly appropriate the slogan ofa unilicd Europe as a
counterweight to Americanized globalism. (We/collie to the Desert oFthe Real
145)
It may be morc accuratc to accuse Zizek of Eurocentricism than of Oriental ism.
At times. howevcr. Zizek's understanding ofjihad. runs dangcrously close to that
the Lewis/ Huntington/ rriedman school. In Violence. Zizek argues that the
"fundamentalists'" whelher Christian or Muslim. are not strong enough believers because
ifthcy were they would not be threatened by the "sinful life ofnon-bclicvers" (85). lie
then presents a completely culluralist argument to explain the anger of Muslims at the
Danish cartoon crisis:
How fragile the beliefofa Muslim must be. ifhe feels threatened by a stupid
caricature in a low-circulation Danish newspaper. The fundamentalist Islamic
terror is not grounded in the terrorists' conviction of their supcriority and in their
desire to safeguard their cultural-religious identity li'om the onslaught of global
consumerist civilization. The problem with fundamentalists is not that we
considcr thcm inferior to us. but rather that they themselvcs sccretly consider
themselves inferior. This is why our condescending. politically correct assurances
that we leel no superiority towards them only make them more furious and lCeds
their resentment. The problem is not cultural dilTerence (their elTorl to preserve
their identity) but the opposite lacl that the fundamentalists arc already like us.
thal secretly they have internalized our standards and measurc themselves by
them. (Violence 86)
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Zizek does not allempt to place the cartoon crisis in the socio-political circumstances
from which it was generated: the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. a recent Israeli
allack on Lebanon. the ongoing siege ofGaza. the continuing persecution of Muslims in
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. and a rapidly rising right in Europe. Instead. he uses a
culture argument of envy and inferiority to posit the Homo Islamic/ls as a pathetic ligure
in a liberal multicultural Europe.
This discussion of the diversity of the debate around jihad and Oriental isms has
been extended to make a simple point: genuine diversity docs exist in the discussions hy
non-Muslim writers. from the right nco-liberals to postmodernists and leftists. Both sides
allemptto "put Islam in" the discourse on globalization. and whilc Islam is a cultural
incompatibility for thc conservatives. it provides a hopeful subtext to critique European
society lor the leftists. Ironically. however. all arguments tend to cnd up on the same c/ll
de sac. Whether it is the argument of the neo conservatives or of the leftists. whether the
Ilomo IslamiClls is dehumanized or humanized. all point to the incompatibility of Islam
with the Wesl. the presenceofa mysterious irreducibleessencc that pred icatesaviolcnt
rupture of Islam with globalization.
And it is exactly at this thrcat of rupture where moderate Muslims arc called into
interpret. and it is in this location that Muslim thinkers have gained value. as voices of
authenticity lor political agendas. More often than not. Muslim rclormers in the West
advocate lor a secularization or reform of Islam to make it more compatible with Western
humanism. while Muslim communities in predominantly Muslim countries growingly
support Islamist political parties. It can also be argued that the role of the metropolitan
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Western Muslim and particularly the White convert to Islam is to help "save" Islam Ii'om
the radicals and to foster a new European and American Islam that can rescue Islam from
the clutches of the spectral Arab and Eastern Muslim. This is demonstrated by the titles
of numerous texts written by Western converts, as, for example, Michacl Wolte's Taking
Back /slam: Alllerican Muslims Reclaim their Fc!ith ((2002). or Joseph Lumbartl"s Islalll.
Fundalllentalism and the Betrayal ojTradition(2004) , both of which highlight this
convert- savior status. Thc White convert is accompanied on this perilousiourney by the
naturalized European or American Muslim, who may have been born inlo Islam, but is
significantly acculturated to act asa cultural insider of both cultures. These "good"
Muslims are diverse and their discourse both support and refute. simultaneously. many or
the Oriental isms discussed above.
In The Social Li/e o/Things. I\ppandurai defines postcoloniality as a system or
postcolonial writers working within the neocolonial context or commodity culture. and
noted that the writer herselfis only one orthe agents of legitimation: others include
reviewers. publishers and communities. In this way. the cultural industries both produce
and appropriate writers to lit into various subject positions in the lield. In 7/1I!
Postcolonial Exotic. Graham Huggan suggests that the encoding or the exotic has been
essential in assigning value 10 postco!oniality.
Exoticism may be understood conventionally as an aestheticizing process through
which the cultural other is translated and relayed back to the ramiliar. Yet ... it is
effectively repolitcized. redeployed both to unsettle metropolitan expectations or
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cultural otherness and to effect a grounded critique of differential relations of
power. (x)
In short. the exotic manufacturcs Otherness by either rcndcring the lamiliar strange or by
making the strangc familiar in the dialectical process ofexoticization (Othering) and
appropriation. It is a "semiotic circuit that oscillatcs between thc opposite poles of
strangeness and familiarity" (13). Functioning as a symbolic systcm. the exotic assigns
the familiar to unfamiliar things and often politics is concealcd under this dialectical
process. The Other is perceived as foreign or demonized when there is a need to
subjugate him. or as fi'icndly and neighborly when the subjugation will be less violent.
Therefore. it is not so much the intentionality orthe author which is the locus of
interpretation. but the function of the author as a commodity in the proccss of
cxoticization. As previously noted. Amy Kaplan has argued that these cultural
commodities are important in gaining domestic support for American foreign policies.
"Good" Muslims use various techniques to familiarizc themselves to their
audiences as valuable interlocutors as they decodcjihlld. as evidenccd in the growth of
Muslim autobiographical or scmiautobiographical fiction and cultural criticism. Not only
is their knowlcdge valuable and strategic but it is also exotic. The Muslim intellectual
speaking to the West. salclliting around the discourse of globalization. positions herselfat
once as exotic and lamiliar. laying claim to an authentic Muslim connection as well as
demonstrating familiarity with Western ideas and norms. In doing so. she demonstrates a
diverse range ofOrientalisms. These postcolonial Muslims arc not mcrcly callous
participants in global capital. as ArifDirlik would accuse them ofbcing. proliting in the
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essentialization of marginal people to whom they marginally belong. Neither arc thcy
merely "comprador intelligentsia'" "a relatively small. ·Western·-style. 'Wcstcrn'-trained
group of writers and thinkers. who mediate the trade in cultural commodities of world
capitalism at the pcriphery" (Appiah 62). They are involvcd in an cndless semiotic
circuitry. the means by which culture isproducedandassigncd valucasexemplilicd in
the contemporary shift of Islam from the periphery to the mctropolis. marketcd lor a First
World audience as a cultural companion to sustaining the militarization rcquircd lor thc
war on terror. Hcrc I will cxtcnd this argument by refcrring to selectcd works by Irshad
Manji. Azar Nalisi. Khalcdllosseini and Yasmina Khadra.
Irshad Manji is a Canadian author/journalist. and eurrcntly director ofthc Moral
Courage Project at the Robcrt P. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at Ncw York
University. Manji's book. The TrlllIhle wi/h Islalll Today. has been published in morc than
thirty languages and she has narratcd a PI3S documentary. Fai/h lVi/holi/ I'-ear. which
was nominated for a 2008 [mmy Award. Manji takes great pains to position herscll'
inside hcr faith and speaks from a subject position ofa concerned and dedicatcd Muslim.
Icading a bravc rclorm lor her faith. Iler wcbsitc. for example.xopcns with a Ilash of
Irshad in relleetion (though not Islamic dress). praying. with thc caption "I am a faithful
Muslim'" This is lollowed by images of men being hanged. women being stoned and
buried alive. and raging masses of Muslim demonstrators. with thc caption. "I speak out
against violencc and human rights abuses in thc name of God'" Following the various
scenes of violence and rcmarks about courage. a photo of Manji. as a child in Islamic
, Sec <.http://www.irshadmanji.com/>
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dress. appears with the caption "I am Irshad." In this way, as in all her work. Manji
credits herselfas an insider, bravely positioning herself against the "bad" Muslims to
redeem and reclaim her religion. She is also frank about who her audience is directly on
her website. First, to all Muslims in the West. who obviously still have the hope of being
"good" Muslims. she poses the question. "will we remain spiritually inhll1tile. caving in
to the cultural pressures to clam up and conform?"' Second, to non-Muslims she asks.
"Will you succumb to the intimidation of being called fascists?"' In this way. Manji
positions herself to a Western audience, placing the firm hope that relorm can come from
Western Muslims who refuse to be as infantile as the violentjihadists. all of Oriental
pcrsonage, whom she flashes across the screen.
Manji also positions herselfasan anti intellectual outside the academic
mainstream and attempts to appeal. in style and content. to a mass popular audience.
Resonating with Bernard Lewis' What Went WronK and The Crisis o(lslolll. hcr work.
The Tro/lh/e with Is/am Today. offers "expert" opinion in all areas of Islamic exegeses:
Muslim Diasporas in the West, Islamic Law. the treatment of women. fundamentalism
and terrorism. the relationship betwcen Islam and democracy, the Arab-Israeli contlict.
and much more. Manji explains lor an ostensibly befuddled audiencc that the problems
with Islam arc related to its patriarchal. homophobic and violent outlook on lite. based on
her own expericnce as a lesbian Muslim under the control ofa domincering Muslim
t~lther. The cover of the book. with the title taped across Manji's mouth. her eyes looking
sadly upward. accentuates her stance as onc who refuses to bequiet.despitc the risk.
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Tarcl EI Ariss makes a valuable insight when he notes that in The 7i'O//h/e II'ilh
Is/am Today Manji takes an anti-intellectual position in order to popularize her argument
and make herself familiar to her audience. He refers to the introduction to the book by Dr
Khaled Mohammed, who teaches Islam at an American university. and praises Manji for
not writing for an academic or intellectual audience but for speaking to the people in their
voice. It can be noted that throughout the book Manji uses a conversational tone.
cracking jokes, often irreverent ones, reminiscent ofZizek's bad taste. lor her audience.
Shc constantly reasserts her right to comment on Islamic relorm: ""It might appear
ridiculous that someone who is not a theologian, a politician. or a diplomat .. has the
chutzpah to comment on what can be done to retorm Islam" (138).
It has been argucd9 that Manji's interpretations are rather superficial and lcaveout
access to key texts which shccriticizes. For example. her feminist intcrpretations leave
out the achievements of major Muslim women ligures, as well as Islamic contcxts tor
property and marriage laws. Her historical analysis largely bypasses the dcpth of the
Muslim history of Spain, including the post-crusade Diaspora when Muslims and Jews
cooperated in Ilceing Christian oppression. in fact, Manji tries to wipc Muslims clear out
ofEuropcan history. paving a clean path between contemporary thought from the ancient
Grceks to postmodernism. Further. the only attention shc pays to the contemporary
politics of the Middle East is in one chapter in which she emphasizcs how Israelis treated
her better on her trip to israel than the Palestinians did. Another ofhcr attacks locuses on
contemporary Muslim immigrants. especially European Muslims, whom shc accuses of
., Var'iouswebs,ites Ilavebeen selup by Musllil11s 10 rel'ute ~~anji's Clolil11s. One of the 111051
inlef'(~stint\ andhul11oroll', is < http://w\\.w.ex.a111irlethetTuth.com/manjisll1/llrshad Manji propaganda.hlm'-
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being ungrateful for the freedom given to them by their host countries. Ilere she places
herselfas a member of the First World. not of an immigrant community. and claims that
"in order to defend our diversity. we need to be less tolerant" (199). advocating for the
necessity of the Patriot Act. Though Zizek would nOl argue lor the Patriot Act. his
assertion of the "paradox of the superego" in I'iofence is remarkably similar: ..the more
you obey what the Other demands of you. the guiltier you arc. It is as if the more you
tolerate Islam. the stronger its pressure on you will be"(113.)
Perhaps Manji's major achievement lies in the movement li'omji/wd to ij/i/wil.
two very closely related terms in Islamic theology. As noted in the Introduction to this
thesis. in the contemporary reperloireji/wd refers to violent revolutionary aelion and an
inner spiritual search. Ij/ihad. on the other hand. which has become a favorite code of
Muslim reformers. describes the process of critical thinking and questioning that is
inherent in Islamic theology. Manji's ij/ihad. however. is not merely Muslim sciI'
reflection upon the failure of Islam in developing Muslim societies. Manji positions
herselfas the leader of Opera/ion!j/ihad. and when she lays out her plan lor Opera/ion
Ij/ihad and reform of Islam. she explicitly points to post-war Iraq as a starting point in the
Middle Eastern region, directly connecting hcr agcnda to the political one (185). I\s U-
I\riss notes. there is no wonder that hcr work has received such recognition from
Friedman who connects her work on Opera/ion Ij/i/wd to Opera/ion !r(/(/i Freedo/ll as a
process ofrclonn and democratization (93).
Manji's move fromjihad to ij/ihad is significantly more than a linguistic
maneuver. lor in order to advocate for ij/ihad. Manji first attempts to deconslruetji/wd
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lor a Western audience. For her.jihad remains dehistorieized and associated with the
authoritarian nature of Islam. She rejects the argument made by other Muslims post-9/11
that Islam was "hijacked'" and claims that attention must be paid to the "nasty side of the
Quran and how it intorms terrorism" (42). To do this. she takes two approaches: lirst she
quotes inconsistencies in the Quran (without annotation. and so it is dirlicult for the
reader to check against a noted translation), and she points to the use of violence in the
Quran. She dismisses the qualifications that scholars have attached to these verses.
claiming. 'Tveread theseholarshipthatexplainstheseverses'in their context' and I
think there's a fancy dance of evasion going on" (43). Ilowever. she docs not give the
reader the privilege of this "scholarship'" since she docs not document it. By
highlighting apparently contradictory positions in the Quran onjihad. she concludes that
"compassion and contempt exist side by side" in the Quran (45). She asks. "what if the
Koran is not perfect? What ifit is not a completely God authored book') What ifit is
riddled by human biases?" (45). Therefore. the deconstruction ofjihai! lor Manji
necessitates a call for ii/ilmd. at the core of which is a questioning of the Quran itselL a
revised copy of which she provides on her website. elllitied Refill'll/is/ QI/ran. The
strategy used to question authenticity is even more rudimentary than that of the early
Orientalists, as Tibawi noted. and discussed in Chapter One.
The second strategy Manji uses to deeonstrueljihad is to hone in on the ligure of
lhejihadis/. particularly Mohamllled !\tta. the 9/11 bomber. attributing his motives to
"unf'cttered access to a dozen virgins in heaven" (45) and the "perpetual license to
ejaculate in exchange for a willingness to detonate" (46). She asks. "what if Mohammed
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Atta had been raised on soul-searching questions instead of simplc ccrtitudes" (47) about
the perfectibility of the Quran? However. then she contradicts herseiL since Atta \\'(/,\"
indeed raised in a secular environment. Manji can only despair that despite hisseeular
upbringing, his engineering degree. and his German post-graduate education he was
"incapable of questioning Islam's autocratic interpreters" (J 61). Thus, by using the
example of Atta, Manji attempts to show the tragic results of trusting a faulty text. Manji
never attempts to eontextualize the socioeconomic and historical root causes of Islamic
political activism, includingjihad.
This deletion is further exhorted in her PBS documentary Faith Withollt Fear. as
she travels through various Muslim communities to rediscover Islam. One of the most
telling conversations is with Nasser Ahmad AI Bahr. supposedly a previous bodyguard to
Osama bin Laden. The voice-over tells us thatjihadi'\"t'\" e1aim Mohammcd as their role
model. stating "Ahmcd sccs the present as a dark age rackcd by thc same struggles as 7'h
century Arabia'" again plaeingjihad in the context of a dark Muslim past. rather than in
an historical present. This past looms over the entire documentary. and. in fact. isa more
valid explanation for thc violent present than any other elucidation: Manji notes that
"what happened in the past is key to understanding why there is so much violence and
silence in the present." For Manji.jihad remains dehistorieized, much in.the way it is I()('
Huntington and Lewis. a blind enacting of the Quran's inconsistent provocation to
violence and the promise of sensual pleasure. Her discussion ol"jihad remains locked in
an Orientalist framework of an unchangeable and lanatic violence sanctioned in a l~lLIlty
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text in need orrerorm. As a supporter or the Iraq war. Manji serves to put a Muslim
stamp of approval on the militarization of the land or /-1011/0 Islall/iclI.\'.
In the recent war on terror. Iran. Afghanistan and Iraq have become particular
targets: Afghanistan because it housed AI Qaeda. Iran because. as a member of the Axis
of Evil and alleged possessor of nuclear weaponry. it can at any time unleash its legion of
iihadislS on the West. and Iraq lor a similar reason. to depose despot Saddam Ilussain
and bring --democracy:' or perhaps Manji's ii1ihad. 10 the region. It has become common
knowledge. however. that the desire to control the vast oil reserves of Iraq and gain
access to the reserves orlhe Caspian Sea is a major economic incentive to
"democratizing" the region. And. surely. the war on terror has been good lor the
American economy. In 2009 the U.S. signed arms deals worth $22.6 billion and on
September 14.2010 the Obama administration announced a weapons sale to Saudi
Arabia lor $60 billion. reportedly the biggest arms sales in U.S. history with the indirect
elket on 77.000 jobs in 44 states (Brauehli n.pag). But not only has the American
government gained. there arc numerous new opportunities ror private contractors
(Gregory n.pag).IO Enormous amounts of money have been paid out to private contractors
lor security. estimated by the Congressional Research Service to make up 54% of the
Department or Delcnse's workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan (Schwartz n.pag). An
estimated $100 billion has been paid out for contractors in Iraq (Risen n.pag). who
III GregorydoclImcnts.lorcxamplc.that ClibicApplications Inc .. aco11lractorlorsllpportscrviccs
lor rehearsal exercises. had a contract vailledat $375 million. whichcxpired in 2007 and wasrcncwcd lill
thc next ten years for $468 million. Similarly, the ICT was awarded a $45 million US Army contract in
1999.whichwasrcnewed in 2004 lor another five years lor$IOO million. to prod lice videogamcslor
trainlllg.
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allegedly are major culprits in torture and murder. now a mailer of public record with the
October 2010 AI Jazeera exposure of over 390.000 elassilied US documents. leaked to
whistleblower website WikiLeaks. 11 Similarly. contractors in Afghanistan. whcre the
number of contractors is significantly higher than military personnel (Cole n.pag) have
come under allack for similar cases of indiscriminate killing of civilians. and though the
exact amount paid to these contractors has not been released. up to $15 billion was paid
to only two linns. to build and support U.S. military bascs throughout Afghanistan
(Gregory n.pag). These examples could be multiplied many times over. and the
connections within the military-industry media-entertainmcnt complex havc become
more intricate. as has the relationship between thc military and privatc contractors and the
alarming numbers of civilian casualties and human rights abuses. Two points in particular
arc clear: this is no Opera/ion/j/ihad. or Huntingtonian process of bringing
dcmocratization to the !!omo !s/amicl/s. Instead. it is a process of commodilication and
dehumanization. consistent with the brand of Oriental ism that has underwrittcn the war
on tcrror since its inccption. A cursory look at a fcw of the popular novcls canonized by
Muslim writers li'om or about Afghanistan. Iran. and Iraq will clearly demonstrate how
the authority of an authentic Muslim voice has been complicit. willingly or not. in the
process of Empire building. Of particular interest arc Azar Nalisi's Reading Lo/i/a ill
Tehran. Khalid Hosseini's The Ki/e RI/nner. and Yasmina Khadra's The AI/ad and 71le
Sirens oj Baghdad.
97
Azar Nafisi is a visiting Prolessor and the director or·the SAIS Dialogue Project at
the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University's School or Advanced
International Studies in Washington, DC. She is best known as the author or the
bestseller Reading Lolita in Tehran: II Memoir in Books. which has been translatcd into
32 languages. was on the New York Times Best seller list for 117 weeks and won the
2004 Nonfiction Book of the Year Award f1'om Booksense, the Frederic W. Ness Book
Award. the 2004 Latifetl Yarsheter Book Award. an achievement award from the
American Immigration Law Foundation. and the 2006 Persian Golden Lioness Award for
literature. 12 Reading Lolita in Tehran is an autobiographical account of Nalisi's
experience as a teacher of literature in Iran where she constructs a secret reading group so
that she and her students can discuss the classics or literature. The memoir unl()lds
around her students, the texts they read, and the discussions she holds with them about
classics by .lane Austen, F. Scott Fitzgerald. Henry .lames. and especially Nabokov. about
their own lives, and about the political atmosphere in Tehran. Endorsed on the cover by
Margaret Atwood as a "literary rail on Iran's fundamentalist sea:' Nalisi's work has
achieved international acclaim. The book has come under harsh scrutiny by postcolonial
anti-Orientalists such as Hamad Dabashi, a rriend of Edward Said. who argues that the
book received immediate validation lor "symbolizing the opposition of Western
democratic humanism to the theocratic Islamic alternative" ("Native Informers and the
Making or the New American Empire" n.pag). Commenting on the close relationship or
Nafisi to neo-eonservatives such as Paul Wollowitz and Bernard Lewis. and their
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validation of her work, he accuses her of being a "comprador intellectuaL" In a morc
tempercd argumcnt. perhaps. Fatemeh Keshavarz makes similar criticisms in her work.
Jasmines and S'lars: ReadinK More /han Loti/a in Tehran. ill II hich ~hl'lJlIl'~li(lll~ II h~
numerous memoirs written over the last decade alone by Iranian women political
activists. who have suffered and survived heroically under both the Pahlavis and the
Islamic Republic, arc virtually unheard oC but afisi's memoir became a beslseller. 13
She also notes that the historical background for the reasons of the revolution arc
obliterated in Reading Loti/a. and that Iran is presented as a patriarchal. oppressive state
crying out lor libcration. Though thc novel's literary merits are qucstionablc ( its
narrativc is dctached and its charactcrs paper thin). it is interesting to note that it is
afisi's rolc as a native informant which has mostly comc under allack. Of particular
relcvance is the fact that Nafisi serves as a Trustce for Frccdom House. a highly
controversial U.S. nongovernmental organization that advoeatcs lar American-style
dcmocracy abroad while receiving a large portion of its funding fi'om the United States
government. Its Chair is thc ex Director of the CIA, .lames Woolscy, and both Samuel
Iluntington and Paul Wollawitz havc scrved as Board members. In !\/wlII(aclilring
C'onsen/, Edward Herman and oam Chomsky pinpoint Freedom Ilouse as a propaganda
machine lor American foreign policy:
Freedom House fulfils its function as a flak machinc. attempting to bully the
media into a stillmore thoroughgoing conlormity with the propaganda
"Shcargllcslhal Weslcrnalldicnces have nOI hcardofpcoplc likc Vida lIajcbiTabrizi, Fariba
Marzban. asrin Parvaz.orAshrafOehghan-ali polilical aClivisls who SirlIggledandrcsislcdbolhlhc
Pahiavilyrannyandlhclslalllic Rcpllbliclhalsllccecded il
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requirements of state policy by methods that are a travesty of honest journalism
(let alone scholarship) - all. of course. in the interest of··fi·eedom."· (227-228)
It is this allegiance that is relevant to our discussion here. As a Muslim interlocutor.
alisi provides a narrative that mainstream American society is ready to hear: how
democracy must be brought to Iran to liberate the citizens Ii·om the grip of medieval
theocracy. With America's ongoing Cold War with Iran over its nuclear programs. and
the lingering threat of possible military action. Reading Lolita. puts a stamp of approval
on such intervention. just as Manji's The Trouh/e with /s/al/l Today did lor the Iraq
invasion. It is not as if the American government requires this approval from Muslim
inlerlocutors. of course. but it does aid the neoconservative agenda of militarization ufthe
Middle East if Muslim writers. authentic voices. familiar enough as Americans and
Canadians. assist in their propaganda to support the argument that Muslims need to be
liberated.
Furthering this argument. it is interesting to compare briefly afisi's Reading
Lolita to The BathhollSe. published in the same year. by an American Iranian
contemporary. Franoosh Moshiri. who teaches literature and creative writing at the
University of Houston. The Bathhouse is a chilling account ofa teenage girl's
imprisonment andlorture al a detention facility located at what had been a public bath.
The selling is presumably post-revolutionary Iran, though specific historical and
conlextual details arc scarce. and even the city is not named. In contrast to Reading
Lo/ita. The Bathhouse docs not elucidate much about the particular history of the Iranian
revolution. but is an in-depth personal and literary probe into abuse and torture. Moshiri.
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however. has been articulate in her interviews and essays about what shc sccs as religious
"fundamcntalism"; at the same time, shc condcmns the Bush administration lor its
colonizing of the Middle EaSl. 14 She also notes the diflicully she has laced with
publishing her work, commenting that the market is interested in memoirs. not liction.
However. it can be argued that fiction sells well ifit is "on message" as. lor
example, Khalid Hosseini's The Kite Runner. the lirst novel published in English by an
Afghani. which sold over eight million copies. has been translated into more than lorty
languages and has been made into a major motion picture. Hosseini's novel is ccrtainly
more nuanced than Nafisi's and tells the story of enduring friendship in war-torn
Afghanistan. as well as highlights the ethnic tensions between thc Hazara and Pashtun.
The main character, AmiI'. an American Afghani. like Hosseini. leaves Afghanistan alier
the Soviet invasion and returns during the Taliban regime to rescue his childhood !i'iend
Ilassan's son, Sohrab. The novel's great hero, Amir's father. Baba. is secular and loves
America. while his nemesis is the pedophilic Taliban executioner. Asset'. AmiI' is a
developed character. familiarized to his audience as an American but also an Afghani.
and so are Baba and Hassan. since a great deal of the plot of the novel is tied up in the
daily activities of the two friends and the inhabiting of these partly lictional characters.
The Western response to Hosseini's book has been quite positive. with critics
hailing it as a postcolonial masterpiece written lor a broad Western audience. a
humanization of Afghanis about which Americans knew little." In a 2007 interview
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with Salon, Hosseini concedes that though the events 01'9/11 and its anermath hdp..:d to
get the book published. his novel humanizes the plight of the Afghani people. promoting
sympathy for them in the American public. However. it can be argued that it humaniz..:s
some of the Afghani people. while demonizing others. particularly the Islamic Afghanis
who are all presented as violent and lawless /-IOrl/O Islall/icus. The reception of the novd
in Afghanistan was certainly not as warm as in America. When the book was turned into
a film and used Afghani child actors. the rape scene of the young Hassan. an Ilazara. by
Pashtuns stirred up enormous anger. so much so that the lilm director. refusing to cut th..:
rape scene as per Afghani demand. removed the three young actors and their guardians
from Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates before releasing the lilm. II' It can hardly
be considered accidental that the controversial rapist is Pashtun. the major ethnic
contingent in the Taliban. against whom the American government and AfO arc
lighting a war.
In fact, Hosseini's follow up novel. A Thousand Splendid Suns. also slated to he
made into a film. paints a dark picture of polygamist fundamentalists. while also telling
an endearing talc of friendship and courage between women. As with The /\ile Runnel'.
S!Jlendid Suns weaves together dramas of personal struggle and regional politics. and
perhaps that is exactly where it achieves success. Again. Ilosseini has been applauded for
humanizing Afghanistan lor Western audiences and. with S!Jlendid S·uns. for bringing to
the lore the graphic abuses women have suffered in Afghanistan. 17 It appears that
1(, Erika Milvy. '"The Kite Runner Controversy," Salan9 Dec. 2007. Web. 03 June 2009
<http://IVIVIV.salon.col1l/entertainl1lent/l1lovies/featuren007/12/09/hosseini'>
I7Forsal1lplerevielVsseehttp://lVlVlV.revielVsolbooks.col1l/kiterunneI'I
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Hosseini has found a successful recipe, familiarizing the "good" Afghani, the victims of
the violent Taliban, the Homo Islamicus. particularly women and children, who await
redemption from their pedophilic and fundamentalist men. In The Kite Runner in
particular, AmiI', who can be read allegorically as America, flees Afghanistan with the
Soviet invasion (just as the Americans deserted the Mujahedecn afier using thcm lor
years of battle with the Soviets) and then returns to save Sorab from the Taliban (just as
the Americans have returned to save Alghanistan).
In short, endearing tales that humanize the Afghanis and Iranians in Ilossciniand
Nafisi's works succeed because they also demonize perceived potential cnemies to
globalization and "democratization." This is not to say that both Hosseini and Nalisi arc
pawns in the neoconservative military machine. though a stronger case could be madc for
Nafisi as a native informant than Hosseini, who does not fit as easily in the nco-
conservative think-tank clique. Instead.llosseini has positioned himselfas a
humanitarian working as a Good Will Envoy lor the United Nations Iligh Commission of
Refugees and starting his own humanitarian foundation lor Afghanis. lx It is intercsting
here to recall Zizek's criticism of humanitarianism as discussed in thc Introduction of this
thesis. For Zizek. humanitarian aid is the cover with which the opprcssion ofthc /-fOIl/O
Sacer is disguised, and in Welcome to the Desert o/the Real he insists that humanitarian
organizations playa similar role to military institutions in robbing the HOll1o Sacer of his
sovcreignty and humanity. The fact is, regardless of the politics or thc intentions of
Hosseini and Nafisi, both novels provide a convincing supportive argumcnt lor thc
IXscchltp:ltwww.khalcdhosseini.col11/hosseini-bio.hll11l
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American need to save both Iran and Afghanistan from its oppressors. Thcsc books
received mass popularity because of their perceived insight into a brutal and oppressive
world. a world with which we are at war. The writers themselves. through mcmoirs and
fiction. are perceived as offering an authentic insight into the troubled worlds of Afghani
and Iranianjihadists. Both Hosseini and Nafisi are familiar Americans. and yct they
rcmain exotic. belonging to places which they are asking LIS to save. Simply put. as
Empires are being built. intellectuals and writers are taken into the fold. intentionally 01
unintcntionally. and their work is selected and packaged to suit a dominant ideology. The
novels mentioned above are not complctely onc sided, as I have argued. nor do thcir
writcrs neccssarily deserve to be accused of being native informants. However. thc
publishing industry knows a story thal will sell when il sees one and has ils fingcr on the
pulse of America's neurosis and fears. And these books. with their varying degrccs of
Oriental isms. are packaged to sell. From the images on their covcrs (the shy Muslim
girls reading an unseen book on Reading Lo/ita. the boy hiding li'OITI an impending
shadow on the Kite Runner. the windblown women in burkas of A Thousand '~/}/endid
Suns). to the endorsements, from thc literary and politically establishcd.the books arc
given value as an insider and victim's look at Islamic radicalism. In short. the production
and rcception of the books, as well as the content, contribute to the justilication of the
ongoing war on terror.
Perhaps one of the most prolific fictional chroniclers of this war on terror who
deals directly withjihad by painting portraits of lictionaljihadists is Mohammed
Moulessehoul, an cx-officcr in the Algerian army, who adoptcd a woman's pseudonym
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(his wife's name), Yasmina Khadra, to avoid military censorship. His most recent hooks
all focus on violence in currently politically volatile places: WOI/Dreams (/993) in
Algeria, The Swallows oj'Ka!J1I1 (2002) in Afghanistan, The Allack (2005) in Israel, and
the The Sirens o/Baghdad (2006) in Iraq. Despite the publication of many succcssful
novels, Moulessehoul only revealcd his true identity after Icaving thc army and going into
exile and seclusion in France. The unveiling was a shock to France's Iitcrary
establishment:
The woman who had written several well-received novels in French and who had
as a result been clasped to the Gallic literary bosom as a writer, who would,
finally, give an insight into what Arab women were really thinking, turned out to
be a man called Mohammed MoulcssehouL And not just a man, but an Algcrian
army officer with three decades of military experience behind him. And nol just
an army officer, but one who had led a struggle against armcd Islamist radicals
and who, as a result, laced opprobrium in the French media for bcing tainted with
the blood of civilians killed in brutal oppression by the North Ali'ican slatc.
(Jeffi'ies n.pag)
The revelation of Moulessehoul's real identity deeonstructed his literary personagc as an
"authentic" voice of an oppressed Muslim woman, such as Azar Nafisi , commcnting on
the patriarchal oppression and religious totalitarianism in her homeland. Thc unvciling
also qucstioned thc very notion of"authenticity" itselr. Moulessehoul is nol a suavc,
familiar interlocutor, a U.N. special envoy, humanitarian and American-Afghan mcdical
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doctor like Hosseini, but a writer-soldier who had fought a brutal war against the
Islamists in Algeria. Moulessehoul was attacked in the French press. his credibility
seriously threatened, and in Le Monde and on French telcvision he defended Algeria's
army against charges that it. too. massacred civilians. asserting in 2002 in the Guardian:
"I can only say what I have seen. In eight years I never witnessed anything close to a
massacre by the army Yasmina Khadra ("I thought only soldiers like fighting" n.pag).
As a result of his self defence of his military actions, Moulessehoul claims his funding
was withdrawn by the International Parliament of Writers (IPW), which had offered his
family support for two years while he established himself outside Algeria. The IPW. set
upin 1993, in the wake of the Rushdie./c/lwa, has provided physical safetyandlinancial
support of writers Salman Rushdie. Wole Soyinka. and Vaclav HaveL 1 '!
Is Moulessehoul a "good" or "bad" Muslim? Whcn he was merely Yasmina
Khadra and not Moussehoul. he was a "good" Muslim. However, now that his military
background is transparcnt. the falsely constructed objectivity of the cosmopolitan Muslim
interlocutor has been called into public scrutiny. Perhaps, it is the transparency of
Mousschoul's anti-Islamism which is so troublesome to France's literary establishment
and this is what is also fuelling his popularity with the English translations of his books.
In 2004. Newsweek acclaimed The Swallows o(Kahul as a "masterpiece of misery,,~(land
on the back cover of the Vintage translation the Nobel Laureate.lM Coetzee wrote,
'''Margaret Drabble, "Why Authors Need a Refuge," The Gllardiall. 8 Dec 100 I. Wcb. 10 Junc
1009 <hltp:l/www.guardian.co.uklbooksll001/dec/08/politics>
'" Adam Piore. "The Death of Humanity: A bleak portrait of life under the l11urderous Taliban
The S',,'a//{}\vs II/Kahlll, .. Newsweek In/ernaliunal. Wcb. 19 Mar. 1004. 15 July 1009
<hltp:llwww.newsweck.coI11/1004/03118/the-death-ot~humanity.html>
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"Yasmina Khadra's Kabul is hcll on earth. a place of hungcr. tedium and slilling Icar.··21
The Swallows o/"f·:ahul was shortlisled for Ihe InlernationallMPAC Dublin Lill:rary
Award in 2006. Who elsc beller than an Algerian army officcr to explain thl: brutality of
jihadists to an already convinced and prcparcd English spcaking audicncc? nprolccted
by thc nco conservativc support of authorities such as Lcwis and Friedman. unlike lanji
and Nafisi. Mousschoul has to struggle harder to prove his impossible position of
objective distancing. This is exactly what makes his liction so duplicitous whcn it comcs
to describing the intcntionality ofthcjihadi.l't.
Citing the influcnce on his work of Camus. Nictzschc. and Dostoycvsky. placing
himselfin a Western intellcctual tradition, Khadra (Mosschoul still uscs Kharda as his
literary name) also positions himselfas a viable Muslim interlocutor for various siks of
conflict. In a 2005 intcrvicw for The Guardian. for cxamplc. hc speaks of his right to
intcrpret Afghanistan. a placc whcre he has ncverbeen:
I havc ncver bccn to Afghanistan but I mct a lot ofjournalists who workcd thcrc
who told mc thaI they rcad the book and said. 'I scethcscincidcntsallthctinK
butlnevernotcdthcm ... Allmyliteraturctakcsplaccinthatspacc--itdcals
with thai which has not bcen allcnded to. I wantcd to bring a ncw look from a
Muslim on the tragedy of Afghanistan. And to bring to it a wcstcrn pcrspcctivc at
thc samc timc.1 have wrillen a wcslern tragedy, but also a book that is Ii II cd with
"SllIanJerti"ies... t'ma He," TIJe(J/lordiol1.22JlIl1e2005. Web.25 JlIly2009
<. hllp://www.gllardial1.eo.lIk/books/2005~jlll1/22/ti"al1ee.world>
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eastern storytelling. When therc are two perspcctives there's a beller chance of
understanding. C'rm a Hc" n.pag)
He then points to the photo ofa woman in a burka on the li'ont of his novel. The .')\ralllJ\\"s
o/Kahlll. and comments. "This could be the Saharan villagc whcrc I was born'"
Thcrefore. Algeria or Afghanistan. Iraq or Palestine. all are being ravaged by the same
monster-thejihadisl and radical Islam. It is to his novels on Iraq and Palestine. places to
which Khadra has ncver been. that wc will now turn our allention.
In The Sirens o/Baghdad. Khadra strcsscs thc location oljihad as an cflCct of
political and personal humiliations by chronicling thc translormalion of a young
apolitical Iraqi through some rather awkward narrative strategies: the lirst person
thoughts ofthejihadisl himsclf. and political conversations bctwcen various
rcpresentative. one-dimensional mouth pieces. The novclmoves li'OITI Beirut. Kafr Karim
(an imaginary Iraqi villagc). Baghdad and back to Beirut again. Khadra utilizes the
nameless narrator's imprcssions of these places placc to describc the psychc of his
jihadisi. The narrator's disappointment in Beirut. hisjudgmcnt of its falseness and
schizophrcnia. o'pcns the novcl:
I'd imagincd a different Beirut. Arab and proud of it. I was wrong. It"sjust an
indeterminatc city. closer to its fantasies than to its history. a lickle sham as
disappointing as a jokc. Maybe its obstinate efforts to resemble thc cities of its
cnemieshavecauscd its patron saints to disown it.andthat·swhy it"sexposed to
the traumas of war andlhe dangers of evcry tomorrow. (I)
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In fact, for the narrator. Beirut. representative oflhe contemporary Arab world. is guilty
of its own schizophrenia. the cause of its own disasters. its own inability to be cithcr Arab
or Western: its "gutless illogical pride, for the way it falls between two stools. sometimcs
Arab. sometimes Western, depending on the payoffs involved" (2). Thus. from thc
opening pages, Khadra's narrative manipulates some of the very Oriental isms wc havc
discussed in the work of Friedman, and Manji-hisjihadisl is consumed with a blind and
egocentric Arabism, and a beliefin the incompatibility of the existence ofeulturcs.
In contrast. life in Kafi' Karim. a traditional Iraqi village, is presentcd quite
differently. Until the Americans violently descend on the village. it is a quiet town.
untouched by the ravages of war in Iraq. The characters are loyal sistcrs and young mcn
who gather to engage in political discussions. playing dominoes and watching tclcvision.
This is a typical small town story, in which the mores of Arab tradition arc rcspectcd:
codes such as respect for the elderly. gcnerosity, and social order arc kcptlirmly intact.
Discussions focus on timcly issues. such as the mixcd Iraqi ICelings on Saddam Ilusain.
and the risc of Islamist politics in the country. The conversations betwcen thc young mcn
in the village highlight the dcbatc about the relationship bctwecn religion and politics and
these discussions focus on the complicity of the Arab region in its own political turmoil.
This complicity is considered to be a fatal turning away from tradition toward modcrnity:
"1 I' thc Americans are here, it's our fault. By losing our faith, we·ve also lost our
bearings and our sense of honor" (37).
It is the code of honor, the mysterious codes ofthc noble !l1I1I111 Islalllicus, that
becomes the main impetus for the narrator's violent choices. The narrator. likc all tragic
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heroes or anti heroes. goes through a process of rapid transformation. In the carly parts or
thc novel. he vomits at the sight of any violence. The loss or the innocence or Karr
Karim and the narrator is symbolized through the murder of the innocent Sulyaman.
described as the town's "purest creature. its mascot and its pentacle" (62). Arter
Sulyaman is mistakenly killed by panicked American troops. thc process or the narrator's
politicization begins:
I was indeed angry. I held a bitter grudge against the coalition lorces. but I
couldn't see myselrindiscriminately attacking everyone and cvcrything in sight.
War wasn't my line. I wasn't born to commit violence. I considered myselra
thousand times more likely to suffer itlhan to practice it one day. (99)
When the narrator witnesses the heavy-handed symbolic humiliation orhis rather. this
anger spirals out or control. American troops invade his house and the narrator's 1~lther is
humiliated in front of him. The sight or his beaten father. pushed to the ground so that his
genitals are revealed to his family drives the young narrator over the edge:
The blow was struck and the die was cast. My rather lell over backward: his
miserable undershirt !lapped up over his race, revealing his belly. which was
concave wrinkled and grey ash belly ora dead lish ... And I saw while my
t~lmily's honor lay stricken on the tloor. I saw what it was lorbidden to sec, what a
worthy respectable son, an authentic Bedouin, must never see: that flaccid,
hideous, degrading thing, that forbidden, unspoken-o!: sacrilegious object. my
rather's penis, rolling to one side as his testicles !lopped up over his ass. That
sight was the edge of the abyss, and beyond it. there was nothingness but the
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infinite void, an indeterminate raiL nothingness. Suddenly. all of our tribal myths.
all the world's legends. all the stars in the sky lost their gleam ... a Westerner
can'tunderstand.can·tsuspectthedimcnsionsofthedisasler. Forme to see my
father's sex was to reduce my entire existence. my values and my scruples. my
pride and my singularity, to a coarse. pornographic Ilash. (J 02)
This cxcerpt is particularly rife with various Oriental isms on the masculinity and
vcngcance of the Homo Islamiclis. The father is symbolic of Iraq which has been
cmasculated through the American presence. The Bedouin code of ethics servcs as the
driving force for the narrator. not the injusticc of the Amcrican occupation. This code of
ethics is not understandable to a Westerncr. as thc narrator states; it is a mysterious.
apparently irrational intention. Seeing his rather's penis. not thc American invasion
itselL drives the irrational Bedouin into a murderous quest for revcnge:"1 was
condemned to wash away this insult in blood" (102). And of the course. the easiest way
to do this is to lind a mechanism, Islam, which by its nature accommodates violence.
through which he can reclaim his identity and honor: "I wanted something greater than
my misery, vaster than my shame" (108).
This symbolic desecration of the body of the father and the lorced desertion of
home and identity. leads the narrator to partake in ideologies or which he is never quite
convinced. From Beirut to a village in Iraq to Baghdad. Khadra creates every occasion
to contextualize contemporary Arab politics as a reason lor radicalization. When the
narrator returns to Baghdad. the novel shifts to a Kafkaesque landscape ofthejilwd--
where people are unjustly kidnapped. robbed and killed. and no one is as he appears-
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very similar to the lawless Algeria of Wo/fDrealJ1.\· and the Afghanistan of the S\m//OI\'s
o/Kahll/. The Siren's narrator is strangely homeless in the landscape of his own country:
he roams the streets until he is taken in bya homosexualli'iend li'om Kafr Karim. in
whose murder he later partakes as a homophobiejihadisl. lie moves li'om one ban: room
to another. waiting for the cvent for which he has prepared himself. In this picaresque
tale full of destruction and villainy, all young men share a sense of having been
dishonored: '"Various motivations activated these men, but they all shared a single,
blindingly obvious objective'"( 158), namely to reclaim their honor. As the narrator shares
stories of dishonor with these men, he begins to feel as a member of a victimized but
powerful group.
The role of waiting and ritual is an important part of this bonding expcrience. The
narrator spends his life waiting tor his big event in virtual solitudc, near starvation. As he
slowly becomes an accomplice to various acts of violence, the sensitive young man
retreats and is replaced by another character: 'I didn't feel anything in particular" (19~).
lie no longer requires reasons for his actions: '\ felt as though I'd lost thc threads of my
own story" (199). History is erased and Baghdad becomes as nondescript as Beirut: '"
didn't love this city IBaghdadl. For me it represented nothing. Mcant nothing'"(:Z 13).
The nameless, homeless narrator is, in fact. an exile in his own country: "Baghdad had
turncd away everything, cvcn in its prayers. And as for me. I no longer recognized
mysell'in minc" (233). Disassociated from nation. and ironically from religion, the only
solacc the narrator longs lor is death. This intoxication with dcath is a way to make up 11)1'
the humiliation ofthc symbolic father, and as a way (or thc narrator to redeem himself.
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The period before the bombing is one of preparation (or death. in which the narrator is
disassociated from his own body: he isolates himsclfin his hotel. which he compares to a
tomb. and allows himself to be injected with a virus which he will spread to others on a
Ilight to London. his body becoming his tomb. Like Manji's account of Atta. the narrator
loses his sense of self in a codified world of rituals and violence. until he is an empty
shadow of his current sci r. ready to use his already deserted body as a weapon.
The decision of the narrator not to commit the act of terror at the end of the story
is mysterious and unconvincing, even sentimental. In l~lct, the ending is implausible. a
clear signal that the purpose of the novel is not character development or even plol. but a
tool through which to fictionalize the making ofajihadis/ as an irrational Bedouin 1101110
Islamicl/s. The closing pages of the novel see the narrator sitting in the airport watching
people board the plane and then walk away to face his punishment. death. ,",·iren".l-
narrator is passive about his destiny and when asked why he did not perlorm the linal act
he says. "I have no idea" (304). Ironically. it is at the point of his disassociation from his
treacherous act that memory reappears and he vividly recalls his childhood. his nostalgic
village. and the people he saw at the airport. particularly the couple kissing each other:
"They deserved to livea thousand years. I have no right to challenge their kisses. scuttle
their dreams. and dash their hopes" (306). The narrator's last words as he awaits his
assassination arc'" don't hold anything against anybody anymore" (307). At that
moment. he linally sees the lights of Beirut. whieh belore he "was never able to perceive
through the anger of men" (307).
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A feew points arc worth noting here. First. the narrator rejects violence when he
remembers himselfasan individual. directly asserting old Orientalist narratives of the
collective nature of Islam and the loss of identity and self required to be Muslim. Ilis
humanity is returned through the simple act of seeing a Western couple kissing in the
airport. which allows the deranged and dehumanized Bedouin to learn humanity. at the
last moment. from the sensitive and humane West. Perhaps most significant is his
assertion that no one is to blame for the devastation of Beirut and Baghdad. absolving the
West. as exemplified by the old lady. the kissing couple and the mother in the airport. of
its responsibility for its part in the destruction of these Arab capitals. In fact. the would-
be victims on the night to London. all described curiously as Western. are the human
lorces which jolt the dehumanized HO/l/o Is/amiC/ls back to his senses and rescue his
sense of humanity. Though reminiscent of Hosseini"s very similar message in The I\ife
Runner. there is no chance of redemption in The Sirens o/Baghdad. since the body of the
jihadis/ has already been contaminated and therefore must be destroyed by his own
friend. Perhaps. we could also read this allegorically as we read Amir"s rescue ofSorab
allegorically. Thejihadis/ (representative of Saddam Husain) cannot bc redecmed. and
his only redemption is by being killed by his fi"iend (America. considering America was
once Ifusain's greatest ally).Thus. redemption occurs only for Amir. the moderate
Western Muslim. nol lor the already dehumanizedjihadi,\'f.
That the narrator cannot fulfil his act of violence leaves open some questions
worth exploring. Even though the novel displays various negative Orientalist
stereotypes. it does subvert this framework on occasion by attempting to describe some
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sense of intention for the narrator/would-bejihadi.l'/. And this intentionality is not locuscd
on religion, but on a culture of humiliation and corrupt politics. It can be argued that
despite its Oriental isms, The Sirens o/Baghdad attempts to contextualize thejihwl
outside ofa purely Islamic context and succeeds, to a limited extent, to humanize the
character ofthejihadi.l'/, in his transformation from sensitive young man to numb and
violentjihadisl back to a sensitive and self sacrificial young man. Part of the appeal or
Khadra's novel is related to the first person access to thejihadisl, since the story is told
from his perspective, as a chronicler of our times. However, the narrator remains
nameless and largely undeveloped as a memorable fictional character, his anonymity
intended to be representative ofanyjihadi.l'/.
Khadra had already told a similar tale ofthejihadisl in The AI/ack, published in
2005 in French, immediately following the London bombing, and translated into English
by 2007. This time the landscape is Israel and the war-torn occupied Palestinian
territories where Khadra tries, though not very suceessrully, to illuminate the nature or
the relationship betweenlhejihadisl and the victim, and to explain some or the causes or
the Palestinian resistance. The main character in The AI/ack is a Palestinian living in
Israel. working in an Israeli hospital. Dr Amin.laafari. Amin is a nonpracticing Muslim,
thirsty for sueccss and material growth, who wants to live a lile outside eonlliet and who
sees himselfas apolitical. as a healer, a surgeon. When his wile Sihem is identilicd as a
suicide bomber, his constructed identity unravels and he begins a journey back through
the wasteland of the Palestinian territories, trying to grasp the intentionality orhisjilwdisl
wile. The fact that Khadra makes hisjihadisl a woman is signilieant sinee there has been
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a great deal of discussion on the rising number of femalejihadi.l'/.I', particularly in
Palestinc.
The thriller allows Khadra to educate on the reality of Palestinian life in Israel and
the Occupied Palestinian territories while simultaneously commenting upon the culture of
martyrdom which is prcvalcnt in thc Orientalist discourse on Palestine. Throughout this
novel. thejihadi.l'/·.I' act remains undecipherable to the victim. In her suicide note to her
husband, thejihadi.l'/asks,
What use is happiness when it is not shared, Amin. my love? My joys t~lded away
every timc yours didn't follow. You wanted children. I wanted to deserve them.
No child is completely safe ifit has no country. Don't hate mc. Sihem. (69)
Sihem, thejihadi.l'/, urges her husband to be a seeker and to see beyond his own existence
and perceived, false happiness. Thisself-sacritieial challengc is repeated repetitively
when Amin meets Sihem'sjihadi.l/ friends:
Which truth? Hers or yours? The truth ofa woman who realized where her duty
lay or the truth ofa man who belicves you need only turn your back on your
tragedy to wash your hands of it. (159)
Interestingly, The AI/ack begins and ends with a fragmented account of an altack.
While rcading thc novel. the reader assumes that thc attack described in the opening is
referring to the attack perpetrated by Sihem, perhaps as recounted through her own eycs,
the only instance of her perspective throughout the novel. Ilowever, by the end of the
novel. when the samc description of the attack closcs the narrative. the readcr is now
aware that the narrator of the scene is actually Amin, who has become a victim ofanothcr
116
attack that he himselfhas failed to prevent, perpetrated this time by his own niece. In this
way, Khadra seems to suggest that not only does thejihadis/ lurk within. in those closest
to us, as chillingly learned fi'om the London bombings, but that there is no discernment
among the victims ofthejihadis/: even those who attempt to understand and prevcnt
thcm can fall prey to their violence. However. like The Sirens ojBaKhdw/. The III/liCk
has mixed messages. It employs numerous Oriental isms. with the Homo Is/amicus
Palestinian activists loyal to nothing, not even each other. except the nationalist cause and
the destruction of Israel. At the same time. it presents a subversive subtcxt by inserting
intentionality outside the typical Oriental isms which blamejihad on the inherent violence
of Islam. Khadra'sjihadis/ clearly forsakes her personal desires lor the higher desire to
light the oppression of the Israeli State; hers is a nationalist. not religious. struggle.
Though his landscape is Palestine. and he does on occasion usc mouthpieces to articulate
the Palestinian resistance. his real landscape is the spectral space where thejihw/is/ could
be your next door neighbor, or even your wife. The close relationship between the victim
andjihadis/. the uncertainty of perspective in the opening and closing scenes. the
questioning of whose perception of reality is correct, all can be read as an assertion that
both thejihadis/ and the victim are inseparable in the cycle of violence.
It is evident from the works examined in this chapter that the Oriental isms of both
Muslim and non-Muslim writcrs through cultural criticism. journalism and liction on
jihad and globalization are complex and multilayered. There is no doubt. however. with
the claiming of authentic Muslim voices. the militarization of Lones like Iraq.
Afghanistan, and Palestine is continually justified. The Muslim writers present
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themselves and their characters as both exotic and familiar. exotic cnough to have access
to the intentionality of thcjihadisl and familiar cnough to rccognizc thc immorality of
these intentions. and appeal to Western audiences. In all cases. redemption lies in both
reform and militarization. Thejihadisls must be conquered at all cost since they orler no
hope for dialogue or redemption. and their mentality is based on primitive codes of
honour. a sense of victimhood and deprivation. and even an irrational rage. that can never
be addressed.
Therefore. fiction and cultural criticism by Muslim relormers articulating the
intentionality ofthejihadislmust be read in the contcxt of the militarization of Muslim
societies in the war on tcrror. The articulation of the nccessity of military intervention
may be dircct or subtlc. or even ambiguous. ranging from Manji's support ofthc Iraq
war, to afisi's pica for a re-imagined Iran. to Hosseini's positing ofa Taliban oppressed
Afghanistan in need of Wcstern redcmption. to Khadra's despair at a lawless war-torn
Iraq and Palestine. In all cascs. there is little hope in indigcnous charactcrs to manage
thcir own changes and progression. They are trappcd in cycles of cndlcss. irrational
violcnce. Even whcn violcncc is cxplaincd in terms of sociopolitical conflicts. as in
Khadra's novels.. therc is no hope that HOfllo IslwlliclI,\' can lind his own way out of this
cycle. It can bc argued that the works discusscd in thisehaptcr. advcrtcntly or
inadvertcntly. scrve thc agenda as described by Kaplan in The IInal'ch)' oj'Efilpil'e in Ille
Making olUS, ('1111111'e, by providing support to Amcriean loreign policy in winning the
hearts and minds ofdomcstic American voters. assuring thcm that American imperialist
projects in Iraq and Afghanistan. in particular. and its policies toward Iran and Palcstine.
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are noble and necessary. An extension of this argument is that the Muslim relormers
forewarn us we are all possible victims of thejihadisl and. therdore. insecure even in our
own metropolitan centers of power. where we desperately need to be protected. The next
chapter will examine the formulation of the specter ofthisjihadisl who lurks within 0/1,.
socictics.
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Chapter Three
Travelling Theory: From Jihad to Ijtihad, Theorizing Intentionality
In his 1982 essay "'Traveling Theory," in the World The Text. and the ('riti(', Said
presented his concept of "'travelling theory," simply put. what happens to a theory or idea
when it "travels" li'om place to place, from person to person, from situation to situation,
li'om one period to another. Said argued that since theories originally develop in specilic
locations in response to definite historical and social circumstances, thcy may lose their
originally "insurgent" spirit, the powcr and rebelliousness that they lirst contained (126).
In other words, with the passing from one location to another, theory runs the threat of
becoming tamed, domestieatedli'om an insurrectionary idea into just another analytical
tool or a new academic orthodoxy. In 1994, in "Travelling Theory Reconsidered" in
Re/lectio/7.l· on E~'(ile, Said revised this argument by proposing that ideas and theories can
also be reinvigorated and made to speak to whole new political situations when they
travel li'om one location to another. A major example to support this hypothesis was how
Prantz Fanon revolutionized Lukacs's concept of rei lieat ion to apply it to Algeria.
Closely reading Fanon's The Wretched o/the Ear/h. Said showed how Fanon
employed Lukacs's subject-object dialectic to speak of the process ofdccolonialization
and the inheritance of colonial traditions:
Lukacs's dialectic is grounded in The Wretched o/the Earth. actualized. given a
kind of harsh presence nowhere to be found in his agonized rethinking of the
classical philosophical antinomies. ("Travelling Theory," Re/lec/io/1.\· 446)
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According to Said, Fanon adapted Lukacs' subject/object to the relationship between the
colonizer/colonized, recognizing that violence is but one component in the decolonization
process that does not necessarily resolve these antinomies. Said noted: '"No one needs to
be reminded that Fanon's recommended antidote for the cruelties of colonialism is
violence'" (447), yet, he also asked:
Does Fanon, like Lukacs, suggest that the subject-object dialcctic can be
consummated, transcended, synthesized, and thal violence in and ofitsclfis that
fulfillment, the dialectical tension rcsolvcd by violent upheaval into pcacc and
harmony? (447)
Said's response to the question he posed was clearly no, and he read Fanon as saying
that liberation did not only consist of the violence of nationalism, lor nationalism will
necessarily be followed by more oppression and violence:
Thereafter Fanon is at pains to show that the tensions between colonizer and
colonized will not end, since in effect the new nation will produce a new set of
policemen, bureaucrats, merchants to replace the departed Europeans. (450)
Said understood Fanon to be saying that neither violence, nor nationalism and its
consciousness, are sullicient emancipatory goals and that, rather. the essential point of
The Wretched oj"the Earth was to note how anticolonial struggle must necessarily take on
a broader, and more radical. global human emancipatory dimension in order to succeed.
And this is a revolution of consciousness, '"an entirely new consciousness-that of
liberation-is struggling to be born" (450). Said also noted lhat Fanon's ideas were
ahead of the Algerian struggle from which they were generated: '"ranon's radicalism, I
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think, is and has been since his death too strenuous for the new postcolonial states,
Algeria included" (450).
Said's description of Fanon's travelling theory is particularly relevant to our
discussion here as it demonstrates howjihad has travelled. to bccome an invisible traee in
theory. Thc intentionality ofthejihadis/ has become the focus of theory and numerous
works of fiction, as the following chapters will explore. Three points that Said has made
are of particular relevance to this chapter. First. that when theory travels it isolien
emptied of its revolutionary urges. This will be exempli lied by demonstrating howjihwl
has sometimes been displaced by ij/ihad in the works of Western Muslim theorists. who
often prefer to use the less heavily connotated term ij/ihad for their radical reform
projects to maintain credibility as "'good" Muslims and viable interlocutors. Second. Said
noted that when theory travels it can also have the opposite crlect, that is. of bcing
radicalized, as was the casc ofFanon's reworking of Lukacs. This will be exempli lied in
Chapter Five by demonstrating how the new postcolonial jihad has been rethought in an
arguably heretical context by thejihadis/,I' themselves, transcending its particularity as a
theologically specific concept to a universalizing ethic that contains both the particular
and the universal. Third. Said maintained that the consciousness for which Fanon was
advocating, which involved an outer physical strugglc--violence against the colonizcrs.
and an inncr consciousness raising-rethinking and reclaiming of indigcnous forms of
knowledge and governance. was far ahead ofthc revolutionary impulscs of nationalist
struggles and is global in nature. This issuc will bc taken up in the conclusion of this
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thesis in relation to a rejuvenation ofiihad theory as an emancipatory component or
postcolonial theory.
At this point it is important to elariry the basic dillerence between the concepts or
jihad and ijlihad. As noted in the introduetion.jihad has been an unstable sign which has
two stable elements: the outer struggle against oppression-al:jihad al asghar (the lesser
jihad) and the inner struggle against psychological and spiritual elements that oppress the
sclr and others ofjihad-al:jihad-al-akhar (or sometimes referred to al:jihad-al-l1as. the
greaterjihad) .In this sense, it is easy to sce how the clements oljihad are present in
Fanon's dialectical concept of liberation. I Jihad al asghar was evident in the struggle
against colonialism. violence itself. andjihad-al:jihad-al-akhar the struggle against the
psychological colonization it len behind. Thisjihad - al-akhar was not achieved in
Fanon's Algeria. and, can be argued still has not been achieved.
Ijlilwd. on the other hand. is a technical term of Islamic law that describes the
process of making a legal decision through independent interpretation or the legal
sources. the Quran and the .)l1l1l1ah (traditions orthe Prophet Mohammed). Ilowever. in
Islamic jurisprudence ijlihadisnot considered as merely II"Cethinking. but requires
concise knowledge or Islamic exegesis, including Quran and .)l1l1l1ah. even ir the solution
to the problem wishing to be solved does not lie there. It is interesting to note the origin
or the word ijlihad has been argued to share the same lexical root orthe wordjihad. and
in ract ean be directly related to jihad al akhar. the inner or greaterjihad. As Muhammad
Jannati notes,
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Ibn Abi Dhar'ah, quoting al-Mawardi, states that the literal meaning of iilihad is
to undertake effort and endeavor in accomplishing something that rcquircs strain
and difficulty, and to this is relatedjihad al-nali' (the struggle against the carnal
self) which involves labor and toil for winning the desired objective and goal.
(n.pag)
We may ask that sincejihad and ii1ihad are so closely related, why is it that
contemporary Western Muslim thinkers theorize so much about iilihad, or even the
greaterjihad, and so little about the lesserjiha(f?
The answer lies in the dangerous climate for dissent in thc post-9II! academy. In
order to have their works published and to maintain or be granted tenure, one of the lirst
steps a Muslim thinker has to take is to disassociate himself li'om the lesserjihad. This
closing of criticism has been commented upon widely by Henry Giroux in The Te!'m!' o!
Neo-Lihe!'ali.l'!n. Giroux relates this closing of critical thought to "proto-fascist"
tendencies in the U.S. that should not be confused with, but are in some ways related to,
historical forms of fascism. "Fascism," wc should understand. and as Giroux elucidates,
should not be consigned to "an ideological apparatus frozen in a particular historical
period," but should be seen as "a theoretical and political signpost lor understanding how
democracy can be subverted" (18). In other words. democracy, and therefore the space
lor terminologies that compete with the dominant discourse. withers not only when
dissent is suppressed and police state tactics are employed. but also when people lack the
means. ideological and material (as well as the time and space resourccs), to collectively
exercise their rights in meaningful and effective ways to make vital popular forms of
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democracy possible (20). It can be argued that Muslim thinkers in the West are
particularly sensitive to these conditions as they constantly have to prove theiradhcl"Cncc
to perceived American or European values to maintain intellectual credibility and even
their sourccs oflivclihood. Giroux also argues that the construction and prolilCration ofa
culture of fear, cxacerbated by the war on terrorism where "all citizens and noncitizcns
are viewed as potential terrorists,'" creates an anti-intellectualizing atmosphcre groundcd
in simplified moral absolutes around "good and evil" and accompanied by notions of
"patriotic correctness" (22-24). Giroux contends that public space, including thc spaccs
of public education, is increasingly militarized through its "logic of fcar, surveillancc.
and control'" (41). One need only extend Giroux's argument to the examples of Campus
Watch and the lists of America's most dangerous intellectuals. 2
Campus Watch is a Philadelphia-based pro-Israeli organization which bcgan a
website to monitor U.S. collcgc campuses lor academic pro-Palcstinian bias and
happenings. It publishcs dossiers on professors. as well as some examples ofthcir
writings, thal thcy consider anli-American. Campus Watch also cncouragcs students to
rcport on professors and assist in publically highlighting anti-American biascs. David
Ilorowitz's The Pm!es,wrs: The !O! Mosl Dangerous Academics in America is
rcprcscntativcofthis type of political harassment. Mark Lcvinc, one ofthc acadcmics on
Ilorowitz's list. writes of serious rcpcrcussions such labeling can havc on acadcmics'
lives, though nol specifically his, since hc is protected by tenure:
'See < hllp://www.campus-watch.org>
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But let's say I was an untenured professor; or, even worse. an untenured Arab
professor. or. more dangerous still, an untenured Palestinian Arab proIessor who
isn't too thrilled with the Israeli occupation or US foreign policy in the Muslim
world. And let's say that a few students. at the encouragement ofpeoplc like
Horowitz, started taping my classes. editing my lectures. and doing a
"documentary" that took comments out of context and made me look like a raving
bin-Ladenite. or at least vaguely anti-Semitic.
Well, then. I wouldn't be so happy. And let's say these tapes. or rumours of what I
might have said (or more likely. not said) in class started circulating. sending the
organized Jewish community into a tizzy and calling for my head on a platter. or
at least the denial of my tenure. This may sound like unfounded fears. until you
talk to my colleague Joseph Masad. a professor at Columbia. who's suffered
through much of this treatment. Or you can get your administration pissed offat
you when wealthy donors threaten never to give your university money because
you invited the "wrong" people to speak on campus. (n.pag)
In such a battle for good, evil. and tenure, it can be argued. it is wiser to stick to
theorization on ij/ihad, which. in itself: is not without risk. than theorize about the
universal applicability of jihad. It may even be necessary to assign jihad as the
misunderstood rhetoric of 'bad" Muslims in order to sustain one's position as a "good"
Muslim.
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In the previouschaptcr.1 argued that cultural criticism and fiction by Muslim
writers. particularly as rclated to the figure ofthe./ihadi.\'l. must be read in the context of
the value of such work in reinforcing or questioning imperialist designs in predominantly
Muslim countries. such as Afghanistan. Iraq. and Iran. I also suggested that Muslimness
has particular value when it comes to explaining and ofrcring advice on the./ihadi.\'1
among II.\'. Likewise. in this chapter. the migration of Muslim relormers fromji/wd to
ijlihad needs to be understood within the context of the institutionalization of neo-
liberalism and the culture of fear that accompanies lhe war on terror in Europe and
America. As Giroux has argued. "neo-liberalism is more than an economic theory." it is
also a "corporate public pedagogy ... an all encompassing cultural horizon for producing
market identities. values and practices" which operates by grossly constraining the
available "range of identities. ideologies and subject positions" (The Terror oj'Neo-
Liherali.\'1II 113). Muslim rdormers. though diverse in their viewpoints. arc particularly
considered relevant when they operate within the accepted range of these subject
positions. One of the most valuable positions is to ofkr sell:'help advice to American and
European slructures of power and ordinary citizcns alike on how they can protect
themselves li'OITI thejihadi.\'1 whose spectral presence lurks within their own socicties.
Muslim mediators consistently demonstrate a desire to place themselvcs in a Western
intellectual tradition. responding directly to popular theories on thc intentionality of the
Wcstcrnjihadi.\'l. They assert their familiarity as Westerners. aligning unequivocally
against "bad" Muslims. while claiming their credibility as interpreters. offering inside
information. attempting to assert an indigenous Muslim vocabulary into an olien already
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closed discourse, with limited acceptance and comprehension of this vocabulary. In
short. the task is enormous and risky for the Western Muslim theorist who attempts to
address the intentionality ofthcjihadis/.
The approach in the previous chapter was contrapuntal to the extent that it
compared the ideas of Muslim and non-Muslim specialists to situate the diversity of
Muslim responses from "moderate" Muslim intellectuals speaking within a circumscribed
tradition. The previous chapter focused on thejihadis/ with whom IFe are at war·~the
jihadis/s of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. This chapter will locus on the challenge
oljihadis/s in Western societies, using a similar methodology as in the previous chapter.
contrapuntal: across disciplines in the humanities and demonstrating the intersections of
the ideas of Muslim and non-Muslim writers. I will argue that the debate on globalization
is essential in understanding the popularization of the figure ofthejihadis/. allowing the
jihadist to transcend the Islamic field, to a certain extent. while still maintaining the
particularity of his unique Islamic contribution, and to become a representative
spokesperson of various global causes. Formulating the intention of thejihadis/ allows
Muslim theorists to insert Islam into theory at a moment of critical disjuncture. By
translating the discontent represented by thejihadis/s, Muslim thinkers olkr challenges
to the multiculturalist, neo-liberal paradigm from diverse political positions. This chapter
will examine the intersections of the work of Imam Abdul RauL Anouar Majid, I.iaddiun
Sardar, and Tariq Ramadan with other non-Muslim writers. such as John Esposito,
Olivier Roy, Terry Eagleton and Slavoj Zizek, as they attempt to theorize how the
challenges presented by thejihadis/ might lead to a reconliguration of global landscapes.
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while migrating fromjihad theory to a theory of ij/ihad. and sometimes back again in a
complex semiotic circuit.
Therearebasicallytwomajortrendsacrossthehumanitiesinexplainingthe
intentionality of the Westernjihadis/. outside the traditional Oriental ism argumcnt orthc
inherent violence of Islam discussed in the previous chapter. The lirst argument lirmly
connects the intentionality ofthejihadis/ to the foreign occupation of Muslim lands and
to the Western alliances with corrupt regimes in these lands. It notes that even when the
jihadis/s are Western in education and culture, they identify themselves with the plight or
their Muslim community and see their struggle as a political one with a specitic purpose.
The second argument tends to disassociate the Europeanjihadi,l/ from his Middle Eastern
progenitors and posits him as a de-culturated individual. alienated rrom Western soeidy,
and symbolic of the global discontent or numerous minority communities. In this
perspective thejihadis/ assumes an ethical. rather than political. posture. Muslim
interlocutors, who directly attempt to explain the intentionality ofthejihadis/, circulate
around these lwo basic arguments.
The lirst argument is advocated by John Esposito. Pruks~ul'ul' l{c'liSi"11 ;lIhl
Inlc'rnaliun,il \nilirs alllllsl;lInic :--;llldic's ;It (iCI'I'sc'luIIII lllli\c'rsil\. I:UlIllllillS l)irCC!lll,ur
thc' I'lillcc' ,\h\akcd Ilin Talal Center lor Muslim-Christian Understanding in the Walsh
School or Foreign Service. who has served as consultant to the U.S. Department or State.
various governments. corporations, universities, and the media worldwide. No doubt.
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Esposito. whose books have been translated into thirty languages.J has emerged as a
leading figure on political Islam and the rise of thejilwd post-9/11. If Esposito has been
at the forefront of the American academy and media in explainingjihad. Olivier Roy has
held a similar position in the European academy and press. Roy is a political scientist
and scholar of Persian language and civilization. professor at the Ecole des Hallles Filli/es
en 5'cience.l' Sociales (School lor Advanced Studies in Social Sciences) in Paris and a
senior researcher in political science at the CNRS (french ational Centre far Scientific
Research). He was consultant to UNOCA (United Nations Ortice of the Coordinator for
Afghanistan) and to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. lie has written numerous
books on subjects including Iran. Islam. and Asian polilics.4 Both Esposito and Roy arc
academics; at the same time both have been called forward in the post-9f11 world to
advise lareign policy makers on the role of Islam in the changing world. and how best to
light extremism. Both arc highly valuable commodities in understanding the intentions
ofthejihadisl and both have also had their arguments misrepresented on Campus
Wateh's "howler of the month page'" which the organization claims "demonstratelsl the
moral obtusencss. politicized outlook. and rank absurdity in the lield of Middle I:ast
studies.andthusthcneedlarCampusWatch"·"
Esposito is perhaps the most prominent non-Muslim scholar who attempts to
highlight the socioeconomic and political root causes oljihad; his work onjilwd faeuses
on the rise of political Islam ism in predominantly Muslim countries which Esposito sees
:; Sec < http. ...'\pl\ln:_~\.·'lI·~I..'I')\\ll,I.:dll 11l'i.II,k ,jk'~
I See < hIlP://WWw.clli.cll/DcpartmentsAndCentres/PoliticaIAnd ocialScicnccs/
Pcoplc/Proressors/Roy.aspx>
'Sce<hllp://www.camplls-watch.orglqlloles.php'>.
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as the root of the formation o I'. jihad in both Muslim countries and in the West. As early
as 1996 in Islam and Democracy. Esposito used the case studies of six Muslim countries
toarguethatlslamismisadiverseandmultifacetedphcnomenonwhich he placed ina
political and socioeconomic context. and that terror is firmly rooted in political realities
rather than in an idcological or religious agenda. I-Ie placed the causes of Islamic
radicalization on the continuing failure of governments in Islamic societies to respond
effectively to social and economic problems. since the incompetcncc and corruption
associated with a number of authoritarian regimes has led many across all segments of
society to seek in Islam a reinvigoration of their society. He also specilied American and
European foreign policies in the region as being a major cause of radicalization. Esposito
further contended that the tendency to dismiss political Islam is erroneous since its more
articulate adherents constitute a new elite thaI is engaged in a sophisticated dehateabout
how best to rectify the cultural contradictions which beset the Muslim world.
Esposito's opening question in Unholy War: Terl'llr in the Name O(lsWIIl set the
frame lor his argument regarding the nature ofthejihad. specifically. With reference to
Osama bin Laden. he asks, "1·lave they hijacked Islam lor their own unholy purposes. or
do they. as they claim. represent a return to the authentic teachings of the l~lith')" (xii).
Ilis answer to this question involves humanizing the figure of bin Laden himself to help
explicate the choices that bin Laden made and the historical and geopolitical
circumstances that shaped his destiny. Esposito puts bin Laden in the context of his
environment growing up in the 1970s in Wahabi Saudi Arabia and the growing Islamic
resurgence oflhe period. noting inlluences on him such as Dr Abdulla Azzam. his
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professor at King Abdulaziz University and Jordanian member of the Palestinian Muslim
brotherhood; and Dr Mohammed Qutb. another of bin Laden's teachers. brother of
Sayyid Qutub; and his deep intellectual fi'iendship with Ayman AI Zawahiri. considered
the ideologue of AI Qaeda. In addition to these intellectual influences. Esposito places
bin Laden in the context of the 1967 Six-Day Arab Israeli War. and the 1973 oil
embargo. Of course. later events included bin Laden's lime in Afghanistan as a 1I/lijaMc/.
warrior for God, his disillusionment with Saudi polilics upon his return. and then his exile
to Afghanistan and Sudan. Arter painting the landscape in which bin Laden navigated.
contexlUalizing the political history which formed him and became part of his own
personal history. Esposito notes. "bin Laden played to Muslims' sense of historic
oppressions. occupation and injustice at the hands of the West" (22). and that the heart of
bin Laden'sjihad against America started with his "outrage at the injustice in his
homeland" (22). He explains that bin Laden holds the American people. who elect their
President and Congress. directly responsible for actions against Muslims. partieularl)
Palestine. and that he rejects charges of terrorism (24). Esposito reviews bin Laden's
statements to demonstrate how he integrates key issues such as politics. honor and
retribution into his philosophy ofjihad. At the same time. Esposito argues that while
jihad began as a local response to authoritarianism. a very particularized and unusual
element ofpolilicallslamism. it migrated into a more universal movement. while still
rooted in the political realities of the Middle East. Jihad has become"a new form of
terrorism. born of trans-nationalism and globalization. It is transnational in its ideology
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and recruitment and global in its ideology, strategy, targets, network of organizations. and
economic transactions (151).
Thus, in describing the intentionality o I'. jihad, Esposito uses the real political and
historical figure of bin Laden to contextualizc the struggle. taking it oUl of a purely
Islamic context. and into the political landscape of both thc Middlc East and the ncw
global transnational reality. In doing so. he challenges the loud claims of
neoconservatives who argue that Islam itselfis inherently incompatiblc with Western
values and warns that unless Muslim grievances are addrcsscd wisely and the economic
and political conditions that engender terrorism amelioratcd, terrorism will continue to
plague the West and authoritarian Muslim regimes. This argument is further elaborated in
Esposito's later work, Whu Speaks/ill' Islam. which reveals the results ofa Gallup poll
across Muslim countries and concludcs that "the religion of Islam and the mainstream
Muslim majority have been conflatcd with the beliefs and actions of an extremist
minority" (x). Esposito moves the debate out of the Western metropolis to show that
"moderatc" Muslims arc in fact the majority in the Muslim outposts throughout the world
and the only way to avoid a continued conllict with Muslim communities is "by winning
the loyalty of the people in the rcgion" (165).
Roy's argument takes quite a diffcrcnt turn as it focuses on the transnational and
global nature of thejihad. arguably at the cxpense of particular soeio-political causes. In
Glohalised Islam: The Search/i)r a Nell' Vmmah, Roy presents thejihad as a secular.
ethical movement, rather than a religious movcmcnt. noting the striking parallels between
today'sjihadisls and Europe's radical left of the 1960s and 1970s (46). for Roy. thcjilwd
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is at the crossroads ofa tradition of radical Third World anticolonial strugglc, Marxist
traditions and Islamic radicalization (47). Like Esposito. he argues that undcrstanding thc
jihadist cannot be accomplished by looking in Quranic text for the justification of
violence, but, unlike Esposito, he maintains that neither can intentionality be
comprehended by connecting it to the particular politics of predominantly Muslim
countries. Roy claims the jihad can only be understood in a larger global context
Here Roy has made one of his most useful interventions as hc discusses the de-
territorialized nature of modern Islamism and argues thatjihadists are utopians who
"light not to protect a community but to recreate a community"' (Glohalised Ishllli 2X9).
1\1 Qaeda has developed, according to Roy, a "two pronged strategy"' of"spcctacular
anti-Western attacks, but also high-jacking local contlicts to bring them undcr thc banncr
of global jihad" (Politics o(Chao,1 in the Middle East 154). In order to achicve thesc
objectives. thejihad""embodies in itselfan explicit procedure of de-cultural ion" since it
promotes the de-contextualization of religious practice ... in this sense it is perfectly
adaptcd to thc basic dimension of contemporary globalization: that of lurning human
behavior into codes, and patterns of consumption and communication del inked li'OIn any
specilic culture" (Gloha/ised Islam 258). Thus, unlike the neoconscrvativcs discusscd in
the previous chapter. Roy asscrts that nco-fundamentalism, upon whichjihad is built.
breaks radically with tradition, and its logic cannot be found cithcr in Muslim history
alone nor in injunctions from Islamic texts. De-culturation involves a growing hostility
to the wrongs or one's native culture lor cxilcs, including both the homc culture and the
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adopted onc. Integration into the new imaginary Ummal/' takes on the form of codes.
actions and recitations. Roy points to the documents len by 9/11 hijackers as a glimpse
into this highly codified world (Gluhalised Islam 266). The inscription ofthcse codes is
part ofa proccss whereby identity is both deconstructed and reformulated. As Roy notes.
faith itselfis constructed:
What is reconstructed is not only the religion: it is thc sclfitsclf. in somc sort of
reprcsentation and staging of the self. Believers (and especially convcrts and born
again Muslims) act in such a way as to stage their own lailh: a sort of
exhibitionism is often manifested among neo-fundamentalists. who use dcliberate
markers of their own religious identity. (267)
The two central arguments of Esposito and Roy. brielly presented above. lonll the
core of the accepted counter-discourse to the clash of civilizations theory discussed in the
previous chapter. Though branded as radicals by Campus Watch. both thinkers have
servcd useful roles as advisors to govcrnments and agcncies. and their recommendations
are considered in the construction of policies and recommendations on lightingjihwl. As
a result. their ideas havc become part of the neo-libcral discourse of reform which argues
lor a three-pronged approach to fighlingjihad. First, there is a perceivcd need to reform
foreign policies that increase the militarization of Muslim lands and strengthen
authoritarian regimes. since such policies lead to a further radicalization of the population
and a fortifying of AI Qaeda. Second, there is a need to reform Muslim societies
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themselves. to provide economic and social development. so the root causcs of
radicalization will be removed. Third. the problem of the radicalization of Muslim
populations in Europe. particularly, needs to bc addressed by dealing with thc diniculties
in the current model of multiculturalism which has allowed Muslims to bccome alienated
and vulnerable to the de-culturizing recruitment strategies ofal Qaeda. It is within this
counter-discourse that we can place the migration fromjihad to ijtihad as theorized by
Muslim writers. This reform movement of "good" Muslims consists ofa diverse group
whose ideas interact ina number of ways.
Imam Feisal Abdul RauL Imam since 1983 of Masjid ai-Farah. a mosque in New
York City. like Esposito. argucs that violence is not inherent in Islamic doctrine. but that
jihad has been taken up by a minority of radicals. Like Esposito. Rauf focuses on socio-
political rcasons forjihad. as wcll as psychological and eullural reasons. In conlrast to
Irshad Manji. discussed in the previous chaplcr, Raufassumes an oppositional response
to Bernard Lewis in his book, What '.1' Rightll'ith Islam is What·.I· Right with AlIlerico.
dircctly rcferring to Bernard Lewis' complaint aboul the problems of Islam. While Raul'
condemns the 9/11 attacks as un-Islamic. his calion the U.S. government to reduce the
threat of terrorism by altering its Middle Easlern foreign policy has olien been mel wilh
controversy. For example. in an intervicw with Ed Bradley on CBS's 6U !vlil7l1tes in 200 I.
Raufstated that thai thc United States was an "accessory" to Ihe crime 01'9/1 I and that
bin Laden was "madc in the U.S.A," referring to the C.I.A. support for bin Laden in
Afghanistan in thc war against the Soviets. In 20 I0, his plans to build Park 51. an Islamic
community centre two blocks away from Ground Zero in Lowcr Manhattan have been
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met with mixed response. Raufhas been accused of doublespeak. particularly by Ibn
Warraq. self proclaimed Muslim apostate and author of Why I am Not a Mus/im and
Delendinx the West. Ibn Warraq claims that Raul' belongs to a group who "still has not
learned that 9/11 had nothing to do with U.S. foreign policy" and argucs that "Raufsays
one thing to Western audiences and another to Muslim audiences"COne Imam. Multiplc
Messages"n.pag).
The difficulties Raufand Esposito have faced lie in the layers ofthcir mcssagcs
which do not fit the Oriental isms prcvalent in the prevailing discourse as ncatly as thosc
of Manji or Ibn Warraq; for examplc, that the postcolonial jihad as employcd today is not
orthodox to Islamic belief but is in fact hcretical to Islamic doctrine, and sccond that this
jihad needs to be understood in the context of American foreign policy. In order to
cxplain this mcssage, in What ',I' RiXht Il'ith Is/am is What's RiXhtll'ith America. Raufset
out to describe the compatibilities between the Islamic and the Amcrican traditions. To
do this. he positions himself~ like Manji. as a native informant ofa diffcrcnt kind: as an
insider to both cultures, hoping to inform Americans about Muslims and Muslims about
Americans. l-Ie notes that Islam comprises "my essential identity as a human bcing" and
America is "a land whose values I cherish" (xvii). Consequently, he stratcgically posits
himselfas a hybrid with an authentic essential Muslim idcntity that allows him to
interpret the current clash of civilizations lor America. and as an Amcrican who carcs
about the preservation of American values.
lfManji takes pains to position herselfas an authentic anti-intellectual. the Imam
lirmly positions himself inside Western intellectual tradition. On numcrous occasions hc
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attempts to draw parallels between Western intellectual traditions and Muslims ones,
including the Kharijites and General Patton 7 I-Ie specitically draws on theories of
Western psychology and sociology to explain the phenomenon of "suicide" bombers in
particular, to uproot it from the Quran and put it in a language Americans can understand.
For example, he borrows Richard Dawkin's controversial theory of the sellish gene to
explain how an individual commits supposed suicide aggression to save the community
He notes that what might appear to be sellishness may be explained by game theory in
which the pay-off for a variety of behavioral traits is computed. The payoff benelits less
the well being of the individual than the well being of the gene, and it bypasses our
conscious behavior (125). He also refers to social theorist Emile Durkheim, rather than
(0 the Quran, to ofter further explanations for "suicide" bombing. Noting Durkheim's
observation that those who use suicide the most are not necessarily those who suiTer the
most. and that high income groups have high suicide rates, he applies this conclusion to
the World Trade Center bombers, all middle class professionals. Referring to Durkheim's
altruistieandanomicsuieide, he notes that suicide bombing is''extremealtruism:'an
"anomie" caused by a tear in traditional societies (146). He concludes that "suicide
bombing in the name of Islam is a sociopolitical phenomenon. not a theological onc"
(147).
RauL unlike Manji. is intent on rescuing the Quran from heretical interpretation.
Therefore, he asserts his religious authority as Imam and quotes specilic verses from thc
7 The Kharijiles seceded Ii'om the 4th Caliph Ali. believing he was too weak. and developed a
new theory orthe Caliphate. Pallon. althe end orlhe Second World War. wanled America 10 conli'ont
GermanyandlheSoviet Union
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Quran which place clear restrictions on aggression and asscrt that "when people kill in
God's name they are really doing so in the name ofthcir own ego, their struggle lor
power. or their desire to obtain some other asset"' (134). Urging ajiJwd lor peace, Raul's
goal is to rejuvenate the "lrue"lradition ofjihad. the inner spiritual striving of which
iitihad is a componenl. by discrediting the roots of contemporary political violence as
jihad masquerading in an Islamic tradition. He also places his argumenl in a political
context and proposes long-term solutions. which lor him arc only partly anchored in the
critical thinking of Operation Jjtihad and the reform of Muslim preconceptions. IIt: calls
lor a reform of American loreign policy. in encouraging the growth of modern societies
in Muslim countries: economic freedom lor Muslims. application of the rule of law.
democratization and the separation of powers. The goal oljiJwd lor peace would be to
support "a free society stated in Islamically orthodox vocabulary" (260). Ilis appeal is
remarkably similar to Esposito's foreign policy.
A favorite strategy ofalmost all the Muslim theorists discussed here is
contrapuntality: comparing the desire for li'eedom and self·determination in Muslim
thinkers and Western thinkers. As the title of Raul's book indicates. he compares the
ideas of various Muslim reformers to American founding lathers. Such a contrapuntal
reading is also provided by Anouar Majid. Director of the Center lor Globailiumanities
and Associate Provost for Global Initiatives at the University of New England. Majid
allempts to demonstrate how this might be done in A ('all.fiJl" JJeres)! where he maintains
that the value system of the reform and change in Islam complements the revolutionary
ethics upon which America has been formed. In an allempl to produce a truly
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contrapuntal discoursc. Majid traces the religious beginnings of American society,
drawing corrclations between its founding documents and the documcnts of the Islamists.
Ilc compares the rhetoric of the founding fathers of Amcrica to thc voices of various
lslamist thinkcrs to highlight the radical nature of thcir lounding vision. highly
privileging the thoughts ofherctical thinkers such as .Jeffcrson. Washington. Paine. and
Whitman and the Mu·ttazilitcs. Abdul Ala Al Ma-arri (poet) 1\1 Warraq. and Ibn 1\1
Rawandi.
Such a contrapuntal rcading allows Majid to universalizc thc Muslim message fiJI'
frcedom of critical thought andli'cedom from oppression, which hc maintains has always
been part of the Western tradition. as wcll. In a truly crcativc rcliguring of history. in
Freedol/l and Orthodoxy, Majid maps a post Andalusian world where. after the collapse
of Muslim Spain. the colonization of the world bcgan. with a complex process of wiping
Arabs and Muslims out of the history ofthc Wcst and constructing a ncw Greco lineage
that asserted the White Euroccntricism convenient lor colonization. But Majid also
connccts the crasure of Muslimncss to a dircct capitalisl agenda of exploitation of the
New World in which all Othcrs were ncccssarily scen as the Muslim Othcr. as intCrior in
the proccss of capitalist exploitation. Majid's goal is similar to Raul's in that he attempts
to revive the idcas of Muslim li'ce thinkers. to rejuvenate Islamic terminology. history
and discourse that will lead toward strong Islamic cultures. Ilowever, in Unl'ei/ing
Ti·adition.\ he notes that while hybridily has been prcscnted as the best alternative to
dismantle polarizations and is cclebrated as a cultural achicvement by intellectuals. it
does little for thc cause of scriously questioning thc rclations of global capital. In 1~1Ct. he
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notes the secularist bias of the hybridity project, indeed ofpostcoloniality itselL which
has excluded religious traditions, including Islam, from the debate. has disallowed grand
causes and utopian projects. such as Islam. which have been replaced with thcoretieal
playfulness. resulting in an absence of Western intellectuals to mount a signilieant
resistance. Arguing that Islamic discourse on human rights focuses on the right to
freedom from economic exploitation Majid extends thc cultural debate to economic
territories. and places the whole issue of resistance, jihad, in context ofa Third World
narrative, of the reclaiming of economic and political rights from torcign occupiers
(Unveiling Traditions 39-42). Thus. lor Majid. the challenge ofthejihadisi. though he
does not refer to thejihadi.\t specifically. is not only a response to military occupation of
lorcign power, but a Third World cxpression of dissidencc to economic cxploitation.
Majid posits as a solution a polyccntric world that can accept various cultures, including
Islamic ones. However. an integral part of this process involves a strengthening of
Islamic culturcs. through an active proccss of offering solutions to global capital, within
anlslamicli'amework:
Ifdelinking the Islamic social imaginary from the capitalist driven process of
Westernization could help maintain. expand or even reclaim noneapitalistspaces
of social relations, then Islam would be re-imagined in more utopian terlllsand
become a lounding bloc in a multicultural world governed by a strong ethic of
reciprocity. (Unveiling Tradition.\' 63)
To elaborate upon this idea. Majid extrapolates a system of Islamic ethics that is opposed
to global capitalism. Arguing that capitalism has created the polarization of the world
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through various peripheries, he hypothesizes how these peripheries can strcngthcn thcir
indigenous economic, social, and cultural systems to confront a homogenizing global
capitalism. These peripheries, including such communities as Native Amcricans, South
Americans, Asian farmers, Muslims, and so on, need to develop thcir own indigcnous
systems, many based on tradition and faith, to challengc global capital. YcL Majid
believes that Islam still lacks the universalistic view necessary forthcprojcctof
polyccntricity. While he notes thal the Islamists are right in their argumcnts about
Western hegemony, he argues that they have been unable to articulate a world view that
meets global challenges. For Majid, this is the critical role of iilihad. or creative
reinterpretation of texts, which he argues must expand outside a purely textual and
theological framework to encompass a cultural practice lo revitalize Islam, to del ink it
li'Ofll the capitalist system, and launch a new dialogue bascd on reciprocity, not
hegemony, similar to the way liberation theory of Latin America has developed. Majid
argues that "liberation theory and a progressively deli ned Islam could address the
injustices of the modern capital system and provide alternatives to failed Eurocentric
models lor social. economic and political arrangements" (Unveiling Ti'adilillns 150). In
this way, the Islamic revival which Majid envisions is connected to Third World
rcsistancc, an alliance of peripheries, where Islam servesascritiealleader.Torealize
such polycentricity, he argues that secular acadcmics must include religious world views
and Islamic thinkers must rethink their attachmcnt to texts that veil the liberationary rolc
of Islam (Unveiling 7hldililll1.l 153). Unlike RauL the goal of iilihad lor Majid is not to
reclaim an authentic Islam, and build Muslimneo-liberal societiesthatarecompaliblc
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with American values. but to offer Islamic alternatives lor a scrious Third World
challenge to global capital. Raul's position rcmains that ofa "modcrate" Muslim intent
on reclaiming an authentic Islam. disassociating himselffrom"bad" Muslims. and
instructing American policy makcrs on what needs to be done to win over the Muslims.
Instead. Majid's migration fromjihad to ij/ihad demonstrates. as does Said's reading of
Fanon discussed in "Travelling Theory" at the beginning of this chapter. a recognition of
both a politics of resistance. never named asjihad. and a process of indigenous sell~
reelection. intellectual discussion and development which Majid assigns as ij/ihad and
Fanon would have described as a new consciousness.
Similarly. in his two works post-9/11. Ziaddiun Sardar attempts [0 address how
ijlihad can translorm the world. In Islalll Pos/lI1odernisl// and Other FII/llres he calls IlH
ij/ihad and places responsibility on Muslims. as do Raul' and Majid. to translorm their
intcrnal systems. arguing that ethical statements need to be translerred into policy
statements to produce Islamic alternatives that are complete models (107). In this act of
ijlihad. Sardar authoritatively rejectsjihad and opts for relorm over revolution. claiming
that .. thc zeal of the righteous and the fanaticism of the revolutionary end in tyranny" and
"a reformist is not a revolutionary: he or she is not foolish enough to believe that the
world can be put right by a single act of political violence" (Pos/lllodernisl// ami Other
FII/llres 108). Change. for Sardar. has to be systematically implemented in achieving the
goal ofa Illulticivilizational world. not unlike Majid's polycentric world: "Such a multi
eivilizational world ofters hope ifit is based on a God-centered ethics" (Posll//odernisllI
and Other FII/llres 179). These thoughts are developed further in 1I00r Do rOil 1\.110\1'! in
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which Sardar argues that rather than harmonizing Islamic thought with Western norms
and values, Muslim intellectuals should scrutinize all modern scientilic culture through
the discriminatory eye. Thus, as Majid divides his world into First and Third. Sardar
divides his into West and non-West. both advocating lor serious challengcs to the
Wcstern mode of scientific rationalism. and neo-liberal markct cconomies. For both.
Islam provides a direction lor the way ahead, a way out of the crisis of modernism and
postmodernism. But in order to do this it has to distance itself from the terminology of
jihad and replace it with ijlihad, as they both do.
Tariq Ramadan learned his lesson well, as to what happcns when a Muslim uses
the termjihad forthrightly as an agent for social changc. Thc Dcpartment of Ilomciand
Security revoked Ramadan's visa in July 2004. preventing him from taking a teaching
position at Notre Dame University in South Bend. Indiana, stating as its rcason that
Ramadan once made a financial contribution to a French charity "Comite de Bienlaisance
ct dc Secours aux Palestiniens" (CBSP). which was blacklisted by the US Department of
the Treasury in 2003.x Ramadan has bccomc a highly controversial ligure in I~urope and
America and is treated with suspicion. particularly becausc of his l~lmily history-a direct
lineage to the Muslim Brotherhood. More than other theorists, Ramadan conli'onts the
role o I' jihad in radical relorm. He explicates thc now familiar differcntiation bctween the
grcater inner and spiritualjihad and the Icsscr outer one lor social justice:
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Jihad is the expression of a rejection of all injustice. as also the necessary
asscrtion of balance and harmony in equity. One hopes for a nonviolcnt strugglc.
hlr removed from the horrors of armed connict. .. Resisting thc vcry violcnt
expression of this tendency and trying to implement thc ncccssary balance of
forces seem to be the conditions for an order that looks human. The latter bcing
the only situation whereby violence is given legitimacy; situations whereby
violence issuslained. repression imposed or rights denicd.to thccxtenl. that if
one succumbs. one loses onc's dignity. (Islam. the West. and the Challenges III
Mudernity65)
Thcre is a critical argument here which differentiates Ramadan from other Wcstern
Muslim scholars, namely his acceptancc of the legitimacy of violence throughjihwl in
cases where nonviolent means have been exhaustedasa means to rcsistthcrcprcssionof
rights. While Majid focuses on polycentric economic and cultural conligurations in a
Third World setting and avoids the issuc of jihad. and Sm'dar firmly migratcs fromjihad
to ijtihad, Ramadan asserts the right to violence. undcr qualification. and uses thc explicit
and controversial term of jihad to describc this violence. lie argues lor an undcrstanding
of the reasons behindjihad:
Every day that passes. entire peoples sustain rcprcssion. abuse of powcr. and the
most inhumane violations of rights. Until when will these peoplcs rcmain silcnt or
sec themsclvcs dccmed "dangerous," by the Wcst. whenevcr they dare to cxprcss
their rejection? I-Jere, it is not a qucstion of defending violencc but rathcr of
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understanding the circumstances wherein it takes shape. North-South imbalances
and the exploitation of men and raw materials. combined with the resignation of
the peoples of the North. produce a much more devastating violence than that of
armed groups. even if the latter are spectacular. As the end ofthc20th ccntury
draws close, can we call all men to mobilize themselves towards morc social.
political and economic justice, for it seems to us that this is thc only way to give
back to men the rights that will silence arms? Such an eftort would be the literal
translation of the wordjihad. (Is/al11. Ihe Wesl. and Ihe (,ha//en~es II/MlldemilY
66)
While explaining the reasons forjihad as residing both in economic imbalance and the
need for a wake- up call of sorts to the cultural and political resignation of the
populations of the West. Ramadan calls for a common mobilization of peoples. "a social
jihad" (66). Thus. Ramadan asserts the revolutionary terminology of Islam. ref~lshioned
to movc away from its connotation of violence toward the vocabulary of intcrnational
social mobilization. Interestingly, the social jihad of which Ramadan writcs includes
ijlihad but is not confined to it. For Ramadan. resistancc is a dual proccss: of lighting
outward repression on one's rights (social jihad) and of internally reforming Muslim
societies themselves (ijlihad). For Ramadan.jihad does not belong to Muslims only: he
seeks to internationalize this terminology as a fight against injustice to be held by all
people:
This situation necessitates an urgent response and a general call lorjihad. Hcre. it
is about giving fi'om one's own person and property. calling all the forces of aII
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diverse societies and engaging in the work of reform. We will not deny that there
are struggles wherein circumstances lead us to direct confrontation. in order to
oppose a purge here, a military occupation there. or another type of aggression
such as the one we have witnessed in Bosnia and Chechnya. However. it cannot
simply be a question of focusing our attention on these events alone and
forgetting the broader type of light which occurs daily and it is. there lore. so
much more urgent. Nowadays. our enemies, in the path of God. are oppression.
hunger. unemployment. exploitation. delinquency and drug addiction. They
require intense efforts. a continuous light and a completejihad which requires
each and everyone's participation. (1.1'/(//11. the West. and the Challenges oj
Modernity 68)
Ramadan explicitly notes whom he hopes will engage in this redelined social jihad.
which to him. as lor Majid and Sardar. is a liberationary movement ofthc economically
dispossessed and those faith-based communitics who place their resistance on liberation
theology:
The Pope calls lor a general mobilization against poverty and the imbalance of
wealth and asserts that it is the duty of Christians to act in this sense. Thejiha(/ of
Muslims is. of course. part of this engagement in the West, but it is equally so in
all the countries of the South. It is a wholcheartedjihad engaged by South-
American communities who exprcss it inlhe 10I'm of liberation theology. or as it
is manifested in the popular and trade unionist forces in the Ncar I~ast and Asia.
(lslall1. the West. and the Challenges oj'ft/lodernity 69)
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However. Ramadan's posited universal socia/jihad. which is intcrnational. docs
not mean he does not focus spccifically on the responsibilitics (or Muslims living in the
West who. he sees. must perlorm a twofold work or deconstruction and reconstruction
(Whm / Be/iel'e 43). This is the nature of ii/ihad for Ramadan. This deconstruction is not
focused only on a critique of secular liberalism. as is emphasized in the work orMajid
and Sardar. but of Islamic sources themselves. Perhaps. it is his distinctive qualilication
as a graduate of AI Azhar University. with in-depth knowledge of Islamic exegesis and
terminology. informed by a PhD dissertation on Nietzsche. that allows Ramadan to
occupy a unique spacc fi'om which he can offer this kind or sustained critique. Using
Islamic terminology, Ramadan theorizes an "abode or testimony"' lor Muslims. lie
argues that the old binary division ordar a/ is/am (abode or Islam) and dar a//wrh
(abode of war) must be broken down. and suggests the term dar ash s/w/llIdah (abode or
testimony). which means Muslims and all people or faith should strive to be living
witnesses of their beliefs through their presence and behaviour (W/w/ / Be/ie\'e 51-52).
Importantly. for Ramadan. the "Islamic message" to which Muslims arc expected to bear
witness is not primarily the particularistic. socially conservative code ortraditionalist
jurists. but a commitment to universalism and the welfiue or non-Muslims as well as
Muslims; it is also an injunction not merely to make demands on un-Islamic societies but
to express solidarity with them:
The European environment is a space of responsibility lor Muslims. This is
exactly the meaning or the notion of "space of testimony" Idar a/-.I'hahw/a I that
we propose here. a notion that totally reverses perspectives: whereas Muslims
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have. for years. been wondering whether and how thcy would bc acccptcd. thc in-
depth study and evaluation of the Western environmcnt entrusts [hcm. in light of
thcir Islamic framc ofrcferencc. with a most important mission .... Muslims now
allain, in the space of testimony. the meaning of an essential duty and of an
exacting responsibility: to contribute. wherever they are. to promoting good and
cquity within and through human brotherhood. Muslims' outlook must now
change from the reality of "protection" alone to that of an authcntic
"contribution." (To Be a European Muslim 150)
In order lor European Muslims to achievc this goal of ijlihad, the challcngc lor Ramadan
is to deepen the understanding of Islam among Muslims, understanding thcir own tcrms
such asjiqh ij/ihad,fa/wa, jihad and shariah. as well as secularization. citi7.cnship.
human rights and dcmocratic models (To Be a European Muslim 56). Clarifying
terminology is critical before a dialogic debate can takc place across civilizations. Ilc
argucs that he wishes Muslims to belong as citizens who are aware ofthcir own
terminologies and can negotiate change by engaging with thcm. To do this. Muslims
must be interested in all issues lhat other citizens arc intcrcstcd in: racc. ccology.
education. urban violence; in other words. arguing for a post intcgration approach.
Likewise. he notes that the West requires a real dialogue with itselfand cannot go on
defining itselfby what it is not. with Muslims as its Other.
Ramadan's description of how familiarity with Islamic concepts can translonn
global society is mapped out in Radical Rejin'm where hc draws up an agcnda for radical
reform which is a transfonnativc proccss. rather than an adaptive one. Ilc insists that his
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argument is not to modernize Islam or Islamize modernity, but that Islamic ethics have
universal implications. Ramadan laments the lack of interaction in social studies with
Islamic scholars outside their own field, as well as lack of consultation with "'The Real."'
meaning the real communities of Muslims (176). For Ramadan, a dialogue of
civilizations is not enough, as one must insist that a priori conditions be set in order for
the goals of the dialogue to be achieved (308). These conditions necessarily lead to
rcllcctionson the relationship between Islam and capitalism.
Ramadan applies his transformational approach to capitalism on two levels: IiI'S!.
to question the Islamicity of capital ism, and, second, to question the Islamic nature of
capitalism itself. Ramadan points to the growing market of Islamic products and argues
that by merely putting an Islamic label on products that are produced by an oppressive
system, outside of Islamic ethics, cannot make them Islamic. The means of production of
commodities through the usc of poorly waged workers, the destruction of the
environment, unfair trade, and the exploitation of the environment is olien \eli
unchallenged by contemporary Muslim scholars who are content with Islamic labels,
such as in Islamic banking, or halal food,'! In lact. labels ofsuperliciallslamieity have
opened up a new market for capitalists in Islamic countries, particularly the Islamic
banking industry which operates with a capitalist ethics by merely integrating a kw
Muslim terms, such as rejecting interest and risk sharing and providing ::.akal. 1o In this
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way. capitalism has been superficially Islamized for the consumption of its commodities.
Second. Ramadan argues that Islamic thinkers have offered no alternatives to and neither
have they been engaged in a sustained critique of capitalism. Muslims have not
participated. except in cosmetic ways. in searching (or better models of overall human
development and instead deal with the issues of global capitalism by integrating into it.
Ramadan concedes that at present there is no Islamic alternative to the neo-liberal
economic model. but there is an ethics upon which a new model can be built. Global
"Islamizedcapitalism'" must be resisted because "the capitalist system has managed to
elTieiently take over an ideational fj'ame of reterenee that was supposed to resist it. with
the collaboration of its operators and of Muslim consumers themselves" (250). Ramadan
notes that the ideational frame of Islam provides the resistance and Muslims should not
allow it to be appropriated. He calls (or Muslims to work with non-Muslim critics of
capitalism to develop new critiques and new economic (orms that engage with other
"universes of resistance to the dominant economic order."' even engaging with Marxist
and atheist thinkers to work out a critique of a system from within (248).
Arc there any likely candidates to assist Ramadan in this radical relorm. the social
iihaL! and iilihaL! lor which he calls') lIe explicitly notes that this work must be caJTied
out by Muslims and olhers. particularly leftist critics and atheists who arc engaged in a
radical critique of capitalism. Iliscall lor radical reform directly synchronizes with the
theological turn in theory as represented in the work of Terry I:agleton and Slavoj i.i:i.ek.
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I have already discussed Zizek's position on thejihadisl in the previous chaptL:r
and so will not repeat it here. In We/come 10 Ihe Deserl oFlhe Rea/. hL: SL:L:S in thejihaclisl
a willingness to sacrifice herself lor change to the existing economic and political systcm.
with an eye on the objectives of the other world. The Western response to this L:XCCSS is.
of course. excess- the reassert ion of conservative dialogue about the Other andlhc
construction of administrative tlll1ctions to contain dissent. Instead of taking thc
opportunity to change the system from which thejihadisl is being produced- global
capitalism- there is an active attempt to either villainize thejihadisi. or Islam in gL:ncral.
or restrict the expression of dissidence by accommodating it to liberal multiculturalism in
nMve gestures of superficial inclusion. Thus. for Zizek. thejihadisi. in his excessiwlKss.
may serve as a hope to start from a "completely alternate position which changes the VL:ry
coordinates of discourse" (40). Zizek also theorizes about the nature of ijlihad andnotL:s
that
/jlihad is a properly dialectical notion: neither a spontaneous immersion in old
traditions nor the need to adapt to new conditions and compromise. but the urgL: to
reinvent eternity itselfin new historical conditions. (We/co/lle 10 Ihe Deserl o(lhe
Rea/53)
Injihad he sees a similar kind of hope:
The basic meaning of jihad in Islam is not a war against the L:xternal enL:my. but
the dlort of inner purification. The struggle is against one's own moral failure
and weakness. So perhaps Muslims should more actively practice the passagL:
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from the publicly best known meaning to the true meaning o I'jihad . (l'io/ence
126)
In lact. it appears that Zizek's appropriation of ijlihad andjihad arc remarkably similar to
Ramadan's vision of both concepts in his radical reform project.
However. the question remains as to how far a contrapuntal relationship with
Ramadan and Zizek can be extended to create an authentic partnership in radical rel(Jrm.
The way ahead for Zizek is. in laet. quite different than it is lor Ramadan. Muslims can
help. according to Zizek. if they can engage in a proper ijlihad to rdorm their societies
and a redefinedjihad. For Zizek. the hope to move out of a post political society lies in
the excess as represented by thejihadisi. not in an accommodation to multiculturalism. or
a reeonfiguration of multiculturalism into multicivilizational or polycentric models as
propagated by Majid and Sardar. Though Ramadan would claim multiculturalism is a
reality and that a proper framework has not been developed to manage this reality. i.izek
posits it as a mere illusion with identity politics itselfas a dead end. lor it is a diversion
from the real class struggle. Zizek sees multiculturalism as incapable of escaping the
model of victimhood. and unlike the Muslim writers discussed in this chapter. olkrs no
hope lor an inclusive truly multicivilizationalmodel. Instead. he argues "postmodern
identity politics of particular (ethnic. sexual and so lorth) Ii Icstyles lits perkctly the
depoliticized notion of society:' one "in which every particular group is accountedl()r
and has its specific status (of victimhood) acknowledged through artirmative action or
other measures" (""A Lenist Plea lor Eurocentricism" 1006). Rather than
multiculturalism which contains the Muslim as {{0!l10 Sacer. Zizek argues I(lr a move to
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the status of"neighbor." In "Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical
Violence:' Zizek argues that if one sticks to "love thy neighbor:' one tries to develop an
ethics without violence. instead of recognizing the "alien traumatic kernel"' that forever
persists in the neighbor, the "inerl. impenetrable. enigmatic presence that hystericizes
me" (140-41). lor beneath the neighbor. "one's mirror image. lurks a radical otherness"
(143). Perhaps. this is where the !!0t/10 !s/amicl/s lurks.
This becomes more evident in I'io!ence where. in referring to the Paris riots of
2005. the 9/11 bombers. and !loods of immigration to I:urope. Zizek articulates the
diflieulty of global capitalism and multiculturalism in dealing with the neighbor. or
perhaps what I have argued in this thesis as the f-IOIllO !s/alllicils. The Muslims in France.
lor example. did not protest because they wanted to be recognized as Muslims. but
because they wanted to be french; an argument with which Ramadan would agree.
Likewise. the walls in Europe against immigration are a signal of the failure of global
capitalism that does not allow people to stay at home (where they belong. perhaps). The
bombing of the Twin Towers had no other goal. like the Paris riots. other than a
performative one of getting noticed. 1\11 these acts of violence arc attempts of the Other.
or I/OIllO !s/amicl/s. [0 break out of the alienation or the indifference shown to her. to be
seen. not as a neighbor. but as a citizen. But global capitalism has no citizens. ;/'izek
would argue; in a sense they all arc at a "zero level protest" (R I). meaning they want
nothing but recognition. Liberal multiculturalism cannot contain these aimless acts.
Zizek argues. and liberal platitudes will result in a society that is "regulated by a
perverse pact between religious fundamentalists and the politically correct preachers of
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tolerance and respect for lhe other's beliefs: a society immobilized by the concern lor not
hurting the Other" (130) The same people who call for the building of mosques in
Europe. for example. also call lor the right to print the Danish cartoons to demonstrate
liberalism. therefore crealing an irresolvable knot. Ironically. Zizek concludes. those
who reprint the cartons arc the Muslims' only real allies. Such a paradox lor Zizek means
that Muslims are showing us the limits of secular disenchantment (133).
Interestingly. we have noted that Ramadan has notcd the samc dilemma. placing
1~lilh in the athcist Icft to accommodatc a space lor the vision and ethics or Muslims.
while Majid and Sardar. on the other hand. have placed a raith in parallel laith-hased
communities. But irthe atheist left is represented by Zizek. can a multicivilizational
polycentric world exist in his Europe? Zizek puzzles why Muslims bother with the
cartoon issue. lor example. instead or attacking their real enemy--glohal capitalism. For
7:izek. ifbothjihad and ijlihad turn Muslims inward to reform their own moral
weaknesses. they are left with basically only one ethical choice:
This means the choice lor Muslims is not either Islamo lascist rundamentalism or
the painrul process or Islamic Protestantism which would make Islam compatihle
with modernization. There is a third option. which has already been tried-
Islamic socialism. The proper politically attitude is to emphasize. with
symptomatic insistence. how the terrorist attacks have nothing to do with real
Islam. that great and sublime religion-would it not hc more appropriate to
recognize Islam's resistance to modernization? !\nd. rather than bemoaning the
fact that Islam. of all the great religions. is the most resistant to modernization. we
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should. rather. conceivc of this rcsistancc as an opcn chancc. as "undccidablc":
this resistance docs not necessarily lead to Islamo fascism. it could also bc
articulatcd into a socialist project. Precisely bccausc Islam harbours thc "worst"'
potentials of the Fascist answcr to our present prcdicament. it could also turn out
to be the site for thc ··best.·· (Welcome to the Desert o/the Real 133-4)
In the end. Zizek. belicves that Islam itsclfmay containthc c1cmcnt of radical cncrgy
that is required to lead a socialist revolution of sorts. but the dangers of a pact with right-
wing fundamentalist cultural valucs is quite high. Thus. Zizck argues that instcad of
renouncing violence and saying rcligion is good. we ought to rcnounce rcligion and
continue violence (Violence 134). And in this. Islam. as a pool of mad cnergy and
violence. in the tradition ofNictzschc and Foucault. may bc of some scrvice in providing
thc Homo Islamicus as sacrifice requircd for the revolution-thc sacrificial violcnce that
atheism cannot offcr since an atheist post-ideological socicty cannot scem to mobilize its
masses for killing and dying. Islam can be employed in a pragmatic manner to spearhead
a Euroccntric revolution. which is suspiciously empty of rca I Muslims. In Zizck's view.
evcnthis is a harsh compromisc sincc the atheists havc a more highly developed sense of
morality than the Homo Islamicus-the religious. aftcr all. do good deals to gain God's
approval whileathcistsdothcm bccausethey belicvethcyare the rightthingtodo
(Violence 138). For Zizck. only Europc is capable of using atheism as its moral principle.
("his is why the only possibility lor thc ncw society is constructcd from a I~uropean
model. as he posits a unilied Europe as the only hope against an American-led global
capital. By First as 7i·agedv. Then as Farce. Z.izck·s anxicty with Islam is obvious. as he
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claims that no malleI' how anI i-imperialist the Islamic movcment appears. it lacks th.:
dimcnsion of a "communalutopia" (71). It is only worthy of short tcrm considcration:
Although in thc long term. thc success of the radical cmancipatory strugglc
depends on mobilizing the lower classes who arc oficntoday in thrall to
fundamentalist populism. onc should have no qualms about concluding short tcrm
alliances with egalitarian liberals as part orthe anti-scxist and anti-racist strugglc.
(73)
Thcrcfore, Zizek can bccomc a rathcr untrustworthy partner in Ramadan's radical n:I()I"Ill.
if Ramadan. Raul~ Sardar. Majid and others can prove themselves as "'cgalitarian
liberals." who are not sexist racists. and then this partncrship will bc for thc convcnicnc.:
of mobilizing the HOII/O Is/all/icus who can be of use in the communist struggle.
Ultimately. Zizek's Muslim partners remain unnervingly dehumanized HOII/O Islall/icus.
to be used as sacrifices in the communist struggle. Zizek's theological turn is not quitc
sustained but divertcd back to European atheism and communism. Pcrhaps Tcrry
Eaglcton might be a more appropriate accomplice?
To his credit. Eagleton confesses in Reason Faith al1d Rew/ution that hc knows
Iillic about theology. and the lillic he knows is about Christian thcology. and so hc will
coniine his work to that lor "'it is bcller to bc provinciallhan pn:sumptuous" (3). Whik
acknowledging that he may be accuscd of universalizing Islamic principlcs about which
he knows lillie. hc continucs to make various assertions about the rolc oljihw/ in thc
contemporary debate and the attack on multiculturalist capitalism. Playing the middle
ground. Eagleton surprisingly places himself in a position as interlocutor: "1 also seck to
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strike a minor blow on behalfofthose many millions of Muslims whose creed of peace.
justice and compassion has been rubbished and traduced by cultural supremacists in the
West" (34). He direclly aligns himself with Muslims: "good." moderates whose religion
has been high-jacked by the Western right and a "bigoted and benighted Islamism" (35).
Eagleton's allaek on Islamic fundamentalism. while aligning ilselfwith Muslim
moderates. is similar to those positions taken by Raul' and Sardar. but. in Reaso/l. !-"ail"
and Revo/ulion. it is to fellow Marxist Aijaz Ahmad that Eagleton refers to develop his
explanation of Islamic radicalism. Eagleton's rceourse to Ahmad allows him to plan: his
own discourse within a leftist and sccular, but also Muslim. critiquc. II lie aeecpts
Ahmad's argumenl lhat. being betrayed by their rulers who arc seduced by capitalism.
with no army to join in to protest. and seeing countless civilians killed by Americans and
Israelis. theji!7adisl.,· do not deem their own killing of civilians as terrorism. or even
comparable to what their own people have suffered. Ifanything. they would consider
themselves counter terrorists. Eagleton elaborates on Ahmad's point that a combination
of domestic. anti-len and mostly autocratic right wing (Muslim) regimes on the onc hane!.
and. on the other. determined imperialist Zionist policies (by the West) have crcated thc
conditions for extremism (101-6). Such engagement allows Eagleton to concludc that "it
is rather that. without the vast concentration camp known as the Gaza Strip. it is not at all
out of the question that the Twin Towers would still be standing" (107). Eagleton.
however. does not claim that without Western imperialism there would be no Islamic
1111latieism. leaving the door open for further reflection on the radical nature of Islamic
II Eaglcton'sreferencesarc to i\hlllad·s··lslalll. Islalllislll and the West.Soc;lIlis/!?cg;s/"r.j.j
(2008):1-37
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theology itself. ror sure. he argues. the global signilieanee of Islam has brought the
West's own internal questions to the lordi·ont. as witnessed in the aggressive new
atheism of Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins. Further. Eagleton argues while
the West is in the throes of late capitalism and postmodernity. undermining its own
metaphysiealloundations. building itselfon praelicalmaterialism. it is now eonti'onted
with another vision which believes in universals and truths (141-42). Therelore. thc West
is now eonfi'onted with its metaphysical foe-Islam. But Eagleton goes no further. Hc
does not theorize exactly how Islam is the metaphysical foe of the West. but mercly
asserts it as the West's Other, which can facilitate self reflection and thus progress tell' the
West:
If the British or American way of lite really were to take on board the critique of
materialism, hedonism. and individualism made by many devout Muslims.
Western civilization would most certainly be altered tor good. This is a rather
different vision from the kind of multiculturalism that Icaves Muslims and othcrs
alone to do their charmingly esoteric stull: commcnding them from a safe
distance. (154)
But what should the West do when faced with. in Eagleton's view. thc universals of
Islam which Ramadan advocates for in his Radical Rejilrm? Eagleton answers.
Either it trusts its native pragmatism in the face orits cncmy's absolutism. or it
falls back on metaphysical values of its own---values that arc looking
increasingly tarnished and implausible. Does the West need to go rull-bloodedly
metaphysical to save itself'? And irit does. can it do so without inllicting too
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much damage on its liberal secular values. thus cnsuring there is still something
worth protecting 11'0111 its illiberal opponents? (166)
Eaglcton is. of course. awarc of the risk of facing the dilemma li'om a purely theological
view. which is why he depends on a materialist like Ahmad to prove the point. lie notes
that while theology is part of the problem. it also fosters a kind of critical rellection that
might ofIeI' some answers. However. the core of Eagleton's dialogue is nOl with Muslims
themselves but with theologians and leliists in the West. If Zizek's objective is to save
the world with communism. Eaglcton's is to save the West by propagating a form of
tragic humanism: "Tragic humanism whether in its socialist. Christian. or
psychoanalytical varieties holds that only by a process of self dispossession and radical
rcmaking can humanity come into its own" (167-68). Surely. this is a rather obscure
agenda and so difficult to assess as an appropriate companion to Ramadan's admitledly
rather seatlered radical reform. Ilowever. it was in his denser earlier work. Un/wh'
Terror. that Eagleton's clarificd his view of the role ofthejihad including Ramadan's
social jihad. in the making of ..tragic humanism."'
In Unholy Terror. Eaglcton posits the ligure of the modern tragic protagonist. not
unlikc the HOII/o 5,'acer, caught betwcen dcsirc and consumption. struggling as a Christ-
like scapegoat. sufICring the sins of global capitalism. Our contemporary tragedy.
according to Eagleton, is that we have lost one of the two main components of tragedy.
l"car and pity: we ICcl f"car but not pity (133). When we sec the face of terror only in the
Other we are unable to sec it in ourselves. and so we must dehumanize and exoticii'.e the
Other in order to fear him. Because we cannot see ourselves as complieit in terror. we
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further terrorize the other, even at the cost of limiting and terrorizing ourselves, in order
to try to prevent the terrorist from terrorizing us. Like Butler, Eagleton concludes that
unless we can feel pity for the Other, those oppressed for whom the terrorists arc
speaking, we arc doomed to repeat tragic activities. Eagleton explains terrorism not in a
socio-political context as he opts for in Reason. Failh and Revolillion but within a
metaphysical framework. Unholy Terror does not deal with reasons lor terrorism or
jihad, per se, but merely seeks to extend the language of the left into metaphysics with
concepts such as sacrifice and evil (v). Thejihadis/lor J::agleton is capable ofsacrilice as
a way of articulating his allegiance to the divine, not as a sacrifice to redeem a
community. Specific references to Islam in J::agleton's work arc abstract and it is unclear
as what kind of worldliness thejihadisl and the tragic humanist should work toward, 01
even if their aims are compatible.
As I have demonstrated in thisjourney through Muslim and non-Muslim
discourse concerning the intentionality ofthejihadist, there has been a considerable
migration to the nature o I'jihad and its relationship to ijlihad. These migrations arc
similar to the migrations noted in Fanon by Said, as discussed in the beginning of this
chapter, Said argued that when theory travels it is olien emptied of its revolutionary
urges, but it can sometimes become re-radicalized. I-Ie also noted that the consciousness
lor which Fanon was advocating, which I have highlighted contained delinitejilwdisl
components, was far ahead of the revolutionary impulses of particularistic struggles, such
as nationalism. All of Said's arguments can be applied to the migrations ofjihwl. An
essential part ofthejihad·.\· travels has involved a careful engagement with th.: radi.:al
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terminology oljihad. often replacing it with the less dangerous terminology of ij/ih(/(/ or
social jihad which navigates away from the contentious issue of violence. There is a
contradictory tendency here. perhaps because jihad has developed such a negative
connotation as a manic form of terror. There is a desire to explain the soeio-political
aspects ofjihad. a desire to de-radicalize it by replacing it with ii/ilmd. and at the same
time a desire to reinsertiihad as a universal form of resistance for a more ethical global
community. Therefore. as it travels the full semiotic eireuitry.jihad re-emerges.
simultaneously maintaining its troublesome and violent particularity. as well as its
universality. It is situated in a particular historical situation but arises as a possible global
form of futuristic resistance.
In its travels.jihad is transformed into ii/ihad on occasion. particularly by Majid
and Sardar. exoticized with various degrees of caution. by non-Muslim writers such as
I~agleton and Zizek. and globalized with universal intentionality. as in the work of
Ramadan. Sardar. Majid and Roy. Its Islamic particularity is emphasized by some as a
starting base. for example Esposito. and its universal application highlighted by others.
such as Ramadan. In all cases. the figure oftheiihadi.\'/ himself remains a troublesome
one: a pitiful scapegoat (Eagleton); a 1/011/0 Sacer (Zizek). a heretical 1/011/0 /s/all/iclIs
marginalized fi'OITI the body of ""good" Muslims (Sardar. RauL Esposito): and possibly a
developing global humanitarian (Ramadan. Majid).
Because the discussions of intent iona lily in academic circles are deep and
intensive. the curiosity regarding the intentions ofthejihadis/ has also becomc
institutionalized in popular culture. umerous films and nonfictional accounts of the lives
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ofthejihadis/S delineate the spectral world or this figure which has exploded into popular
culture: li'om the political explorations in The /{ingdo/ll ..~)',.iana. and Ul71hinkahle. the
debut orthejihadisl in rap music's AI Qaeda Unil and the work of Immortal Technique.
to the numerous television serials. such as 2-1 where thejilwdist serves as the perennial
Other. In addition to these examples. is the huge amount of allention paid to the \ellers.
audio recordings and videos ofvariousjihadisl.\·. no doubt which will grow exponentially
aner the May 2011 assassination of asama bin Laden. and the gruesome beheading
videos accessed on numerous radical websites.
These diverse representationsofthejihadisl are particularly evident in lidion.
which. to a certain degree. competes with the self-representation ofthejihadisl himselfin
the videos and speeches which serve as testimony to his act. Writers construct the
iihadisl as a full-fledged character. acting as a medialor through which to describe his
intentions to a largely Western audience. At the same time. theji/wdisl speaks lor
himself stubbornly asserting his intentionality in the lorm ofa spectacular and
contradictory universal ethics. The mediation oflhese enunciations oftheji/wdisls. real
and fictional. is particularly problematic. as I will examine in the lollowing chapters
through a comparison of representations of fictionalized and real jihadists.
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Chapter Four
Fictional Jihadists
In the previous two chapters. I have explored two csscntial characteristics or
cultural criticism and fiction by Muslim writers as related to the figure ol'theji/wdist: the
desire to place themselves ina Western intellectual tradition where they have credibility
as interpreters. and the need to offer indigenous. inside information rcgarding the current
perceived confrontation between Islam and the West or globali7.ation. I have also
demonstrated a multiplicity ol'subject positions: some writers are deeply attached to the
Orientalist narratives of the inherent violence of Islam and assist. perhaps inadvertently.
in justil'ying the militarization or Muslim countries; others are eager to disassociate
themselves fi'om "bad" Muslims. reclaiming an "authentic" Islam and positioning
themselves as the most viable interlocutors; and yet others insist on positing the current
debate onjihad as a moment of signiticant inteljection I'rom Islam on the slate or
capitalism and globalization. My approach has been contrapuntal to the extent that it has
demonstrated how the works or Muslim writers and critics are contained within a lilirly
rigid public discourse on Islam and globalization. Through an in-depth analysis or
cultural theory. I have demonstrated that the mythology ol'theji/wdist has permeated
academic consciousness. allowing lhejihadist to transcend the Islamic lield to become a
spokesperson ol'dilkrent sorts tor global causes.
164
This phenomenon does not only apply to theory. but to litcrature as well. In
popular literature and film. particularly. thejihadi.l'l possesscs an oscillating strangeness
and familiarity. Familiar motivcs. such as personal despair at the loss ofa parent.
unemployment. humiliation. and alienation. are assigncd as possiblc intentions for his
violent act. At the samc time. foreign unknowns. such as Quranic incitation to violence.
Bedouin codes of family honour. or the politics of far-away countries. also inform these
portraits rendering thejihadi.l'l as strange. and alien. Depending on the depiction and even
nuances within thc same depiction. the portrait ofthe.iihadi.l'1 resonates as a familiar
neighbor. while remaining foreign and unknowable.
Further. the line betwecn fiction and nonfiction is consistently blurred in this
proccss of construction. as popular knowledge on actual.iihadi.l'/.I' finds its way into the
fictionalization ofjihadi.l'l charactcrs. Indeed. the critics I have discussed in the previous
chaptcr spcnd considerable time in elaborating upon specific profiles and portraits of
individualjihadi.l'/.I'. and drawing conclusions as to the intentionality ofthe.iih{f(1 itselr.
through the lives of asama bin Laden. the various 9/11 bombers. and the culprits in the
Madrid and London bombings. This analytical approach to the individual lives and
motivations of these real-lile characters has gencratcd a certain narrative consistency in
presentingthe.iihadi.l'/,\'·intentionstoa Westernaudience.anapproachderivecl from
critical commentary and liclionandceaselesslyreprocluced.lnterestingly.lictional
accounts ofjihadisl.I' mirror the nonfictional analysis. in this sense clearly illuminating
the historicity oftcxts. Of course. it can also be argucd that thesc fictional accounts
generate. rather than reflect. current popular knowledge about the.iihmlisl, One ean argue
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that the fictional imagery or jihadisis presented in contemporary lilm and novels. lor
example. does as much to generate popular knowledge orjihad as does academic
analysis or the roots ofjihadisI motives. In either case. the important point is not whether
fiction informs cultural criticism or cultural criticism inrorms fiction. but that both arc
intricately tied up in constructing a genealogy of terror in a Foucault ian sense. 12
Various Muslim fiction writers have played an important role in describing this
genealogy by emphasizing the intentionality ofthejihadi,I'1 as a major theme connected to
numerous vectors. such as religion. politics. and personal quests lor identity and honor. In
P!o/ling Terror: Nove/iSIS and Terrorisl,I' in Conlemporwy Fielion. Margaret Scanlon
noted that terrorist themes have been prominent in numerous novcls li'OIn the birth or the
genre in the 19111 century as "writers seem increasingly drawn to presenting thcir societies
as a Foucaultian nightmare. a lormidable blank like the Siberian wastclands or
Dostoevsky and Conrad depict. or thc vast impersonal city that overwhelms .lames'
would- be terrorist and ignores his suicide" (4). Many orthe works cxamined in this
chapter fall into this genre or the popular ··terrorist" novel. Further. there arc both
similarities and differences in the presentation orthejihadisl between Muslim writers
writing lor a Wcstern audience in European languages and non-Muslim writers writing to
the same audience. While some or the most noted non-Muslim fiction writers. who have
written about terror. such as Don Del ,illo and John Updike. accentuate the role or Islam
"ForFoucault.gcncalogyrcl'crstohowhulllanpracliccsandil1lcrprClalionschangc.Scc
particularly Laoguage. Coullfer II/ell/on·. Practice. ed. Donald Bouchard (Ithaca. Ncw York: Cornell
University Press. 1977). Thcconlclllporarycmphasison boththcgcncalogyol'lcrrorandthcinlcnlionality
ol'jiltadcountcractthc purclyculturalist argulllcntsol'Huntingtonand Lcwiswhoasccrtainlhalthcrc is
somclhinginhcrcl1Ilyviolcl1Iandirrcduciblcinlslamthalpcrpclratcslcrror.
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in the process. Muslim writers. such as Slimanc Bcna"issa. Mohsin Ilamid. and Orhan
Pamuk situate terror in political and personal circumstances. This chapter argues that the
inlcrvcntions of Muslim fiction writers deconstruct the culturalist argument about the
intcntionality ofthejihadist as bcing fully shaped and informed by Islam. While these
writcrs do follow ccrtain novelistic formulas. thcy simultaneously offcr alternative
reasons behind the inspiration forjilwd
In his critical work, !vIuslim Narratil'e.\' and the Discourse II/English. !\min
Malak offers a frcsh look at fiction by Muslim writers and notes that they "project the
culture and civilization of Islam li'om within" (2). cmphasizing that thcir cngagement
with Islam is "a dimcnsion worth probing and deconstructing" (J 51). While usdul.
Malak's innovativc introduction to modern Muslim classics docs not offcr a contrapuntal
rcading by comparing the contributions of Muslim and non-Muslim writers within a
thematic and historic framework. or ofthc intcrsections betwecn disciplines on certain
Muslim themes. This chapter builds upon thesc cxcellcnt contributions of both Scanlon
and Malak in examining somc ofthc divcrgenccs between Muslim and non-Muslim
lictional portrayals ofthejihadist figure. and how thcsc portrayals conform to or
countcract conventional academic wisdom.
John Updike's 2007 Terrorist. a Nell' )'lIrk Tillles bcst scller. manipulates
numcrous Oriental isms to prescnt thc paper-thin and pathctic character of Ahmad. son of
an absent Egyptian father and an Irish-Amcrican nursc's aide. who prepares to blolV up
the Lincoln Bridgc. but fails. Thc critics are mcrciful with the book when they note that
whcn faced with a plot relying heavily on coincidcntal conncctions and undeveloped
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heroes "it seems meant as a rable. and any good fable requires some derring-do (Ston.:
n.pag). Updike is praised for giving the reader the terrorist"s point or view (Leonard
n.pag). with the failure or the character Ahmad being due to the fact that he is too
Updikean a character. too aesthetic. to be a real suicide bomber (Adams n.pag).
Updike·sjihadis/. Ahmad. is drawn to Islamic radicalism after being bullied in
high school and brainwashed by a neighborhood Sheikh. lie interprets his world through
a distorted Quranic lext which Updike intersperses throughout his novel and which h.:
confesses in a 2006 interview for the Nell' York Times was translated lor him by a
graduate student. In the same interview. Updike states his intention in creating a
humanizedjihadis/:
I think I felt I could understand the animosity and hatred which an Islamic
believer would have lor our system. Nobody's trying to sec it rrom that point or
view. I guess I have stuck my neck out here in a number or ways. but that's what
writers are lor. maybe ....1sometimes think 'Why did I do this?' I'm delving into
what can be a very sore subject lor some people. But when those shadows ~\ould
cross my mind. I'd say. 'They can't ask lora more sympathetic and. in a way.
more loving portrait ora lerrorist.'(n.pag)
Unfortunately. Updike docs not succeed in drawing this "Ioving portrait": Ahmad
remains undeveloped and unconvincing as a character. The hatred he leels lor the society
around him is never rully crystallized except through the clumsy Quranie translations
which seem to be echoing permanently in his head. Ahmad also has no translllrll1ation or
any sort. In the beginning or the novel. he notes. "These devils seck to take away my
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God" (3); at the end. he utters. ··thesedevilshave taken away my God"(310). Ahmad
does not succumb to a sentimental jolt of awareness. as docs Khadra's nameless narrator
in The Sirens oj1Ja}!.hdad. as examined in Chapter Two. On the other hand. his plan is
subverted by his mother's lover and high school. Jewish counsellor. Mr. Levy, perhaps
the most memorable character in the novel who. in an unconvincing heroic moment. fiJils
Ahmad's plan. In fact. Ahmad even remains unmoved by Mr. Levy's arguments to
circumvent his act of terror, just as he is unmoved by the children looking at him. soon to
be his victims, in the next van. Ahmad aborts his act only when 1~lced with his arch
enemy's altempt to foil his plan. Updike constructs no transfonnative moment lor his
character, nor docs he succeed in humanizing him. Ahmad is len unredeemed. foiled by a
.Jewish antihero. If the novel is indeed intended as a fable. the old Orientalist argument
here is very thinly veiled: there is no hope of redemption for thejihadis/: the solution lies
in intervention. perhaps by a Jewish neighbor.
Though definitely a much more successful novel than pdike·s. Don DeLillo's
multilayered Fallin}!. iv/an, which refers directly to 9/11. also stops short in humanizing
the character ofthejihadisl. Critics eagerly awaited DeLillo's intervention as a long-time
chronicler of the relationship between the terrorist and the writer. with many praising his
insightful reflection on the victims 01'9/11. while noting the decline in his writing when
he writes about thejihadisl himself(Lilt n.pag). As Frank Rich notes in his 2007 Nell'
York Times review: "When "Fa/lin}!. Man "sporadically leaves Keith and Lianne behind
to retrace 9/11 li'om the point of view of the hijackers. that spell is broken, These bricl'
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interruptions seem potted. adding little beyond mellifluous writing to thejournalistie
record" (n.pag).
The narration of Fallin}!. Man is split in perspective between Keith and Lianne. the
survivors of 9/ II. and thejihadi.l"l identified only as Hammad. a follower of Mohamed
Atta. whom the novel puts on the first plane to crash into the World Trade Center. I\s a
fictional character. Hammad. like Updike's Ahmad. is not particularly persuasive.
DeLillo's account of his actions in the period leading up to 9/11 follow the same tormula
as Updike's with the same process of radicalization being articulated: the long political
conversations. the dull monotony of rituals. and the dehumanization of the victims.
Below is one of these typical Hammad reflections:
There was the feeling of lost history. They were too long in isolation. !'his is what
they talked about. being crowded out by other cultures. other futures. the all-
enfolding will of capital markets and foreign policies. (80)
When Hammad has a temporary attack of conscience about his victims. he quickly
resolves his contliet: "The others exist only to the degree that they till the role we have
destined lor them. This is their function asothcr. (176)
Perhaps. one of the most interesting achievements in the novel is that DeLillo
presents a near nihilistic view of the relationship between thejihadi.l"l and the victim.
each caught in the mad meaninglessness of the present. each dependent 011 the other I{)r
its necessary implosion. This becomes evident in the last chapter when the attack itselfis
recounted through the eyes of both Ilammad. thejihadi.l"/. and Keith. the victim. so that
the reader has to discern where Hammad's narrative stops and Keith's begins:
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He fastened hisseatbelt.
A bottle fell ofT the counter in the galley. on the other sidc of the aisle. and h~
watched it roll this way and that. a water bottle. empty. making an arc on~ \\ay
and rolling back thc othcr. and he watched it spin more quickly and then scatter
across the floor an instant before the aircrafi struck the tower. heat. then fuel. then
fire. and a blast wave passed through the structure that sent Keith Neudecker out
of his chair and into the wall. He found himsel I' walking into a wall. lie didn't
drop the telephone until he hit the wall. The floor began to slide bcneath him and
he lost his balance and eased along the wall to the floor. (239)
This is DeLillo's most explicit connection between the two men. but the similarity in their
behaviour is already present throughout Fa//inK Man. Both discover blood on their
clothes without knowing wherc it came from; both seek solace in ritualistic acts-I(lr
Ilammad.the physical preparations he makes for the attacks. for Keith. the arbitrary rules
that govern his poker playing and the physical therapy cxercises hc compulsively repeats.
Both distill their lives down to thc essentials-I lam mad prays and sleeps. prays and ~ats;
Keith reduces his sleep to live hours to have more time at the poker table. Del.illo. like
Updike. seems 10 be suggesting that thejihadisl and the victim are caught lip in one
process of self annihilation. In many ways. DeLillo's fiction articulates the message of
l3audri liard and Zizek regarding thejihad ',\' response to the consumerism of globalization
and the alienation of the individual. Yet. the reader docs not get a fully developed human
jihadisl fi'om either DcLillo or Updike. Certainly. thejihadisl is made more familiar.
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simply because he lurks in a lamiliar landscape. but he still remains largely foreign.
exotic. and not quite human enough.
Perhaps this is why the film Paradise NoH' made such an impact. for it disrupted
the Oricntalist narrative consistency. prevalent in even America's most heavyweight
writers. with a fully humanized fictional account ofthejihadisl on the big screen.
Paradise Now. directed by Ilany ;\bu Asad and released in 2005 alicr thc London
bombings. winner of multiple prizes at the 2005 Berlin Film Fcstival and of the Oscar li)r
Best Foreign Film of the year, playcd a seminal role in humanizing the intcntionality of
thcjihadist. The lilm was condemned in some quarters in Iiollywood as being pro-
terrorist. while conversely. and typical of the way extrcmc reactions vic lor attention in
the popular imaginary. there were rumours that the culture minister lor the Palestinian
government considercd banning the lilm lor being too critical of the suicide bombers
(Bradshaw n.pag). Paradise NoH' problematizes the intentions oljilwd through two
friends. Said and Khaled. who are not particularly religious. not apparently very political
(though politics turns out to be an important looming lorce in their background). but they
accept a "suicide bombing" mission in Tel Aviv. While the terrorist network propelling
the young men lorward is presented as cold. exploitative and bureaucratic. Said and
Khaled are quite likeable; in fact, their lives are remarkably ordinary. as ordinary they
can be in the occupied West Bank. and both are motivated by reasons outside the
neoconservative debate. Said is motivated by a desire to prove himsciL to repay the
crime of his absent father who was accused of being a collaborator with the Israelis.
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Khaled merely follows Said, out or despair. boredom. and hopelessness. and the desire to
make his family proud or him.
A particularly illuminating achievement of the film is how it makes the liiC or the
iihadisl ordinary. even though it is set in the foreign landscape or occupied Palcstine. For
example. the sombre lilming of the "suicide bombers'"last message is given a comic turn
when both the audience watching the filming of the video. fellow radicals. and the
camera man. eating sandwiches, arc unmoved by the prewritten messages which have
become almost mundane to them. The construction or the video itselrbecomes the
subject of commentary and humour. with its staging. nonworking cameras. eruptions and
interventions ordaily lire. such as when Khalid remembers to interrupt his video and
mention to his mother about the best place to buy water filters. The shock at the end or
the movie occurs because the audience has become accustomed to seeing thejihl/liisl as a
normal person. Ironically. it is Said who turns away rrom the act and Khaled. who was
never as committed to it as Said. who goes through with it demonstrated by a suddenly
blank. black screen at themomentortheattack.
What makes Paradise Noll' unusual and controversial is thal it presented the
political and religious landscapes as mere backdrops lor the personal landscapes or
despair and honour in the two central characters struggling to survive in occupied
Palestine. The film succeeds in making the characters both human and exotic. The two
young men are both likeable and understandable. and thus ramiliar. though their action.
"suicide bombing."' is foreign and unfamiliar. The very attempt to explore the
intentionality orthejihadisl. outside ora purely religious and eulturistnarrative. to make
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him human. is indeed an efTOl1 at building a counter narrative to the dominant discourse
of jihad and or contemporary power relations. This errort is also evident. with varying
degrees or success. in numerous works or fiction by Muslim writers. Three novels
particularly demonstrate these contributions: Slimane Bena'issa's The Last Night o(a
DOli/ned SOli!. Mohsin Hamid's The Rellictant Fllndoll/en/(f!ist. and Orhan Pamuk's
Snoll'.
Slimane Bena"issa is most well known 1'01' his plays. Following the eruption orthe
Algerian Civil War he exiled himselrto France from !\Igeria permanently. l3ena'issa
received the Grand Prix Francophone de la SACD in 1993 and his work has won the
recognition or institutions such as the Commission Internationale des Francophonies. the
Association Beaumarehais. and the Maison du Theatre et de la Danse d'Epinay-sur-
Seine. In 2000. French President Jacques Chirac named him to the Ilaut Conseil de la
Francophonie. 13 firmly establishing him as an inOuential figure in the French culture
industry. Lestils de l'oll/ertllll1e (""Sons or Bitterness"). created at the Festival d·!\vignon.
narratedtheparallcllivesoraradicallslamistandajournalistwhose lirc was under
threat. At Avignon. Bena"issa himselrplayed the character orjournalist Youcer. I lis play
Prophetes sans diell (""Prophets without a God"). which depicted a conversation between
Moses. Jesus. and the author as they await the absent Muhammad. presented at the
1.1 See <hllp://cncyclopcdia.jrank.org/aniclcs/pagcs/5594/Bcna-ssa-Slill1anc-19~3.hIJlll~
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Theatre International de Langue Franyois (TILF) in Paris. also met with worldwide
His novel La derniere nuil c/'un dall1n/! (The Lasl Nighl ota Dall1ned Soul).
written in 2003 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and relcased in English in 200·t
explores the psychological. spiritual. and religious dimensions ofthejihad and earned
recognition in France. winning the Prix Mediterranee 2003. Perhaps even more critically
valuable than the novel itsclfis how Bena·..ssa uses the value of his Muslimness to
interject his own intentions in the Foreword of the book. which reads like a personal
manifCsto. In the Foreword. he positions himself firmly in a Western intellectual
tradition. citing the influence of Victor Hugo's The Lasl Day ota Condell1ned !IIW! and
Solzhenitsyn's One day inlhe Life u.{lvan Denisovlich. lie writes.
I feel connected to both these writers. first because lhcyare my literary masters.
but especially because of the present historical context. As in their ease. I Icel
history forces me to speak out responsibly against certain unjust. inadmissible and
inconceivable deaths. My response as a Muslim is dictated by my personal
experience with religious extremism. which forces me to speak out. and. like TOIll
Thumb. to place the third stone in the way of ogres in order to point the way
toward hUlllanity.(vi)
l3ena'issa then goes on to speak of what he believes to be the plight lacing Muslims: to
live out "an Islam that is expressed through all manner ofviolencc" or be silent.
positioning himselfas one ofthc rare who refuses [0 be silent (viii). No doubt. like his
fellow Algerian Khadra. Bena'issa did suffer personal trauma. specifically self-imposed
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exile in France. where he. like Khadra. became a literary star alter writing about the
Algerian civil war.
After assigning value to his literary talent and personal voice. Bena"issa continues
to explain what he believes are the various reasons for terror. including those cited by
Esposito and Roy: globalization. poverty. and the need to belong. noting that in the global
systcm of domination "religions arc becoming more political as a way to lill a vacuum
and construct. each in their own way. an opposing position" (viii). In this way. Bemt"issa
atlempts to place his novcl. though fiction. within the dialogue of contcmporary historical
academic discourse. But. unlike Esposito or Majid. for example. he docs not attribute
Islam with the capacity to speak to any of these problems: "The solution to all of these
problems. admittedly signilicant. is. in my mind. to be found outside of the realm of
religion" (viii). He also made a rather embarrassingly sentimental appeal as a Muslim.
taking it upon himself to speak lor all Muslims in asking for lorgivencss: "Speaking as a
Muslim. I ask for forgiveness from all the families who have been victims ofrcligious
extremism across the globe. regardless of their faith" (ix). This rather unusual plea
allows Bena"issa to position himselfas a "good' Muslim and distance himsclfli'om the
"bad" ones.
If Bena'issa Icels an aninily lo Ilugo. Hugo he most dclinitely is not. rhe novel is
a cumbersome read. adapting a familiar and tired lormula. not unlike Updike's: a
symbolic. missing father. a sense of exile and dislocation. a process ofdc-eulturatiol1.
treatises on the political radicalization behind thejihwji.l'/. eodilication of 1~lith. the
cmcrgencc of a new ethics locused on righting present wrongs. symbolic impotence and
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an aborted act. Despite the failure of the novel as a literary work. it is worth exploring to
elaborate upon how Bena'issa. certainly more effectively than Updike and Delillo.
inventively employs the novelistic form to explore the issue of exile and its connection to
the lormation of the Weslernjihadis/.
The Las/ Nigh/ o(a Dall/ned SUIII is heavily peppered with Quranic quotes. as in
Updike's Terroris/. at times 10 justifyjihad as thejihadis/s do. at other times to
discourage violence. as ""moderate" Muslims do. Strangely enough. the quotations from
the Quran are not taken li'om standard translations but from the author's own French
translation li'Ofll Arabic. which is then rendered into English. So it is that the original
Quran is twice removed in the text. displaced and yet heavy with authority. as each verse
is identified for easy access. The idcntification of the sections of these twice-removed
Quranic references exemplify the plight of the exile. who is also twice removed from
culture. the culture of his origin and the culture he has adopted. This is. of course. a
central thcmc in thc novel and various narrative strategies arc deployed to demonstrate
this state of dislocation and to relleet on the location oljihad. perhaps as being in a de-
eulturatcd zonc of personal and exilic strite. Bena'issa emphasizes repetitively that as the
Quran and /lalli/Ii (traditions of the Prophet) all become removed from their historical
period and reinterpreted for political objectives. they too arc exiled from their
metaphysical roots. just as his character Raoufis exiled from his culture.
Bena'I'ssa's characters arc not Saidian metaphoric exiles. blending hybridity to
locate a new opposition in the cosmopolitan metropolis. a secular criticism. To the
contrary. they arc radicalized and dislocated individuals who arc merely symbolic
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mouthpieces for various ideologies. The two central characters. Raouf and !\thman. arc
software engineers living in the Bay Area of California. who join a team of live. ready to
hijack a Boeing plane and crash it into a building. The characters refer directly to what is
now well known about the 9/1 1 bombers; like Alta. et al. RaouL the narrator. grew up in
a comfortable middle-class Muslim household (both parents arc professionals) and
benelited from an education in the West (which parallels the fact that several of the 9/11
bombers seemed to be long-term graduate students in Germany). !\thman himself has
even completed his PhD studies in Germany.
It is under Athman's finn tutelage that Raoufbegins his descent intojihad.
involving an in-depth process of deconstruction. Raouf notes about !\thman. "lle likes to
say that by destroying logic, a new structure of meaning could result. and those new
meanings could undermine the logical structure upon which they are based" (10).
Athman's objective is to strip Raoufofthe adopted culture in which he had wrapped
himsclf. by merging the historical past of the Quran with the present. As Raoufnotes.
Athman uncovered my true identity. the one I had always kept in check so I could
finish my studies. not upset my parents. maintain a certain distance li'omlhe
country of my roots. and question the country of my birth still in keeping with my
parent"sprinciples.(52)
!\thamn . having made the transition from Marxist to Muslim. has his own Islam with its
own Machiavellian ethics. I-Ie rejects the notion ofthejihadis! as a tragic ligurc.
Eageleton's scapegoat lor globalization. or Zizek's 1/011/0 Sacer. In fact. !\thman rejects
the notion of tragedy in general:
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I'm in the divine. you're in the tragic. I stand up vertically; you lie
down horizontally. ietzsehe said" "Tragedy is when those below
don't know. and those above can't go on anymore'" For us Muslims.
the one above can always go on: it's God. Those of us below must
always know that. There is no such thing as tragedy in Islam. (74)
Ifthejihadisl is not a tragic figure for Athman, neither does he completely
identify himself with thc politics of anti globalization, though he does recognize the
nature of implosion inherent in globalization. Noting that America necds to be attacked at
the heart of its contradictions-"You have terrorize those who terrorizc you" (67)-
Athman highlights the difference between thejilwdisis and thc activists of the
antiglobalization movement. whom he believes lack a coherent intentionality because
their ideas arc based in worldly politics: "like the anti-globalization militants who don't
really know how to destroy the system. It's up to us to do it lor them" (118). Athman
philosophizes his own form of Islamic politics, outside Marxism and the antiglobalization
movement: "Politics is the art ofcrcating a structure lor your expansion. In order to live
your religion fully you need this structure. and as long as you don't have it. you'rejust
plain political period. I am really a politicized believer" (119).
The difference between the political activist and thejilwdisi. then, lies in utopian
belieL not in changing theculTent system but in creating an entirely new one, an
argument with which Zizek would not disagree. Athman also elaborates on the
exhibitionist nature of thejihad in this utopian project when he recounts a story of how
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he discovered terror as a child by breaking dishes in order to get the attention or his
parents who were not listening to them. The breaking or the dishes had nothing to do
with what he wanted to say. but it did get him attention.. Thus. Athman claims that thl:
"terrorist act is the one that has nothing to do with reality. But one that gets listened to"
(121).
In opposition 10 the political treatises of I\thman. thejihadi.l'l rl:cruiter. Bena·issa.
develops the sensitive character of Raoul'. who is olien uncertain or his own
transformation. Unfortunately. he employs some awkward narrative strategies to
humanize the character of Raouf: the first person narration through which he accounts his
own process of transformation is the most effective. while his verbatim memoril:s or
eulogies and letters are less so: the recalling orhis mother's eulogy at his rathn's
runeral. a letter rrom his dead mother. and his leller to his mentor .Iamal serve as trealisl:s
that counteract Athman's and give a voice to the opposing view of the moderatl: Muslim.
Like the Quran in the text. these treatises arc twice removed. dislocated. and though
unconvincing as literary strategies. runctionmelaphorieally to express exile ilselL
Raoul's first person account orhis descent into terror is centred on identity and
basic existential questions arising rrom his sense of dislocation. rather than on I\thman's
radical post politics. Bena'issa downplays description in the novel and the reader lacks a
strong sense of place; the story could happen anywhere. The location is the narrator's
own consciousness. at the centre of which are his parents. symbolic ora distortl:d
homelessness. removed. exiled. and delormed in some way. The only description or
Raoul's rather is ofa dead body embalmed in his casket. against Muslim tradition.
IRO
bloated and distortcd so much that Raoul' throws up whcn hc sccs him. the object of a
cross-cultural debate between Raoufs mother and his lathcr's relatives as to thc proper
mode of burial. The dead. absent father is remembered only in relation to the exiled
Lebanese mother who serves to deliver various speeches on exile. including the
unconvincing eulogy at her husband's death Bena'issa rctrieves only when he is
hypnotized. and the letlcr she writes for her son before her death and alier his arrest.
delivered to him by his girlfriend. In this sense. the litanics arc separatcd in the novel as
expliqueson exile. rather than integrated into the plot. I\s such, they arc always remov.:d
from the narrator himself. either by his own unconscious. or through the meditation ofa
Throughout the novel the mother serves as an acculturated Muslim. echoing a
secular belief in multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. She chooses the rather
unconvincing occasion of her husband's death to givc the following philosophical
rcllcction on exile:
I am an cxilc from a utopian country. I am cxilcd from a utopia which would he a
fusion of my country of birth and my adopted country. But what saves tru.: .:xiles
is thaI thcy dcvelopan cxtraordinary encrgy. and ifth.:y arc talentcd. thcy will b.:
exceptional. (IR6)
She echocs Said's scntiments on thc privilcged position ofthos.: hctween cultures.
bclieving that exile leads to a kind of universalism. a kind of disinterest cd spac.:: "w.:
hecomc unfetlercd obscrvers of others. of oursclves" (186). This worldliness allows th.:
mctaphorical exile, thc intcllectual. to escape both liliativc and aniliativc connections to a
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certain degree. Thc mother cscapcs hcr bonds as a Lebancsc and an Amcrican to conjun:
up her version of a cosmopolitan Islam. Her last letter to hcr son alier his arrest
synthesizes hcr sccular approach. positioning her as a mctaphor lor a moderate and
genuine Islam which has given birth to a deformation. hcr son. Tcllingly. she kels as ir
shc has had a miscarriage. drawing an analogy to jihad as a miscarriagc rrom Islam: "1
feel all the changes a woman's body fecls in thc beginning ora pregnancy as it gets ready
lor a baby. except that in minc thcy are occurring in a vacuum"' (239). She hopes her son
would be her father. thc carrier ofa new vital Islam. and wonders "did our history
translonn us into savages .... Are wc capable of becoming adult Muslims?"" (242). The
lettcr resembles Said's musings on cxilc and raises all thc qucstions that moderate
interlocutors raise about thc rolc or Islam in terrorism: the relationship bctween Islam.
modernity. socialism. and exile. and thc role of the intcrnational community in
negotiating current conflicts. While it is hardly a lettcr a dying mothcr would write to a
suicidal son. it does exhort a basic premise upon which thc novcl ends: ··the solution is
not to light violencc. but to cradicate the causes that created this violcnee in the lirst
placc··(252).
If both Athman and the mother are representativc characters. exhorting opposing
political treatises to explorc thc issues of jihad. Raoul' is thc site lor the collision or these
eonllicts and lor the proccss ordc-culturation and codilication so aptly described by Roy.
as discussed in thc prcvious chaptcr. The detailed description or Raoul's process through
lirst person narrativc follows a lormulaic approach. First. Raoul's cngagcmcnt is an
emotional and an intcllectual one which requires separation rrom his past. In his
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repentance. he says. 'I give up my rormer lire as I gave up the milk or my mother" (RO).
Once he becomes a born-again Muslim. Raout"eannot remember how he had organized
his world before: "When 1try to remember how I thought before and about what. I
haven't the slightest idea. no memory whatsoever. I became an amnesiac of the void that
used to be inside me" (94). The process or becoming ajihadi.l'l is equated to the process
of being in exile: "I had to exile myselrby naming my country of origin. by inventing my
adopted country" (136).Wilh this separation rrom his previolls lilC. including his lover
and his mother, the process ofpolitieization takes hold and he intellectualizes the position
of the middle class Westernjihadi.l'/: "Ifreal minds don't die lor Islam. martyrdom will
remain an idiotic idea for idiots. I think the lact that people like us agree to do it will
change the scope of the problem" (108). By people like us he means thinkers.
Westerners: .. thosetrained in their universities" (109).
The period or isolation leading to the event reads almost exactly like the klter of
instruction li'om Alta, as fictionalized by both Updike and DeLillo. Raoul' and his fCilow
jihadi.l'/.I' live in a house, isolated. hooded when they arc together. with a lile of ritual.
deprivation and purilieation of the body. and prayer. During this time. the erasul'l: of sdf
is supposedly completed: "They recreated me (or another world. I was no longer the
same, and in my eyes. the world was no longer the same either" (160). This period of
purification. through codification. is described in painstaking detail by Raoul' who
outlines the supplications and codes to ensure paradise. and the ritual of the event rather
than the spiritual meaning behind it: shaving. ablutions. and the recitation of certain
words at every step.
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Perhaps one of the mosl interesting aspects of the novcl besides the close
correlations made betweenjihadand exile is that Raoufremains both guilty and innocent
of the act itself. The cvent does occur and he does watch it on television screens among
many other spectators. His calculations led to the event; however. he did not board the
plane. Again, as in Khadra's The S'irens o/Baghdad and in Updikc's Terrorist. the logic
of the failedjihadist is never really madc clear. Whcn asked why he had chosen
martyrdom. Raoufconnects his reason to the dcath of his symbolic f'<Jther. which had len
him alone spiritually, and with a need to redeem his father's sins which he sufkrcd due to
exile. and to right the wrongs done against him. The father. at once a real and personal
figure. representative of the failed Muslim community. becomes Raoul-s major reason
lorjihad. Ilowever. the reader is never quite sure of why Raoul' did not go through with
the act of terror except that he aborts his act when he stops taking his pills. andlinds
clarity. For Bena'lssa, then. the codification ofthejihadist experience is a kind of
hypnotic and drug induced state. li'om which his character emerges. ifnottotally. The
conflicted Raoul' is remorseful, but as he watches the event on television. as a member of
an unsuspecting audience. he is also proud of his contribution: "the rapidity. precision
and acrobatics of the manoeuvrc intensiliedthe violence of the act to the extreme.
Maybe that's the one divine aspcct of it all .I'm really proud of my calculations" (12-1). In
contrast to this pride. Raoufs reasons for not going through with the acl. as with the letter
of his mother. become a mantra lor a new-found moderate Islam. The moment of
illumination is leli open. as ifit is unexplainable. except (or the knowledge that God "is
fundamentally against all extremes and immoderation" (232).
184
If the character ofRaoufis conflicted and neurotic. it is at least human. The
character is left disoriented and almost inarticulate in the face of the results of his actions.
Though the novel is of questionable literary merit. it does raise some interesting
interventions on a "rea\"' fictional character. trying to explain the process which \cd him
to terror. The awkward. but politically effective. counter narratives of the mother and
Athman place the lext lirmly in the counter discourse aboutjihud and its intentionality.
This counter discourse forefronts the role of exile and dislocation in producing the
Westernjihudis/. and presents various arguments for placing the phenomenon of the
jihudis/ in the exilic experience of globalizalion. accentuates the urgency lor reclaiming a
more authentic and nonviolent Islam as advocated by moderate Muslims.
The Relllc/w7/ Fllndulllen/ulis/ by Mohsin Hamid. short listed lor the 2007 Booker
Prize. is much more successful at humanizing thejihudis/. but docs not leave open such a
wide range of possibilities. The novel recounts a dramatic monologue between Changez.
a young Pakistani man who had studied at Princeton and works lor nderwood Samson,
and an anonymous American at a coflCe shop in Lahore where Changez tells the story of
his transformation from Wall Street executive to a "reluctant fundamenlalist.'· The
narrative ofdisenchantmenl with the West is reminiscent of the classics oflhe growing
canon of Muslim litcrature, such as Tayeb Salih's 1968 Seuson o!i\Iigra/iol1 /II /he Norll,
and Taher ben Jelloun's 1988 Soli/uire, Ben Jelloun's Paris and Salih's London arc
rellected in Hamid's New York, particularly as women and cities become metaphors for
the violence of colonization and postcolonial rcsponses to it.
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In The RelllClanl Fllndall/en/alis/. there are no political treatises or ritualistic
hypnotic religious experiences. Instead. Changez dispassionately recounts his
disillusionment with the world of global finance with which he had become emhroiled
and his failed love affair with the inaccessible Erica. who scrves as a mctaphor lor the
West. In the beginning. when Changez recounts thcir trip to Greece. Erica is
introduced as the fragile. slightly detached girl who shows an interest in him as a li'iend
and whom he entertains with anecdotes of Pakistan. Symbolic Greece serves as a
location to open the relationship between the New Yorker and the Pakistani. since Greece
has always stood between the West and the Muslim world. a space mediated to the West
through Muslim translators. and a space through which this interlocution has been erased
to form a direct lineage between Greek and Western cultures.l~ Symholic Greece allows
the novel to be read allegorically as a sustained commentary on the nature of the
Muslim/West relationship.
The relationship with Erica demonstrates the violence of this encounter. Erica is a
neurotic and hysterical West. emotionally unbalanced and scarred because of the death of
her liancee. Chris. Meanwhile. it is significant that Changez. who feels protective of her.
can only have sexual relations with Erica by reminding her of Chris. actually taking on
his identity during the sexual act. lor without this performance. Erica is frigid: "it
reminded me of a wound, giving our sex a violent undertone" and aner "I fell at once
hoth satiated and ashamed" (106). Thus. only by taking on the identity of a dead lover
can the physical relationship between Changez. the Muslim. and Erica. the West. actually
II This erasure has been cOll1mented upon extensively by Anouar Majid in UIII'eilill,~ hoc/iliolls
and Akbar Ahmed in /slil/llol/{ll'llsl/llodemi,\'/11
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occur. At the same time. this relationship facilitates Erica's selfdcstruction: she starves
herself to death and then commits suicide (orat Icast disappears. since hcrdeath is not
conclusive in the novel). Changez. then. the Muslim. brings on the suicide or
disappearance of the West itself.
Read allegorically. the novel presents a familiar narrative in postcolonial Muslim
liction. The metaphoric relationship between White women and Black men.
representative of a larger relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. was
theorized by Frantz fanon in Black Skin. White Masks: "When my restless hands caress
these white breasts. they grasp whilC civilization and dignity and make them mine"(63).
Likcwisc. in The 5,eason ()lMi~ration to the North. Mustala Saeed. a Sudanese cconomist
at thc London School of Economics also known as thc Black Englishman. is put on trial
(or murdering a woman. his wile Jcan Morris. and lor contributing to the suicides of three
other women. In his trial. Saeed articulates. "1 came as an intruder into your very homes:
a drop of the poison that you have injecled into thc vcins of history. I am no Othello.
Othello was a lie" (95). In So!iwire. ben Jelloun's North AIi'ican immigrant murders or
imagines the murdcr of. (the reader cannot be certain). an imaginary White woman whom
hc has constructed from images in magazines. In fact. murder. real or imaginary.
becomes a scenc lor the reconstruction of the selfand nation in ben.Jelioun and Salih.
Ilamid's book can be placed in this postcolonial Muslim literary tradition as it relkcts on
the impossibility ofa conversation between Muslims and the West and on the role of
violence in such mcdiation in a posl-9/11 world.
187
Yet this simply written but complex narrative can be rcad on another levcl by
focusing on the relationship between Changez and the namelcss American whom thc
reader knows only as Changez's silent audience. The novel is narrated as a monologuc in
which a nervous American listens to Changez's story at a cotke shop and thcn follows
him in a walk through Lahore. Thc conversation between the two men is bascd on a
shared paranoia and suspicion. yet bound by a certain intimacy and evcn moments of
trust. perhaps representative of the relationship between Islam and the West. Throughout
thc conversation, only Changez speaks; the American spcaks only through body
language. Strangely. at the end of the novel. the American and Changez lind thcmsclvcs
in an alley being approached by two ominous looking mcn. Thc re<ldcr docs nol know if
either one of the characters will be a victim or not. and ifso which onc of them will
become the victim. lias the American brought Changez to his capture or has Clwngo.
broughtthc American to his demise? The question is left unresolvcd. As Ilamid himsclf
nOles in a 2009 interview with Harcourt Books.
The lorm of thc novel. with the narrator and his audiencc both acting as
charactcrs. allowcd me to mirror the mutual suspicion with which Amcrica and
Pakistan (or the Muslim world) look at one anothcr. The Pakistani nmrator
wonders: Is this just a normal guy or is hc a killer out to gct mc? Thc Amcrican
man who is his audicncc wonders the same. And this allows thc novclto inhabit
thc interior cmotional world much like the exterior political world in which it will
be read. The form of the novel is an invitation to the rcadcr. Ifthc rcadcr acccpts.
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then he or she will be called upon to judge the novel's outcome and shape its
ending. (n.pag)
Further. in "My Reluctant Fundamentalist.' Hamid discusses his ehoice of monologue as
a form appropriate to the rich postcolonial tradition of Muslim tiction:
The frame of a dramatic monologue in which the Pakistani protagonist speaks 10
an American listener. and a voice born of the British colonial inllections laught in
elite Pakistani schools and colored by an anachronistic. courtly menace thai
resonates well with popular Western preconceptions of Islam.(n.pag)
Thus Ilamid's novcluses narrative techniques much more discreetly than the awkward
maneuvers of Bena"issa. without the need tor long political treatises. Further. the character
ofChangez is much more believable than that of Raoul'. and much more likeable and
human. Yet. both writers focus on one basic reason for the translormation of the Western
iihadis/: the sense of exclusion from his adopted country and the reclaiming of his origins
in response. Hamid. however. adds none of the Quranie or religious references typical of
Bena"issa and pdike's works. but. instead. situates his character and his motives lirmly
in the world of Wall Street capitalism. and tailed encounters at intimacy. In this way. The
Nelllc/an/ Fllndall/en/alis/ allegorizes the plight of the "bad' Muslim. who tells his story
to an unresponsive and silent audience.
This allows us to elaborate on an issue discussed in the beginning of this chapter: the
audience ofthejihadis/ which in all the novels diseussedthus li1r is a Western audience.
With the sometimes Islamophobic debates on the possible inclusion of Turkey in the
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European Union. 15 Orhan Pamuk's work. particularly thc post-9/11 novcl. S'1101l·. providcs
an example of critical intervention into the concerns regarding thejihadisl among /IS. or
in other words. the possibility of Turkey with a population of over sevcnty million
Muslims and the second largest military in NATO bccoming orficially European.
The worldliness of Pamuk's texts became obvious in 2005 whcn hc eomplaincd in
a series of interviews that Turkey had been responsible for the massacrc ofa million
Armcnians and 30.000 Kurds and. as a result. Turkish prosccutors chargcd him with
"insulting Turkishness." The charge was eventually droppcd following an international
outcry. but had hit international headlines just weeks before talks about Turkcy's entry
into the EU. Pamuk. who has always argued for Turkey's entry into the EU. was uscd to
demonstrate that Turkcy. with its human rights violations. was not rcady to join the
democratic EU. Pam uk commcntcd directly on this sccnario: "In Europc. conscrvativc
people who do not want to scc Turkey in Europe tricd to abuse my situation. Thcy
wanted to show that this country docs not deserve Europe. which put mc in an awfully
awkward situation" (.. , want to continuc" n.pag).
Pamuk's work continucd to come under even morc scrutiny sincc hc won the
Nobcl Prize for Literature in 2006. Since then. Pamuk. who writes in Turkish. has
bccome known to a larger intcrnational audience. politicizing his work in thc debate ovcr
Turkcy's negotiation lor EU mcmbcrship. Pamuk. commcnting on his Nobcl win. noted
I' Public opinion in EU countries generally opposes Turkish membership. though with varying
degrees of intensity. The Eurobarometer September-Oelober 2006 survey shows thai 590 00 fEU-27
citizens are against Turkey joining the EU. while only about 28% arc in 1~IVOr. European Commission
Eurobarometer 66 - Public Opinion in the European Union. Sep-Oet 2006. Web. 25 Oct. 20 I0
<http://ee.europa.eu/publieopinion/arehives/eb/cb66/eb66en.pdt'>
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his own value in this situation: "Well. unfortunately. that makes the thing very precious
in Turkey. which is good for Turkey of course. getting this prize. but makes it more extra
sensitive and political and it somehow tends to make it as a sort ofa burden"
(""Interviews:' nobelprize.org n.pag) . It is in this context. read against thc ongoing debate
on Turkey's entry into tbe EU, that Sno\\' offers a direct commentary on thejilllldisl
among /IS, particularly on the political tensions in Turkey. notably among secular
nationalists and Islamist political movements. Allhough Margaret Atwood's 2004 Ne\\'
)fork Times review of Snow places it firmly in the tradition ofpost-9/11 literature, ,"·Oll\\' is
more than a post-9/11 novel-it is also an articulation into the debate on the potential
increasing MuslimnessofEurope.
Pamuk has commented that the novel was intention(lily written as a political novd
since he wanted to write "a political novel in which I explored my own spiritual
dilemmas-coming from an upper-middle-class family and feeling responsible lor those
who had no political representation?"(""The Art of Fiction" n.pag). S/7(I\I" became an
exploration of the political contlict between secularism and Islam in Turkey. as well as a
philosophical commentary of the mediation of the novelist and poet in representing
others. Pamuk noted lhatneithertheseeularist nor the Islamistswere happy with the
novel:
The secularists were upset because I wrote that the cost of being a secular radical
in Turkey is thal you lorgetlhat you also have to be a democrat. The power of the
secularists in Turkey comes from the army. This destroys Turkey's democracy
and culture of tolerance ... They also didn't like that I portrayedlslamistsas
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human beings. The political Islamists wcrc upscl bccausc I wrotc about an
Islamist who had enjoyed sex belore marriage. It was that kind of simplistic thing.
Islamists are always suspicious of me because I don't come from their culture,
and because I have the language, attitude, and evcn gestures of a more
Westernized and privileged person. They have their own problems of
representation and ask: How can he write about us anyway? lie doesn't
understand. This I also included in parts of the novel. ("The Art of Fiction:'
n.pag)
Of course, it is this debate on the secular versus Muslim nature of Turkey that permeates
many of the debates of Turkey's entry into the European Union.
In Snmr, Orhan, a novelist. goes to Kars, snow in Turkish, in Anatolia years aner
his now departed friend Ka, short for Kalka, had returned there after a decade abroad in
Germany (Stoda n.pag). Orhan wishes to retrace Ka'sjourney to lind out why girls were
committing suicide and to rekindle his lost love with Ipek who has recently divorced her
Islamist husband. The eontliet belween the Islamists and the aggressive secularists
provides the political argument of the novel and Pam uk problematizes the binaries of
Islam and secularism, onen making the Islamists the victims of violence rather than
perpetrators ofi!. Pamuk's art in this novel is ultimately to destabilize the image of the
potentialjihadis! andlhe modern secularist. the religious and the secular. as two separate
and self contained entities. For example, even the motives of the girls who arc
committing suicide. supposedly out of religious conviction, arc not what they appear:
thcrc are rumors that the lirst girl committed suicide, not as a political statement about
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her right to wear hijah. but because her father was planning her marriage to an older
gentlemen. not allowing her to marry for love. Kadife. ringleader of the headsearf
movement. is also having an afTair with the Islamist leader. I3lue. and her sister. Ipek. u
secularist. did not divorce her husband for his new-found fundamentalism. but because
ofa love affair. like her sister·s. with Blue. These contradictions destabilize the world of
appearances: nothing is as it appears; private acts are politicized. and sometimes private
acts compete with ideology for the identity and allegiance of the individual.
Unlike Updike. Dc Lillo and Bena'lssa's characters. all of Pamuk's Islamists are
multifaceted. articulate and aware of their contradictions. Every character is shown
wrestling with belief and all characters go through believable transformations in their
thinking about God and the roles of Islamic and secular symbols in society. Blue. the
potential and suspeetedjihadi.l'/. is a rich and complex character. fully aware of and
articulate about his complexities. When Blue is first introduced, Ka(and the reader) is
aware of his mythological status. as a shadowy figure in hiding whose history has been
mythologized. lie is immediately positioned as a perlormer and activist who has taken
the opportunity of numerous media appearances: "he was such a hit as the 'wild eyed
scimitar wielding Islamist" that he was invited to repeat his perlormanee on other
channels" (69). Yet when Ka meets Blue. he is amazed at his grace and handsomeness
and how different he is in reality than the image presented in media: "in his manner,
expression and appearance there was nothing of the truculent. bearded. provincial
fundamentalist whom the secular press had depicted with a gun in one hand und a string
of prayer beads in the other" (72).
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Blue is interested in Ka because he sees him as a link to the West. as a possible
journalist and mediator. In order to convince Blue of his false status as journalist. Ka
invents a German whom he assures Blue will publish his "Statement to the West." The
conversation between the two becomes a fine example of the ironic stance of mediation
between the seribe and thejihadist, For example, as Ka edits Blue's statement he focuses
on the role of language in winning sympathy fi'om a Western audience. It begins when
Ka attempts to explain the discomfort the fictional editor might feel at the terminology
·'thcWest"itself:
"'He takes offense when people discuss the Wcst as if il's a single person with a
single point of view," Ka said carefully.
"But thal's how it is" Blue said. alier another pause. "There is. alier all. only one
West and only one Western point of view. And we take the opposite point of
"The fact remains that they don't live that way in the West." said Ka. "Il's not as
ifit is here; they don't want everyone thinking alike. Everyone. even the most
ordinary groeer. ICels compelled to boast of having one's own personal views, If
we used the term Western democrats instead of the West. you'd have a beller
chance of pricking people's consciences," (228)
Blue concedes to Ka's analysis and recognizes the powcr of language and articulation in
representing oneself. In short. he plays the game. This is evident later. when Blue asserts
his exhibitionistic and individualistic stance and chooses to be executed rather than
compromise:
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There's a word Europhiles very commonly usc when they denigrate our people.
To be a true Westerner, a person must first becomc an individual. and then they
go on to say that that in Turkey. there arc no individuals? Well. that's how I see
my execution. I'm standing up against thc westcrncrs as an individual: it's
becauselamanindividualthat I refuse to imitatc them (324).
Blue is capable of using the terminology of his enemies to turn it back on them in his
performance, and he is awarc of the rolc ofjournal ism in creating and sustaining his
mythological status. Bluc notes the inability of the Islamisls 10 represent themselves
under thcir own tcrms and notes the rcason for it: "wc'vc fallen under the spell oflhe
Wcst. wc'vc forgottcn our own stories. They've removed all thc old stories from our
children's textbooks" (78). The only way to reach the Turkish public. he admits ruefully.
is via thc Wcstcrn prcss. At the same time. the journalist himself becomes rcsponsible tilr
thc articulation ofthc messagc. Blue. similarly, notcs thc complicit rolc of the writer. as
one responsible. in articulating thejihadist 's messagc: "But having hcard it from me. you
can't claim to be innoccnt from now on" (237).
The role ofjournalism in creating a community of responsible victims is explored
further by Pamuk through various conversations bctwecn Ka and Serday Bey, the owner
of the Border City (Ja::elle. Bey writcs stories before thcy happen, ironically noting that
the writing itselfmakes thc event real. that papers print what sells, are purely commercial
enterprises run by commercial intcrests and that ifpeoplc wanted the truth papcrs would
sell it: ··they even comc to bclicvc the lies we print about them" (302). Thc fact that all
the prcwrittcn articles come true in thc novel suggests that thc audience is prcpared lilr
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the violent enactment of the real violence produced and perlormcd in the symbolic
system. as Baudrillard had claimed in The Spirit o!"Terrori.\·/II.
The beauty of art. and particularly the role of poetry. is a major subject of
consideration throughout the novel. It is after all. Ka. thc poet. who betrays Bluc. the
jihadist. directly causing his death. Ka himselfis weak. romantic and li'ustratcd: in
Germany. where he is murdercd. he spends his time giving small poetry readings. living
in an apartment building and renting pornographic films. Blue. on the othcr hand. is
respected. mythologized and significant. and also a poet. Surprisingly. Blue dccides to
Icave behind his poems as his "testament" to be publishcd aner his death (322). It is not
political violence itself that becomes his testament but it is his poetry that bccomcs his
.I'hahada!7. 16 evertheless. while both characters end up dead. Ka at thc hands of
supposed Islamists and Bluc at the hands of secularists. throughout the novel there is an
ongoing rivalry bctween the poet and thejihodist. with Ka admiring and liking Bluc.
despite himself. Indecd. the novcl is populated with a variety of frustratcd poets. Bcsides
Ka. thcre is Muhtar. an ex-Marxist and Ipek's husband who turncd to politicallslamism.
Necip and Fazil. the young Islamists. and Blue himself.
When Muthar speaks to Ka about his conversion to Islam hc also talks of a great
pain he felt when he could nOl lind an audiencc lor his poetry: "the truths in thcsc poems
dcservcdto stand alongsidc the truths in Western poetry" (56-7). Ilis inability to lind an
audicneeledMullartothepoliticallslamistparty"thatvalucsthcspiritualsidc"(57).
Like thejihadi.l't who rcquires an audicnee for his act ofviolcncc. Muthar thc poct
", "Witness. Rccitalion orlhc Islamic witncss orlailh. "Thcre is no god but God and Muhammad
is the mcsscngcr or God" (John L. Esposito. Tlte Orjiml DiclilJllllrl' "j'I"lum 219)
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requires an audience to make his conversion real. This exhibitionism, Pamuk insinuates,
is at the center of conversion and of political Islam itself. Likewise. Necip is a young
Islamist. caught between his world of political Islam and his desire to be a poet. who secs
in writing the ability to exert control over existence: "We could be the poets of our own
lives if we could first writc about what shall be andlatcr enjoy the marvels of what we
havc written" (141). It is Neeip's account of his feared atheism that becomes one ofKa's
major poems. Ironically. Ka, a sccular. exiled Turkish poet. who claims "I wantcd to be a
Wcsterner and a belicvcr" (142), tinds himselfmcdiating the existential doubts of an
Islamist. Later in the novel, Neeip is shot in the head, much the same way Ka is shot:
Necip the victim of secularist violence and Ka the victim of Islamist violence.
II is worth nOlhing that though Necip and Ka both die, the soul ofNecip
supposedly lives on in Pazil. an Islamisl science fiction writer. who himsell'has a ICw
direct words of warning to the novelist. Orhan, about representation. Pazil. Necip's
double, warns Orhan. Ka's double. that he refuses to be represented unfairly in his novel
and will only agree to be represented ifhe can speak directly to his Western audicncc:
Your Western readcrs would be so caught up in pitying me or being poor that thcy
wouldn't even have a chance to see my lite. For example. if you said I was
writing an Islamist science tiction novcl. they'd ,iust laugh. I don't want to bc
described as someonc people smile at oul of pity and compassion. (410)
lie continues. ''I'd like to tell your readers not to believe anything you say about mc.
anything you say about any of us. No one could understand us fi'om so far away" (,r26).
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Fazil warns Orhan that he must insert this disclaimer into his novel. making an important
point about the naturc of mediation. The reason hc asks lor this disclaimcr is not bccause
Fazil does not respect art. but the opposite. because he knows it olien constructs a reality
that is difficult to change.
In the end. the rcadcris ler-iwith the novelisl and narratorOrhan as the most
viable and convincing mediator. Ncvertheless. the novelist compctes with both the poct.
Ka. and thejihadisl Bluc. Whcn Orhan discovers cvidcnce that Ka rcally did betray Blue
and causc his murder. hc wonders. "Could it be that thc writer clcrk was sccretly
delighted at thc fall of thc sublimc poet"' (419). lIe also rccognizcs something abollt
himself: "1 was jcalous not of Ka but of Bluc" (414). Thus. both Ka and Orhan arc
jealous of Blue. thejihadisl. lover and rival. a man with whose mythology thcy cannot
compete. Though thc poet is directly responsiblc for thc death ofthcjilwdisl. and so in
turn dies. the mythology ofthcjihadis/lives on whilc thc poct bccomcs a broken memory
in Kars. a betrayer. Furthcr. evcn though thcjihadisl is murdcrcd. indircctly. by the poet.
thc poct's own mediation. his pocms. are lost and unrccoverable. In lact. Ka has no
messagc lor thc world. Only Orhan and Blue do. and Orhan is much more uncertain
about his. based on an absent and lost text of poems. and a tedious chronicling of details
ofthc life ofa poct he wishcs to bc. It is the mythology of Blue. then. that remains as the
grcatcst work of art in thc novel. a mythology so strong that the authorities dump his
body in a nameless lakc to avoid massivc political pilgrimages to his burial site. Ka and
Orhan are both diminished in fronl of Bluc. Pamuk ncvcr makes any grandiose claims
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for the novelist whose role is more of an anthropologist and historian. a doeumcnter. but
he does make claims. for thejihadisl 's value. a major focus in the text.
In this way. Pamuk's Snoll' has more in common with DeLillo's Jl!alll/. than it
does with Fallinx Man. Mau II did not deploy anyjihadisls among its important
characters. but it did entertain plenty of troubled thoughts on the subject of the novel ist's
jealous rivalry with the terrorist. The novelist. according to DeLillo's protagonist. Bill
Gray. has been superseded by the terrorist as an infiltrator of evcryday consciousness. In
fact. in Mau II terrorists are positioned as rivals and doubles of writers. as Blue is the
rival of both Orhan and Ka. Likewise, Scott archives Bill"s work as Orhan attempts to
archive Ka's lost poetry. The irony in DeLillo's novel is that whcn Bill givcs himselfup
as a hostage to terror, his sacrifice is not accepted; he dics as a result of delayed injuries
of a hit and run accident when on a boat from Cyprus to Beirut. Likewise. Ka is
murdered by an unknown and suspected Islamist on the streets of Germany without any
publicity or fuss. In A4all II. terrorism's televised narrative has replaced the novel.
Likewise. in SI7I111' theatre replaces reality.
Pamuk's usc of two acts of staged theatre in SI7I1 11 , accentuates this relationship
betwecn reality and pcrformaneeand thecomplieit relationship between the audicncc and
the performers. The first play. "My Fatherland or My Ilead Searl:" tells a talc ofrcligious
fanatics who plot a conspiracy and are gunned down by the protectors of the Turkish
state. Ilowever. the absurdity occurs when the actors. who arc real police agents. gun
down the boys fi'om the religious school who arc members of the audience. !\ massacre
results which is written into Kars' history as a coup, blamed on Kurdish nationalists and
199
supported by Ka. Therefore. history is reversed as the actors perpetrate violence on the
audience. a metaphoric commentary on the nature of thejihad which attacks its audience.
Ilowever. ironically. here the attackers are the seeularisls and the audience. orvicli ms.
the Islamists. In the second act of violence. a play called "The Spanish Tragedy'·. Kadilc.
who is supposed to remove her headsearf in a submission to secularism. instead makes a
deal with the actor Sunay, a secularist. to shoot him. theatrically and really. and then kill
herself Hence. in the second play. one pertormer commits violence. accepted and agreed
upon. on the other. and the audience participates in witnessing and even willing this
death. since the murder-suicide has already been predicted in the paper before the act
itsell'has occurred. In both performances. the audience has become so disconnected from
the real that it is unable to recognize it when it sees it.
In Pamuk's world. the theatre does the very thing it seems to be representing and
as such confuses the audience that has come to expect perlormance to be lictional. The
audiencc of"My fatherland. My Ileadsearl-- is barned and unsure if the violence is real
or merely part of the perlormance: "a number of Kars residents out of touch as they were
with modern theatrical conventions took it for yet another bit of experimental staging"
(156). Even the admirers of theatre rise to clap for the "beauty of the theatrical enccts"
(157). When someone utters that the guns arc loaded '"his words gave utterance to what
everyone in the hall knew in his heart but still could not bring his mind to accept" (157).
Even if the real is too real to accept. the play continues aner the murders. with an
uncertainty between what is theatre and what is real. The second piece of theatre. which
is clearly staged for political purposes as a way to assert secularist hegemony over the
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Islamist rebellion of both the head scarf-wearing girls and Blue. makes a dircct
connection between real political results and artistic performance. Kadilc and Sunay
discuss the relationship between reality and art and she tells him directly. in rrontorth.:
audience. that she will kill him. Though the actors both tell the audience what really will
happen. Sunay assures the audience that his death will not happen when he convinces
them the gun is not loaded. When Kadifc finally shoots Sunay and the audience do.:s not
believe he is really shot. Sunay is disappointed at [heir inability to understand his
deception: "they know nothing about modern art"(404). Even though the audience sees
the actions on stage. they only really believe Sunay's death has occurred when they read
it in the paper. This savvy audience is so suspicious or the real that when it is perlorm.:d
in rront of them. murder becomes mere performance: it needs to be mediated to be
accepted as reality. Pam uk insinuates. therefore. that the audience is responsible. in part.
lor the death or the performer. As the Colonel who investigated the act concludes. "(rthe
people or Kars were so eager to see him kill himselfon stage. if they were still prepared
to enjoy the drama. telling themselves it was just a play. they too were complicit"' (·W7).
Pamuk's destabilization or the binary between secular andjihadislmotives and his
humanization of the Islamists send a strong message to European audiences regarding
their perceptions ora learrul Muslim Turkey. His reflections on identity. the I~uropean
and Turkish nature or his main characters, Ka, Orhan and Blue. also imply that the
Turkey is already part of Europe. and always has been. involved in thesamc
metaphysical battles with thc nature of identity and politics. Ilis commcnls on the rolc or
.. theatre" andjournalism in creating reality also sends a strong mcssagc rcgarding thc
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diabolical imagc of Turkey. its politics and pcoplc. which is held by many Europcans.
and which. at timcs, becomes a sclf-fulfilling prophecy. further. Pamuk'sdcconstruction
oljihadi.l'/.\'· motives and the role of perlormance raise some pertincnt qucstions of
mediation and responsibility. which have not been raised to the samc extcnt by any of the
writcrsdiscussed in this chapter.
What is the unique contribution 01' Muslim mediators in dclincating thc
intcntionality ofthcjihadi.l'/? First. it is evident that thcsc intcrvcntions havc
problcmatized thc nature orthe nativc informant or comprador intcllcctual. as a merc
insider offering crcdence to thc dominant discourse on the war on tcrror. Thc novcls
cxplored hcre cngagc dircctly with the now popular and acadcmically common
knowledge orpattcrns found inthc livcs ofthejihllGli.\·/.I': the authors share a ccrtain
lormula with non-Muslim writers. such as Updikc and DeLillo. but at thc samc timc thcy
attcmpt to contextualizc thejihad outside of a purcly Islamic contcxt. Thcy also
humanize thc charactcr ofthcjihadi.l'/. portraying his intcntions as identifiable. whilc
bcing awarc orand scnsitive to the unlamiliarity ofthc codcs and idcologics the
disillusioned young mcn in thcsc novels grali onto an Islamic causc. Second. there is an
awareness of writing in a Europcan language for a Europcan audicncc and the process of
cxoticization andf~lmiliarization that weighs hcavy on the writcrs' consciousness: all the
Muslim writcrs in the chapter commcnt directly on thcir own personal cxpcricnces and
crcdibilityas viablc interlocutors. Forcxample. whcnaskcd inan intcrviewabout his
Muslimness. considering that hc has writtcn a book to "rcprcscnt" political Islamists.
Pam uk responds carcfully in a 2005 Del' Spiegel intcrvicw:
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My religion is complicated. Literature is my true religion. Alicr all. I comc from a
completely nonreligious family .... 1consider myselfa person who comcs from a
Muslim culture. In any case. I would not say that I'm an athcist. So I'm a Muslim
who associates historical and cultural identilication with this religion. (n.pag)
Third. all writers arc acutely aware of the exhibitionist positioning ofthejih(((lisl. his
engagement with his audience. his role as story teller. a chronielcr of our timcs. as thc
novelist was in earlier times.
Clearly. the insertion ofa sustained relationship between thcjihadisl and thc
victim is part of a counter discourse that challenges the dominant paradigm circulating in
the discourse on the war on terror. Thc very allempt to explore the intentionality ofthc
jihadisl. outside ofa purely religious and eulturist narrative is indced an effort. itsciL at
building a counter narrative to thc dominant discourse otjihad and of contemporary
power relations. The articulations ofthejihadisl hersclfare an intcgral pari of this
eountcr-diseourse--lhe subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Five
Secular and Divine Intentions: Re(a)el Jihadists and the Community or Responsible
Victims
Said's focus on the difference between secular and religious criticism. in a
metaphorical sense. has heavily permeated the discussions reviewed in the last few
chapters regarding the intentionality ofthejihadisi. I have noted. for example. in Chapter
Two. how thejihadisl is demonized and dehumanized in various novels and cultural
criticism in a complicit relationship with the militarization orMuslim countries in the war
on terror. In Chapter Three I discussed how the secularization or the intentionality or the
jihad has become paramount in describing its intentionality in both neoliberal and lenist
discourse. and also in the move rromjihad to ijlihad in the radical reform process. In
fictional representations of thejilwdisi. such as those examined in Chapter Four. the
jihadisl becomes humanized and the binary between secularism and religion is blulTed:
thejihadisi. employing the fi'amework of Islamic ideologies and codes or honor.
undertakes politicaL personal and symbolic acts. As thejihad becomes secularized in
intention. the binary between the religious and the secular is also deeonstructed.
In this chaptcr. I will maintain that while the secularization orthejilllld helps us
understand its global role and its sense of global ethics. and takes it out orthe neo-
Orientalist debate regarding the inherent violence or Islam. it also underestimates the
particularity of the jihad as a raith-based globaL postcolonial articulation. Thejihadisis
themselves continuously communicate the Islamic basis ortheirargumenl. and this seems
to be either overemphasized as a singular motive by neoconservatives. or overlooked by
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those who replace it with a secular discourse on globalization and human rights. The bet
lhatjihadisis consistency explain their raith-based ethics is ofien taken as eonrused
ranting or incoherent argumentation. Occupying the same field as the "good" Muslims
(lnd their mediators makes it more difficult for Ihejihadisis to be heard. since the
(ludience has become accustomed to hearing Ihem through the interpretation ortheir
"moderate" interlocutors. In this chapter I will argue that Iheji!wdist is indeed speaking.
though it is contentious as 10 whether she is being heard. I will identiry two issues which
I believe make the environment lor this hearingparlicularly static prone: lirst. the dual
misunderstanding regarding the "saerilicial" nature orthejihad and the "sovereign-less"
sWtus ofthejihadisis. and. second. Ihe sometimes unitary attention paid to the
perfonnative and peelaeular role or thejihad at Ihe expense or its political consequences.
By addressing the contributions or faisal Devji and Ilenry Giroux. I will highlight some
or the ways thejihadi.I/.\ are being simultaneously heard and silenced. By using
examples ("om speeches and videos ornotedjihadisis. I will argue that thejihwlisl
stance. though orten times not coherent. is in l~lct pcrlormativc (1m! political. secular (lml
other-worldly. not based in a discourse of sacrifice and sovcreignty but in a utopian
vision oflhe founding ofa new 1I/11I1Wh. The Islamic vision is more than a loose narrative
that underlies secular motives; it is a radical reimagining of a utopian I~lith-based project.
Thejihadisl humanizes himselr lor his audience. while committing violence upon
himselrand his audience. Yet. it is not the violence itselL or even the recording orthis
violence (or public consumption that has placed theji!wdist at the center orlheory. The
media is replete with far grealer examples of mass violence to which we have become
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relatively desensitized. However. it is the willingness ofthejihadis! to annihilate
himself: wrongly perceived as suicide. which fascinates the public. If: as /,,izek argues in
Welcome!o the Oeser! oj'!he Real. people can no longer imaginc a eausc worth dying lor.
it is also true that they can only imagine a causc worth killing for. Thejihadi.\·! rejects the
terms of terrorism and suicide vehemently. though analysts. evcn Muslim oncs.
continuously apply these terms to him. For thcjihadis!. his act is one of both secular and
sacred intent and can only be fully comprehended within this frame. lie does not consider
himself"sovereign-less." for his sovereignty is defined by belonging to Islam. to
belonging to God. which cannot be defined in terms of national sovereignty. And his act
is nol suicide. highly condemned in Islam. and neither is it an ael of saeri lice of sci f IlJr
the formation ofa human community. but an act of witnessing to his 1~lith as a Muslim
who lights the oppression of socially constructed justice to achieve divine justice. It is
critical to use thejihadis!'s own terms to comprehend fully the multi dimensions of his
intentionality which. I will argue. is both symbolic and political. not one or the other.
In gencral. the debate over the intentionality ofthejihad lacuses on worldly and
otherworldly motives. the latter a thoroughly under-discussed issue. perhaps. because the
other other-worldly has been denigrated in postcolonial theory as the opposite of Saitt's
worldliness. and so inhabits the site ofa dogmatic stance with little to olkr radical
theory. The dominant paradigm in accentuating secular and rcligious motives is to
emphasize that religious violence is more fanatical. ICarful and unmanageable. with its
perpetrators referred to as "new terrorists," Walter Laqueur. in No 1:'l1d!o War. explains
"the 'new' terrorism has increasingly become indiscriminate in the choice of its victims.
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Its aim is no longcr to conduct propaganda but to effect maximum destruction, especially
in terrorism inspired by religious fanaticism" (9), Simon and Benjamin also note the
differcnce between secular and religious-inspired violence and the consequcnt paradigm
shift:
The old paradigm of predominantly state sponsored terrorism has been joined by a
new. religiously motivated terrorism that neithcr relies on the support of sovereign
states nor is constrained by the limits on violence that the state sponsors havc
observed themselves or placed on their proxies. (59)
As Bruce Hoffman likewise elaborates "whereas secular terrorists attempt to appeal to a
constituency of actual supporters or potential sympathizers. religious terrorists arc at once
activists and constituents cngaged in what they regard as a total war. They seek to appeal
to no other constituency than thcmselves" (95). At the core of this division between the
new (religious) and old (secular) binary is the view that thc practitioncrs of this new form
of terrorism are more fanatical. radical. and perhaps irrational than the secular
organizations of old terrorism, with thc paranoia and l~lIlaticism of the new terrorism
creating an increased distance from the political and rational motives of the
phenomenon's predecessors. Thus. the new terrorists engage in symbolic "perllJrlnances
of violence that symbolizc a cosmic war" and their acts are Ij'amed as largely symbolic
and transformative(.Iurgensmeyer 162).
The issue under consideration here. then, is not so much thc violence oljihad. but
the naturc of this violence, particularly the fact that thejihadisl kills himsclfaswcll as
others. This act is discursively referred to as"suicide bombing"as a mcthod by which the
207
jihadisl inscribes his own death on the public consciousness. makes his act forever a
public performance. As this thesis has explored. the motives for this "suicide'" in liction
and criticism. are sometimes considered as socially constructed. either for personal or
socio-political reasons. and other times mocked as misguided other-worldly motives. a
hysterical desire for numerous virgins or drinking endlessly from rivers of wine. In f::lct.
the lack of discussion on divine motives. other-worldly intentions. allows the discourse to
be punctuated with the terminology of sacrifice. rather than one of testimony. which is
thejihadis/tradition.
These considerations are taken up by Talal Asad in On Silicide I3l1l11hing. i\sad
traces the genealogy orjihad and concludes that modern explanations for suicide
bombings focus on the notion of sacrifice which originates more in Christian tradition
rather than in the Muslim one. wherejihad is firmly connected to self delCnse. lie argues
that connecting the concept of sacrifice tojihaddesignates it as religious terrorism which
defines the bomber as morally underdeveloped- and therefore premodcrn when compared
with people whose civilized status is partly indicated by their secular politics and their
private religion. and whose violence is therefore. in principle. disciplined. reasoned and
just. (45) To formulatejihad as sacrilice. foreign to its Islamic roots. sets it as a
"perverse form of national politics and permits unhelpful relCrences to a unique culture of
death" (50). Instead of tying suicide to a premodern Islamic tradition. i\sad argues that
suicide bombing is gcncrated by neo-liberalism itself. Asad notes that liberal societies
were founded on the Christian notion of sacrifice with individuals saerilieing rights in
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order to achieve the protection of the State which is given legitimacy [0 perpetrate
violence on behalfofits citizens:
I want to suggest that the cult of sacrifice. blood and death that secular liberals
find so repellent in pre-liberal Christianity is a part of the genealogy of modern
liberalism itself. in which violence and tenderness go together. This is
encountered in many places in our modern culture. not least in what is generally
taken [0 be "jusC' war." (88)
lie further elaborates that liberalism disapproves of a violent exercise of freedom outside
the fi'ame of the law, though it constantly shins these boundaries. redelining law to
address its needs. Suicide bombers. he continues. operatc within this idcology of a
continually shilling legitimation of violence: ofa "limitless pursuit of freedom" (91). In
this way it confronts liberalism with its own internal contradictions. For I\sad. not only
is the postcolonial concept ofjihad a deviation or Islamic theology that cannot be
undcrstood by postulating a culture of death and sacrifice inhcrcnt to Islam. it is deeply
rootcd in the metaphysical tradition of liberalism and the socio-political conditions
brought about by nco-liberal capitalist expansion. Asad accuses Western theorists or
readingjihad through a nco-liberal Christian lens. therefore asserting it as a lorm or
sacrilice. implicitly compared to the sacrifice or.lesus.
However. Asad docs not elaboratc this argument by comparing the Islamic and
Christian versions or the death or.lesus. which would. in ract. rurther support his point.
In Islam. .lesus, Issa. was not actually sacrificed. and instead was made to appcar to be
sacriliced. According to the Quran. thc sacrifice or death or.lcsus was a collective
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illusion. instigated by God himself. as he rescued Jesus from dcath and cnthroncd him to
immortality. Therefore. for Muslims. Jesus was not sacrificed. or even killed. and his
sacrilice had nothing to do with redeeming the world of its sins. In fact. hc was saved
from death and granted immortality. and in this way the transgrcssions of his opponents
wcrc dcfcatcd. The appearance of his death was in fact an illusion to cover his actual
crossing over into an immortal realm. The Muslim rejection ofthc notion ofsacritice as
evident in the story of Issa necessitalcs. I believe. a morc thorough analysis of this
concept. particularly as secn byjihadisls themselves.
It is important to note lhal thejihadisls consistently refer to their struggle as a
iihad. articulating a vision of immortality as a reward for thcir strugglc. not a sacrilice. At
the same time. however. to displacejihad from its Islamic tradition and posit it as a
sccular misrcading by the Christian neoliberal tradition silcnccs one of the arguments of
thcjihadisls thcmsclves as to the nature of his particularity. To claim thatjilwd is not part
of an Islamic tradition because its postcolonial configurations which we are witncssing do
not Iii that of traditional jurists. is. in fact. taking an ahistoricaL theological and purely
textual view ofjihad. It is important to trace thesc postcolonial transligurations and use
the tcrminologies which its pcrpetrators do:jihadisl.\' consistently rcfcr to thcmselves as
iihadisls. Thcrcfore. it scems Asad. perhaps because of frustration with the usc of the
term jihad to assert a prcmodcrn culture of death in Islam. is guilty of not following his
own advice: "'Ifonc is to talk about rcligious subjectivitics. onc must work through the
concepts the peoplc conccrned actually use" (44). It is important to take a brierjourney
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into the Islamic conception of the terms of martyrdom and suicide in order to understand
the intentionality ofthejihadis/, from the discourse ofthejihadis/ himself.
In short. there is no Islamic concept of martyrdom or suicidc. though the current
debate focuses largely on these concepts. Ali Shariati. 17 lor example. described the
relationship between the concept ofshahid IS and martyr as actual antonyms. lie noted
that the root of the word martyr is derived from the (Latin) rool "mort. and "implies
"death and dying, and so martyr refers to "the one who dies lor God and 1~lith":
Thus a martyr is. in any case, the one who dies. The only difference between his
death and that of olhers is to be seen in the "cause." He dies lor the cause of God.
whereas the cause of the death of another may be cancer. Otherwise. the essence
of the phenomenon in both cases. that is to say. death. is one and the same. As far
as death is concerned it makes no difference whether the person is killed lor God.
for passion. or in an accident. In this sense. Christ and those killed for Christianity
are "martyrs." In other words. they were "mortals." because. in Christendom's the
term "martyr" refers to the person who has died las suehl.
But a shahid is always alive and present. lie is not absent. Thus the two terms.
"shahid "and "marlyr." arc antonyms of each othcr. (n.pag)
Shariali maintained that the shahid is always present, and docs not die. unlike a marlyr
who actually dies. To support this argument. he clarified lhat the word sill/hid has a
"Dr Ali Shariati (1933-1977), an Iranian sociologist, isconsicieredoneofthclllajorilllclkclll3ls
behind the Iranian revolution. His vast bodyofworkcolllbincs Marxist and Islalllicprincipiesanci includes
IranslationsofFanon'swork
lK"Oncwhosuffersorloscsonc'slifcintheprocessofcarryingolItreligiollscillty"(John
L.Esposito. The Oxfim/Dictiol1(lrI'of'ls/(I1/1 229).
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double meaning. First. it means one who gives testimony to his faith with his death and.
second. it means a model or paradigm which is eternal. Thcrefore. a .I'hahid dies as a
witness to Islam. struggling to institute justice and Divine Law on earth. Ifit meant only
that. then .I'hahid would be the same as martyr. However. the second meaning of his
paradigmatic status indicates that he is immortal. This is demonstrated in the special
burial procedures for the .I'hahid. who because he is rendered free fi'OIl1 sin through his
act is considered already purified. and. therefore. is not washed. according to regular
Islamic ritual, but is buried in his clothes. He is entitled to immediate immortality. entry
into paradise and enjoys special status there since his failh has already been tested.
Therefore. the notion of the "present" .I'hahid indicates lhal he is an immortal paradigm
and a model, but also that he transcends death and merely crosses dircctly over into
paradise. Shariati explained.
A shahid is the one who negates his whole existence for the sacred ideal in which
we all believe. It is natural then that all the sacredness of that ideal and goal
transports itself to his existence. True. that hisexis[ence has suddenly become
nonexistent. but hc has absorbed the whole value of the idea lor which he has
negated himself. No wonder then. that he. in the mind of the people. beeomes
sacredness itself. In this way. man becomes absolutc man. bccause he is no longer
a person, an individual. Hc is "thought." (n.pag)
These .I'hahid, Shariati notes. are "alive. present. witnesses. and observers. They are not
only so in the sight of God. but also in the sight of the masses in evcry age and cvery
land" (n. pag).
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Shariati's description of.l'hahid is directly relevant to the perception ofjih(/{I in
eontemporaryjihadi.l'l discourse since Osama bin Laden. in particular. though Sunni.
borrowed quite freely from the Shia doctrine of jihad and .I'hahid (Devji. Land.l'mpe.\· 01
Ihe Jihad 13-32). For example. in a September 2009 recording. bin Laden argued.
Praise be to God, we are carrying our weapons on our shoulders and have been
fighting the two poles of evil in the East and the West for 30 years. Througholll
this period, we have not seen any cases of suicide among us despite the
international pursuit against us. We praise God for this. This proves the soundness
of our belief and the justice of our cause. God willing. we will continue our way
to liberate our land. ("The Latest bin Laden Statement" n.pag)
Ilere. bin Laden obstinately rejected the terminology of suicide bombing. instead
focusing on the soundness of belief in his struggle for justice which is protected by the
laws and will of the Divine. Thejihadi.l'/.I' die for a Divine cause. the establishment ofa
justlllll/llah. as ordered by God. Thisjust society on earth is. of course. worldly but
ordained by Divine Law. Therefore. thejihadi.l'l is not sacrificing or martyring himselfas
an individual for the good of worldly justice only. but transforming himself lI'om
individual into a thought. becoming the "absolute man:' crossing over into the realm of
God's justice. As such. jihad cannot be articulated as sacrifice but as a living. immortal
testimony to faith. For certain, it also a political and worldly struggle lor the existence of
an earthly IImmah at a specilic hisloricalmoment. but it is not onl)' that. The continued
existence of this earthly IImmah immortalizes thejihadi.l'/·.I' erforts. who is always present
and observing. according to Shariati. This otherworldly intention also transforms the
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nature of sovereignty. another misused term which is orten misinterpreted. in discussing
thejihadis/·.\·stance.
Sayyid Qutb argued that the modern world is a form orjahiliy\'{/hl'l:
Thejahi/iyyah is based on rebellion against God's sovereignty on earth. It
transfers to men. one of the greatest attributes of God. sovereignty. which makes
some men lords over others ... Only in the Islamic way of Ii Ie do men become free
fi'om the servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the worship of
God alone, derive guidance from Him alone and bow before him alone. This is
where the roads separate and this is the new concept we possess and can present it
to mankind ... that is the vital message which mankind does not know. It is not a
product of western invention. nor European genius. whether Western or Eastern.
(6-7)
Therefore. for Qutb and for thejihadis/s who follow his teachings. all men arc
"sovereign-less'" since sovereignty can only be granted to God. a other power has the
right to demand obedience or allegiance if it is not based on Divine Laws. The concept
of the nation state that demands sovereignty is absent forjihadis/s. In fact.jilwc! is the
way oul ofjahiliyya and false sovereignty. According to Qutb. theji/wd must use
persuasion and force to destroy institutions that keep people enslaved; it does not compel
conversion but destroys institutions that prevent it: '"Its purpose is to free people who
wish 10 be freed from the enslavement to men. so they may serve God alone" (42). The
">"Pre-Islamic period or ignorance of monotheism anddivinc law. Incurrentuscrd~rsloseeular
modernity .... SayyidQutb intcrpretcdjaltililyahas the dominalion ofhumansoverhumans.nllherthan
submission of humans 10 God" (John L. Esposito. Tlte Oxf(Jrd DiCliOl/lllT o/l,Jam 15-1)
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ji/wdi.l'/. therefore. does not sacrifice himself for country: he fights to frcc others from the
sovereignty of men and unjust institutions and his testimony is that there is no god but
God. meaning that nothing can be worshiped but God. Qutb eloquently explained the
notions of --sovereign-less" for Muslims: "The homeland of the Muslim in which he lives
and which he defends is not a piece of land. The nationality ofa Muslim. by which he is
identified. is not the nationality determined by a government (102).
Bin Laden consistently repeated Qutb's argument. In "The Solution."' which
addressed the American people on the occasion of the sixth anniversary 01'9/11. bin
Laden spoke at length about American failure in Iraq. but used it to locus on his main
point. the problem to which he later provided a "solution:' that of capitalism and its
eflect on the globe. He argued that the war in Iraq. despite the American people
appearing to repudiate the Bush administration and its loreign policy by electing the
Democrats to Congress in 2006. was doomed to continue because of the grecd of
capitalists and corporations. the "real tyrannical terrorists:' controlling American
interests through corrupt government officials. lIe declared that capitalism and
democracy have detrimentally anected not only the people of Iraq and Afghanistan
through war. but also the people in Africa through displacement and mankind. in general.
through global warming. bin Laden claimed that despite the talk ofdcmocraey by Bush.
Blair. Sarko7.y and Brown. these ligures display a --flagrant disrcgard lor the intellects of
human beings:' and people must rid themselves of the shackles of the capitalist system.
The "solution:' bin Laden argued. is lor the American people 10 embrace and join Islam:
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However. there are two solutions for stopping it. The lirsl is li'om our side. and it
is to continue to escalate the killing and fighting against you. This is our duty. and
our brothers are carrying it out. and I ask Allah to grant them resolve and victory.
And the second solution is from your sidc. It has now become clear to you and the
entire world the impotence of the democratic system and how it plays with the
interests of the peoples and their blood by sacrificing soldiers and populations to
achieve the interests of the major corporations. And with that. it has become clear
to all that they arc the real tyrannical terrorists. !\nd despite this brazen attack on
the people. the leaders of the West--espeeially Bush. Blair. Sarkozy and
Brown- still talk about li'eedom and human rights with a flagrant disregard for
the intellects of human beings. So is there a form of terrorism stronger. clearer
and more dangerous than this? This is why I tell you: as you liberated yourselves
before from the slavery of monks. kings. and feudalism. you should liberate
yourselves li'Dln the deception. shackles and attrition of the capitalist system The
capitalist system seeks to turn the entire world into a liefClom of the major
corporations under the label of 'globalization" in order to protect democracy.
("The Solution" n.pag)
Ilere. bin Laden posited the Western populations as victims of their political leaders and
capitalism. living in a state of false consciousness. under a false sovcreignty orjahi/in'ah.
Interestingly. he assured his Western audience that as they managed to free themselws
from the false consciousness of their religion through secularism. they can now transcend
secular capitalism to engage in a greater morality by sharing in the utopian vision of
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Islam. He pointed to the Mlljahidin.20jihadisls. as an example: "There is a message lor
you in the Mujahidin: the entire world is in pursuit of them. yet their hearts. by the grace
of Allah. are satisfied and tranquil.·· Even the 1\4I1jahidin. thejilwdists. are not victims as
they are living by the laws of truth as opposed to the materialistic laws of capitalism. In
Islam. for bin Laden. there were no victims. and he asked his audience to transcend their
status as victims by embracing Islam: "The true religion also puts peoples' lives in order
with its laws; protects their needs and interests; refines their morals; protects them li'om
evils; and guarantees for them entrance into Paradise." If they accept Islam. bin Laden.
argued. the wars will end. lor people will see the truth and no longer agree to b.: govern.:d
by their rulers "because as soon as the war-mongering owners of the major corporations
realize that you have lost confidence in your democratic system and begun to search for
an alternative. and that this alternative is Islam. they will run af"leryouto please you and
achieve what you want to steer you away fi'om Islam."' Because pcople's new-Iound faith
will deprive the capitalist of··the opportunity to defraud the peoples and take their money
under numerous prctcxts. like arms deals and so on."' the war will stop. For bin Laden.
the objective was not stopping the war and then hoping lhat people will join Islam. Ilis
objective was having peoplejoin Islam which he was ccrtain will stop the war. In this
way his intentions werc clcarly both secular and other-worldly. since only by living by
Divine injunctions can worldly life bejust. lie cvcn provided an .:xample of the
advantage of such Divine Laws. arguing they are worldly. practical and just: "There are
,,, "One who engages injillIId. Technically the term docs not have a necessary connection with
war. tn recent years those MlIslimswhoengage inarmeciciefenseofMlIsl imlanclseallthemselvcsorare
callecl IIIl1jahidill.Theyare not a monolithic movement of one origin blltratheraredivcrsc"(John L
Esposito. 71,e Oxj;mIDiclio/1{IIY0/!.I"lalll 213).
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no taxes in Islam, but rather there is a limited zakal [alms] totaling only 2.5%." This
entire excerpt is quite remarkable because it is evident that bin Laden clearly wished to
convince his audience that the solution is Islam. which does not allow victimhood or
sovereignty to anything but God. and he asserted that after embracing Islam there will bc
no more victimhood.
It is evident from this extended discussion of bin Laden's "The Solution," and
those of his intellectual predecessors that the concept of martyrhood. victimization and
worldly sovcreignty are highly problematic for thejihadisl who does not sce himselfas a
victim, or homo ,weer. a "sovereign-less" body. Yet such terminologies are frequently
employed in cultural criticism when writing about thejihadisi. This leads to fault lines in
otherwise valuable theorization. An interesting example of this is the intriguing work of
Faisal Devji. Zanibari/Canadian historian, former head of Graduate Studies at The Ismaili
Institute in London and reader at Oxford University. In the preface to his LandsClIpes o!
Ihe Jihad. Devji positions himselfas a viable spokespcrson. a Muslim from Indian
ethnicity born in Dar-es-Salam, where the American Embassy was blown up in a 1998
AI Qaeda attack. in fact. an inhabitant of the de-terrioralized zones ofwhieh Olivier Roy
has written. Devji's choice to position his own history in thc introduction. "I was in Dar-
es-Salam-the town of my birth, on August 7. 1998. when the American cmbassy was
blown up" (viii). allows him to insert a pcrsonal c1cmcnt into thc debate on the nature of
thcjihad which had struck at the heart of community with which hc was t~lmiliar. lie also
directly comments. as do all of the Muslim writers discussed in thc thesis. upon the new
role for interpreters, such as himself. to play in the discourse on Islam and jihad:
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When the Quran is on the Nell' Yurk Tillles bestseller list. are we not justified in
saying that Islam has become an American phenomenon. to the degree that
Americans might be even more interested in Islam than are Muslims') This is
demonstrated by the fact that Islam no longer remains the preserve or academic or
religious specialists but has become a subject upon which anybody can pronounce
- because it has indeed become part of not just American but also global culture.
(xiii)
Similarly, in The Terrorisl in Search ol!lumanily, Devji personalizes his position as a
Muslim as both a potential victim and suspect in thejihad:
On .Iuly 7, 2005. as I was going through the airport security in ew Delhi. en
route to Mumbai, four bombs ripped through London's mass transit network . .lust
before being herded onto the plane. I saw images or the carnage on a television
monitor in a departure lounge. Among these were shots or the bus that Ilasib
Hussain had blown up in Tavistoek Square. directly in front orthe pedestrian
walkway that led to my flat. .. I was leli thinking not only how close I had come to
being one or the victims. but also of how I had equally become a potelllial suspect
in the process. (57)
In both books. Devji uses his status as a Western Muslim rrom the peripheral areas or
Islam to rightly suggest thaI as a supranational movement the eurrenljihad can be
interpreted as part or what he sees as a central trend or the post-Cold War era. namely the
replacement of territorial politics with ethical issues. He argues thatjihadisl.\· tend to view
the West as a negative mirror image or Islam. in other words as a metaphysical entity.
219
which is a rather obvious point as made clear in how the notion ofjahi/iymh is echoed in
variousjihadis/ texts. Devji goes on to argue that intentionality itselfis not enough to
understand the nature of thejihad, which is a "series of global events that have assumed a
universality of their own beyond such particularities" (Lamlscapes 87). Since
intentionality cannot fully explain the nature ofthejihad. the symbiotic relationship
between the media and martyrdom can offer some insight: "as a series of global cllects
the jihad is more a product of the media than it is of any local tradition or situation and
school or lineage of Muslim authority" (87). Devji further argues thal the media is a
means of both exhibitionism and recruitment and allows Islam to becomes a global
spectacle, both for Muslims and non-Muslims, not as a "religious universality expressed
in the vision of converting the world" but as a "conversion of vision itsell" (Landscapes
93). for Devji. this is Islam devoid of real intentionality. and therefore of political
objective. replaced with ethical objectives displayed through spectacular and symbolic
performances through acts of martyrdom:
Islam comes to exist universally in the places where its particularity is ckstroyed.
the presence of its ruins on television screens bearing witness to the Muslim's
universality as martyr and militant. Whalmakes Islam universal then. then. isthe
forging of a generic Muslim, one who loses all cultural and historical particularity
by his or her own destruction in the act of martyrdom." (Landscape.\' 94)
Thus. lor Devji thejihadis/ emerges as universal mediator. although speaking
from within a Muslim context. speaking to grand causes, and the victims of global
capitalism. Muslim comes to stand in lor humanity and thejihadi.\·/ uses the
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rhetoric of the humanitarian. Thus far. Devji's argument is consistent with bin
Laden's, from whose early speeches he quotes.
However, although Devji's analysis is insightful, it unfortunately Icads
him to some dubious conclusions. .Just because the intentionality ofthcjihad
cannot be explained by secular or religious binaries alone, and bccause its claims
are ethical and universal, and because the media is critical to its articulation and
recruitment. does not empty it of its Islamic motive, assigning it a performalivc
and nonpolitical status. Devji sees the rhetoric and actions ofthejihadisl as
spectacular in the sense that they cannot propel political action but attain a similar
status to globalization and environmentalist movements. To do this, however, he
often ignores the direct interventions ofthejihadisls to their audiences and the
manner in which they present Islam as an alternative to theaudienee'scurrent
mode of victimization, as analyzed above in bin Laden's treatise. It is true that
thatjihadisl globalization goes beyond territory, culture, or politics and is now
described in sweeping ethical terms. and it is also true that it brings together
people of heterogeneous beliefs and backgrounds who do not share a common
prior history. However, Devji does not note how this prior history is rcfashioned
into an Islamic utopian vision that denies victimization, and strives lor both
worldly and other-worldly objectives. On bin Laden. for example. he stales.
His full list includes the following accusations against America: attacks on
Muslims. support of dictatorial client regimes, theft of wealth and natural
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resources which are bought at ncgligiblc priccs, occupation and corruption of
Muslim lands sprcad of immorality and debauchcry in the formsofscx, usury and
intoxicants, exploitation of women, environmental degradation. racism. dcploying
weapons of mass destruction. war crimes and violations of human rights ... it is
on this level. thcn. that jihad joins movcments like environmentalism oranti-
globalization .... At the forefront of ethical life today. (130)
For Devji. howevcr. this signals a shift from geopolitics to metaphysics. and thc acts
thcmselves are encoded as part of a highly metaphysical acl only. Again. this is par/ially
true only. as part ofthejihadi.l'/·.I' objective is to create ajust community on earth. which
is a worldly rather than metaphysical acl. In short. thejihad is not only a response to
globalization but. in ilself. is founded on a global vision to begin with. since Islam is a
glob<ll vision for the postcolonialjihadi.l'/.I'. following in Qutb's formulation.
In The Terroris/ in Search o(Hlllllani/y. Devji's soundly supported argumcnt
unlorlunately runs amok due to his overdependence on the concept of martyrdom and
victimization. He argues thaljihadis/s "make the conncction between Islam and thc
victimized humanity" (40). thereforc becoming victims <lnd joining the victims in thcir
own death. while dcmanding that humanity stand up against injusticcs. Thesc samc
arguments have been madc by Eagleton. especially in Unholy Terror. where hc argues
that the intentionality ofsacrilice is to exposc the struclures of injustice (135) <lnd to
provide a reason lor a prccondition lor moral responsibility (116). For I~aglcton. th.:
victim is the terrorist andlhe terrorized. both victims 01'<1 seculari7..:d and late capitalist
world consumed by global power. Thejihadi.l'/s. however. while seeing his targcts as
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victims of global capitalism. as elearly stated in bin Laden's texts as discussed aboY.:.
does not see himself as a victim. He. as a shahid. is ever-present and observing: his
death. in this sense. is as ordinary as his life. Thejihadislthen maintains a stance of
superiority to his victims. whom he may pity as well as despise. as they are enslaved as
sovereigns to corrupt ideologies ofjahilliya. which thejihadisl has transcended. Both
Devji and Eagleton's otherwise reasoned arguments about thc connection between the
jihadisl and the victim makes the mistake of assuming that thejihadisl perceives himself
as a victim while. in fact. he perceives herselfas powerful in his transcendence of death
and asks his victims to share in the same experience. In a 2005 article in The G/lardian.
Eagleton claims.
Like hunger strikers. suicide bombers are not necessarily in love with death. They
kill themselves because they can see no other way of attaining justice: and the I~let
that they have to do so is part of the injustice. It is possible to act in a way that
makes your death inevitable without actually desiring it. ("/\ Different Way of
Death"n.pag)
In fact.jihadisis have said time and time again "we love death."' with thc love ofdealh as
opposed to life. being a key message. lor example. in a statement released by /\1 Qaeda
claiming responsibility lor lhe 2004 Madrid bombing21
This is not to say. of course. that Muslim culture is dcath-obscssed as various
neoconservatives point out. but to emphasize that death becomes a form of power for the
jihadisl who hopes. by example. to set it as a testimony to his faith and intention to
21 See for example "FlIlilext: 'AI-Qaeda' Madrid claim." I3I3C Nell's, 1-1 Mar.2004. Wcb. 21 Apr
2007 <hllp://news.bbc.co.1Ik/2/hi/cllropc/3509556.st>.
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establish Divine Law. Talal !\sad has pointed out that thc love of death is also a
dominant theme in Christian theology and the privileging of the "culturc of death" as a
favored explanation for Islamic "suicide bombing" is popular bccause it presents "a
model that lends itself to thc discoursc of the protection of civilization (committed to lite)
against barbarism (a love of death)"' (56). Similarly, Dcvji has noted how the concept of
"sacrifice" permeatcs various Eastern ideologies, specitically Gandhi's philosophy of
rcsistance. and concludcs. "What the hysteria over militant Islam's dcath cult" or
"nihilism" entails. then. is an attempt to redraw humanity's borders around the love of
lite in such a way as to dcprive those who love death oflhcir status as human beings"
(The Terrorisl in Search ofH/llI1anily 202). In short. thcre is a definitive rclationship. as
Eagleton asserts. between faith and violence. whethcr it is considcrcd sacrifice. as in the
Christian beliefor testimony. as in Muslim bclief. In fact. thc claims ofthejilwdisls arc
directly rcsponsible for the theological turn in thcory cvidcnced in the work of 7.i7.ek and
Eagleton who are opcn to thc idca that an act of apparcnt sclf destruction can bring about
a gcnuine transformation in valucs. a metaphysical reasscssmcnt of the structures of
injustice. In this sense, as discussed in Chapter Three. thcjihadisl is dceonstructing th..:
sccularlrcligious binary which has dominated thcory. Devji would agree that thejih{/(I is
propelling theory outsidc thc confines of humanist discourse and pushing the globe
toward a post human politics: "I laving destroycd thc body as a subject within which such
human virtues could bc grounded, and dismissed lite itsclfas the limit of humanity,
militant practices like suicide bombing open up a space for the post human" (The
Terrorisl in Search ofH/llI1anily 221). bin Laden's statements, as discussed ahove.
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clearly show that this was his aim, to destroy structures of injustice and convcrtthe world
to his Islamic vision where death is not the limit of human lile, nor is it associated with
nihilism. No doubt bin Laden would have framed his argument diflerently. without thc
terminology of sacrifice and suicide. but emphasizing that it is obedience to the One
Sovereign which makes humans fully human, including the transcendence of dcath.
One unfortunate result of scrutinizing only the symbolic value ofthejihadisl.
which otherwise oflers valuable contributions to theory, is to allocate the jihad a purely
perfimnalive role, devoid of real political intention. For Devji, for exampic. the audience
ofthejihad is both fabricated and catered to by the media, and therefore remains
indefinable. Thejihadis/. because he does not clearly map out an alternative vision.
remains nonparticular in his demands, while the consequences of his actions are to
exhibit. rather than effect, any real political actions. Thejihadis/. thcrclorc. is lirst and
foremost a performcr:
The community created by the spcctacle of martyrdom. thercfore, is purely
abstract, as much an ef'lect of the mcdia as thejihad itself. !\ndin factthc
abstract audienceofthejihad asa media spectacle implicsthat it iSlruly
witnessed only by a universal being who is everywhcre and so nowhere: who else
but God." (Landscapes of/he.lihad 103)
Henry Giroux's The Spec/acle (~fTerrorism offers a seminal contribution to our
understanding of how the terror of thejihadis/ and terror by thejihadisl aCl as means of
social control and the closure of dcmocracy. Giroux rightly argucs that the theatre of
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terror accentuates thatthc state is an object (and perpetrator) of terror and vulnerable to
the attacks. the origin of which are stateless. bereft of state organization and
Icgitimization (48). This possibility ofa stateless sovercignty has been enabled. Giroux
notes. "by the asccndancy of fundamentalist religious authority throughout the globe"
(48). This notion of the statcless sovereign has been used by America to torturc and
illegally detain perceived cncmies. and Giroux develops a vcry uscful differentiation
between the ..terror of the spcctaclc" and the "spectaclc oftcrrorism"to deseribc the
mcchanism often'or as a form of social control. The "[crror ofthc spcctaele" refers to usc
of tear by America to militarize and privatize public space. build consensus and rituals
where politics and powcr arc hidden in broader appcals to solidarity likc fascism and
communism (29-30). The "spectacle often'or" refers to a new kind of politics of how
terrorism can be marketed. contrasted to thc previous. politicized through fcar and shock.
and is not about illusion but the thrill of the real (30-31). The "spcctacle of terrorism:' he
argues. manipulates a small screen culture. constructs a subjcet and a public in a state of
pcrmanent fear in a chaotic world. and creates a new kind of politics "organized around
the modalities of dcath. hystcria. panic and violcnce" (31). For Giroux. ··the public
intcrest has largely been fashioned as a giant Reality TV show where notions of
collectivity register as a conglomeration of private concerns" (3). Likcwise. hoth the
··terror of the spectacle" and the "speetaele of terror" privatizes discourse:
In the post-9I11 world. the spaec of shared responsibility has given way to the
space of private fears: the social obligations of eitizcnships arc now reduced to the
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highly individualized imperativcs of consumerism. and militarism has bccomc thc
central motif of national idcntity'" (I)
Giroux is right to notice that the "spectacle of terror" has political motive as wcll as a
symbolic value. but he is not completely correct in assuming that it has privatizcd public
space. To be fair. Giroux. focuses namely on the effects of thcjihad on Western socicty.
arguing that the language ofthc social has been sacrificed for state protcction. translatcd
into the suspension of civil liberties. cxpansions of government surveillanec and thc
proliferation of the view thal dissent is anli-American (3). In this hc is corrcet; sincc
citizens are terrified (or their safely. they respond as powerless individuals. clinging to a
perverted sense of patriotism that justifies the torture of others. Howevcr. in rcgard to
..the speclacle of terror'" Giroux's argument is not entirely sound as thc "spcctaele of
teITOr·· has been a critical part of AI Qaeda's recruitment stratcgy and has significantly
politicized Islamisl discoursc in prcdominantly Muslim countrics as wcll as for Muslim
minorities in the Wcst. having a direct public impact. It can even be noted. as I havc
argucd in this thesis. that this spectacle ofthejihadis/ has rc-politicized theory. acting as
an impetus for an urgent social engagement betwccn thc intcllcctual and socicty. Giroux
notes that the insurgent videos provide a mcans of rcsponsc to thc saturation of I\mcrican
imagcs of crimes against Muslims and a "measure ofrevengc" (50). and it is this
identi tieation that ··ties us 10 a retrograde notion of the social that is organized around a
eulturc of shared leal's rathcr than shared responsibilitics" (50). Ilcrc.1 arguc that. in
fact. thejihadi.l/ dcmands a new public engagement. and her goal is not privatization or
fcar but a genuine social engagement that will shattcr thc illusions ofthcjahillim. thc
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false consciousness or which bin Laden spoke. Jihadi.l'/.\' usc the familiar methodologies
of the private. for example reality TV. while addressing a very large and specilic public.
with specific messages which they expect that public to act upon, Their objective is not a
politics organized around panic. but one organized around metaphysics and faith. which
they consider as an invitation. though a violent onc. to a just public engagement. Again
and again thejihadi.l'/.I' attempt to propel Americans. including American Muslims. out of
private space and into public space. not by attempting to make them solitary. panicked
individuals. but individuals who collectively take responsibility lor the violence of the
system they continually support. The goal orthejihadi.l'/.I'. therelore. is not to privatize
terror but to put it firmly in public space as an impetus lor public action: in this sense
their role isdelinitely political as well as perrormativeand spectacular.
Thejihadi.l'l then consistently addresses a community of responsible victims and
often subverts the rorm orreality TV for his oppositional politics. Various speeches.
especially those orbin Laden. Adam Gadahn and Anwar Alwaki. and videos which
document thejihadi.l'/',\' death. commonly known as suicide videos. exemplily the process
by which his death is made a public spectacle requiring political deliberation. The
spccches and videos hold no signilieance without the spectacle of the media. since bin
Laden. Gadahn and Alwaki arc not statesmen in the ordinary sense and the deaths
themselves of the "suicide bombers" arc signiticant to othcrs only by the fact that they
kill others. As Devji notcs. the death which conveys this message has to bc witnessed in
order to be relevant. and so it becomes a "social and therelore inclusive acl" (7'errori.l'1 in
5;earch oj'H/lmanily 95). The witnessing or these events also imposes a responsibility on
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those who witness the act. For thejihadi.\'f. since the performance or making his dcath
public makes those who witness it responsible to act "the spcctacle ormartyrdommakcs
ignorance inexcusablc" (Dcvji. Terrori.\'f in Search ojHulllanifl' 102). Thcrcrore. thc
actual witnessing or the actmovcs it from the arena ora performancc to a rca I political
act. witnessed by a community. The ideologues ofthcjihad, bin Laden, and his
American li'ont menAlwaki and Gadahn. articulate repctitively that social engagcmcnt
and public action arc their objectivcs. II' we consider thc audicnce. lor exam pic. thc
community orresponsiblc victims to which each ofthcm speaks, thc implicd and
sometimes directly implicd reader, it is evident that lor all thisaudicncc is spccilic.not
abstract.
bin Laden. lor example. was very clear about his multiplc audienccs and
addressed both Muslim and non-Muslim audiences. In an early intervicw with eN in
1997. bin Laden spokc to an obviously Western audicncc. Whcn askcd whatmcssagc hc
would have for then Prcsident Clinton, he retorted. nonc. but hc did have onc lor the
mothers of the American troops stationcd on the Arabian Pcninsula:
To these mothers 1say ifthcy are concerned lor thcir sons. letthcm thcn objccllo
the American govcrnmcnl's policy and to the Amcrican president. Do notlct
themselvcs be chcated by his standing before thc bodics orthc killed soldicrs
describing thc rrccdom lighters in Saudi Arabia as tcrrorists. It is hc who is a
tcrrorist who pushcd thcir sons into this lor the sakc or Isracli intcrcst. Cl3in
Laden's Intcrvicws:' AI Qaeda in if.\' Own Wore/I' 52)
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There are a lew points of interest here: first. the call to American mothers to
witness the deception of the government and their responsibility to stand against it. and.
second. a belief in their ability to understand the objectives of power. bin Laden appealed
directly to this community of women. as one who was compassionate to their loss. lor
they have been deceived by the President and his war machinc. Ilethereloreattempted to
create a bond ofidenlilieation between himself and these victims. Note that he was
careful not to call the American soldiers terrorists, but instead positioned them as
misguided victims, with President Clinton as the real terrorist. Therelore. he recreated a
new community of victims of the American administration. Similarly. over a year later. in
an interview with AI Jazeera, bin Laden appealed to the responsibility ofa Muslim
audience:
We believe very strongly .. that they want to deprive us of our manhood. We sec
ourselves as men. Muslim men. committed 10 delend the greatest house in this
universe. the holy Kaaba. which is an honor to die lor and defend. ("Bin Laden's
Interviews." AI Qaeda in il.l· 011'/7 Words 59)
Ilere. bin Laden evoked the concept of honour and religious obligation to inspire the
Muslimmassestostimulatetheirsupportandaetion.lnthiswayhe tried to appeal to and
activate both an American and a Muslim audience. shifting registers to address the
diflerent groups.
Perhaps one of bin Laden's most interesting addresses was his "Message to the
American People." released days before the 2004 American Presidential election. This
was a bin Laden intervention into the American democratic process. aeling as an equal
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statesman for the "sovereign-Iess" State of Islam. a stance he repeated in ycars to come.
using America's own rhetoric of "we fight because we are free men who do not slumber
under oppression" ('"Bin Laden's Interviews," A/ Qaeda in its Own Words 71). bin Laden
chastised his American audience for their mental lethargy with the personalized afTront.
"I am amazed at you." amazed because the !\merican audience continucd to believe the
lies they are told. I-Ie made an emotional and personal appeal to them. explaining his
motivations as spokesperson for thejihad: "the events that affected me personally began
in 1982"' (72). As Devji has noted. here bin Laden was describing Lebanon. and although
his account of the event was real, bin Laden was never in Lebanon in 1982. and so the
personal way he presents Lebanon was representative of the Muslims. the eyes of their
collective vision ot' the event (Landscapes oFthe Jihad 96). lie described Lcbanon in a
graphic manner as iI' he were present. with the goal of describing what 1982 Lebanon
meant for Muslims. directly relating what he saw in Lebanon to the plot to bring down
the Twin Towers. tracing a line of cause and effect. and told his American audience that
"we had no choice" ("Bin Laden's Interviews." 11/ Qaeda in its Own Words 73). lie
argued that he had no choice but to commit a spectacular and violent act becausc all other
lormsofmediation had failed:
This is the message I sought to communicate to you in word and deed. repeatedly
lor years before September II th You can read it. if you like. in my inlerview with
Scott in Time magazine in 1996. or with Peter Arnett on CNN or with John Miller
in 1998. You can see it in practice it'you wish in Kenya. Tanzania and !\den.
And you can read it in my interview with Abdul Bari Atwan. as well as my
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interviews with Robert Fisk. The latter is one of your compatriots and
coreligionists, and I consider him to be neutral. Did the allegcd dclcndcrs of
freedom at the White House and the channels controlled by thcm bother to speak
with these people, so that they could tell the American people thc reasons for our
fight against you? (73)
Here bin Laden clearly expressed his sense of disappointment at his failed interventions,
through actions (Tanzania, Kenya and Aden bombings) and mediation--the various news
sources that he used in an attempt to make the public responsible witnesses to current
cvcnts--directly mentioning familiar names ofjournalists whom he believed werc also
ignored. Since the American audience had ignored all thcse attempts at communication,
they were now responsible for their own victimhood. bin Laden assured them that their
sccurity was in their own hands, not those of their leaders. giving them direct
responsibility for thc acts thcir politicians are perpetuating on Muslim countries. In this
way. he gavc his audicnce thc power to change the system which he was attacking, with
the assurance that if they use that power to change this system they would be sail: from
his attack upon it. bin Laden wished to transform his audience of victims into a
community of responsible citizens who could actively challenge the unjust system thcy
are living under.
The same message was consistently clear in bin Laden's later messages. As
examined above in "The Solution:' he expressed his surprise at the lethargy of American
people, whom he further presented as powerless because of not only their political
leaders, but also the corrupt aims of corporations and capitalists: "you permitted 8ush to
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complete his first term, and stranger still. chose him for a second term, which gave him a
clear mandate from you--with your full knowledge and consenl to continue to murder
our people in Iraq and Afghanistan"C-The Solution" n.pag). Accusing Bush. Blair.
Sarkozy and Brown of displaying a "nagrant disregard for the intellecls of human
beings." he cited works by Noam Chomsky and Michael Scheuer. asking his American
audience to read these books to open their minds. He repeated this call for critical
consciousness lhrough his audienee's own sources in his September 2009 rck-:Isl',
/'/"(/l'l I.lIhh\' illlhc lillill'd Slall's (I rallsnipl-- rhl' I.all'sl hill 1.:llk-11 SI:\tCllll'IIII1.P:I),:)
l.adl'll \\ as kccill ~ iIllcrcslL'd ill Cl llllllluilical illg his Illl'ssagl's t(\ \ mcricall aud il'IlCCS aIIII
claimcd C(\llsislClllh Ihal he \\as alll'lllplillg III frl'c 1I1L'IIl fr,) III IIll' illll'lk-ctualll'rr(\rislll llf
thl'ir k-adcrs alld llpClllhl'ir millds 1(\ a nilical discussillil. I his is hanlh IIll' :\uIIHlril:\ri;1I1
Cillsillg(\fdisc(\ursc ()f\\hich (iinHI\ \\rill's. II is als() clc:lr lhal hc 'P()kl' as ;\11 illsi,k-r.
1'r()11l ill"ilk- thcir 1\\\11 cullural hcrilagc. rcll'l"l'llcillg lhl' ll'\ls alld thc a\l;lhsis llfp(\litic;i1
l'\Cllh that c()uld aid ill lhcirnilical rl'l'()IISlruclillllalldpropl'llhclllilll()Puhliclik.lk\ji
Ili'()\\llniliqul'(lflhl'\\C,liSlhl'l"l'll1rcallillllllilll'lll()rilllL'I'I1;i1(\lll'.hutlll()I·C
Ih:llllh:lt ilis;I/\lI'lll()f\l'lllrilllljui'lll ill \\hich thl'prillcc()I'lL'ITlll"i,t"pc;lb
through ()IlC()['1l1l1rl'dullllllicsralhl'l'lhallill his 1\\\11 1l:IIIlC.I llihl'lfthis;,d()pli(\ll
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politici<lnsinl':uropL'<lnd l\IllL'ricl. but in thccascol"hilll.'idl'n it i1lusll',lIcs
additionalh thc I'act thai hc POSSl'SSl'S no Pllsition outsidl' Ihl' \\orld ol"his
cllL'mics. ({hc {ermri.l/ ill Scurch IIIf fllil/UI/ill" 20-!)
,drcad) bccn<Jrtil'ulalcdhl ()utb.tllllut'hitclnbl'art'ul'dth'ilbinl.'ldl'nt'lohalilL'dthis
art'umcnt. Ihcpllinl hncistiwi bin I.adcn did allclllpi to pl"llpL'1 his.\l11crican,llIdiL'nCc
Illpuhlic lili.:.l'lllltl·'il·) to (iirou:\·sclaiI11.'1I1d hl'dide,dll()I·nitic,dllwut'ht.lk\\as
his\\llrk ,lIld ils implications l(lll(lIIint' his r--1<i) 2011 assassin;llion -\mlekarh thc
art'ullll'llIs\\hichhl'\oil'l'd\\illconlinul'lohl',lrtiClil;llL'd
Similar persistent messages can also be divined in the speeches of two American
al Qaeda operatives: Adam (AI Amriki- the American) Gadahn and Anwar Awlaki. this
time to intercede in the discourse to Americans in general and Amcrican Muslims
spccifically. Gadahn first appcared on ABC in October 2004, idcntifying himselfas
"Adam the American." speaking in American English and directly addrcssing his ICilow
Amcricans and again in 2005, on the fourth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on Good
Morning America, attacking U.S. foreign policy and military activity, particularly in Iraq
and Afghanistan, predicting there would be future attacks in Los Angclcs and Melbourne.
Australia. There have been numerous other interventions by Gadahn, enough to have him
listcd onthc FBI most wantcd list.
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The appearance ofGadahn. and thc tact that his idcntity was kcptuncertain lor
some time. had a strong impact on the community of responsible victims. This
spokesperson is an American. speaking in English. making cultural rcferenccs an
American would make. but donncd in Arab clothes and arguing the reasons lorjilwd in a
socio-political context. On September 2.2006. in a vidco called "Invitation to Islam."
Gadahn dircctly reOected onthc importance of mediation inthejihad. and invitcd a
number of Orienta lists to join Islam. including Daniel Pipcs. Robcrt Spcncer. Michael
Scheuer. Steven Emerson, and George W. Bush. In the samc rccording. Gadahn praised
British politician Georgc Galloway andjournalist Robert Fisk lor exprcssing their respect
and admiration lor Islam and for "dcmonstrating their sympathy for Muslims their
causes." and he urged Amcrican soldiers to "surrcnder to thc truth," "cscapc from Ihe
unbelieving Army." and "join the winning side"( n.pag). Thc diversity of this audience is
interesting: American opponcnts who construct ncoconservativc vicws of Islam. Ihe
letiist politicians and journalists who try to contextualize the geopolitical nature of the
jihad. and the American soldiers in occupied lands. The text addressed multitude
audiences. echoing bin Ladcn's "Message to the American People'" and called on them
10 convert to Islam. Similarly. on October 4.2008. Gadahn released a video primarily
focused on Pakistan. but with rcferencc to economic wocs in thc US. arguing, again like
bin Laden. that the capitalist system is the causc orthc world's ailmcnts and urging
victims of this system to lind truth andjustice in Islam and the sovereignty of God. thc
only sovereign who should bc obcyed (""Azzam the Amcrican rcleases vidco locusing on
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Pakistan" n.pag). Throughout 2009-2010, he made various recruitment videos lor
English-speaking converts.
Anwar Awlaki. another English-speaking American, has served an even larger
role than Gadahn in addressing Western Muslims and in 2010 caused a major civil rights
protest when he became the first American citizen to be openly put on the CIA hit list.
After spending over twcnty-one years in America and Britain as a student and then imam.
Awlaki's call to ajihad forjustiee has become more militant and put him into direct
confrontation with moderate Muslims mediators upon whom he remarked:
They reject the principle of pride and demanding justice, they want to promote the
prineiplc of humiliation and compliance. They want 10 market the democratic and
peaceful U.S. Islam that calls for obeying the supcriors even if they were traitors
and collaborators, they want an Islam that recognizes thc occupation and deals
with it. they want an Islam that has no Sharia ruling, nojilwd and no Islamic
caliphate. ("'Interview with AI Jazeera" n.pag)
In another message. he clearly articulated the dith:rence between the mediators. many of
whom have been discussed in this thesis. and thejihadisis. and directly interceded til
contradict them and speak to Muslims in America:
To the Muslims in America. I have this to say; how can your conscience allow
you to live peaceful co-existence with the nation that is responsible Ilxthe
tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? Ilow can
you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islamic
Muslims? The Muslim community in American has been witnessing a gradual
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erosion and decline in core Islamic principals so today many of yo ur scholars and
Islamic organizations are openly approving of Muslims serving in the US Army to
kill Muslims, joining the FBI to spy against Muslims, and arc standing between
you and your duty o I'jihad. Slowly but surely your situation is becoming similar
to that of the embattled Muslim community of Spain after the fall of Granada.
Muslims of the West, take heed and learn from the lessons of history. There arc
and ominous clouds gathering in your horizon. Yesterday America was the land
of slavery, segregation. lynching and Klu Klux Klan and tomorrow it will be a
land of religious discrimination and concentration camps. Don't be deceived by
the promises of preserving your rights from a government that is right now killing
your own brothers and sisters. Today with the war between Muslims and the West
escalating you cannot count on the message of solidarity you may get from a civic
group or political party or the words of support you hear from a kind neighbor or
nice co-worker. The West will eventually turn against its Muslim citizens. ("1\
Call to Jihad" n.pag).
This message is intriguing because it focuses upon a very spccilic audience in the
"spectacle of terror." Western Muslims arc not threatened. but they are warned not to
have faith in the American system to protect their rights, for 'The West will eventually
turn against its Muslim citizens'" This is an open attempt to radicalize Western Muslims
intoacritical consciousness. a violent one. perhaps. with whichGiroux may not agree.
but a critical conscioLisness all the less. This is an effort to activate the Muslim minority
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to reject their government's policies and to act publicly. not as private individuals. but as
members ofa collectivity-as Muslim Americans.
From this analysis of the audiences of bin Laden. Gadahn and i\wlaki's speecht:s.
we can easily discern clear audiences and intentions and a concerted effort to propel the
Western public from a private to a public stance. This is contrary to Dcvji's claim that
the audience remains abstract and Giroux's notion that public space is becoming
increasingly privatized. as discussed above. It appears that the messages of thcjihadisl
are clearly political and intended to elicit political responses li'om a multitude of
audiences. The role the media plays in forming and disseminating these messages is
indeed critical but we should be careful to heed Chomsky's warning when assigning
globalization and spectacle as the sole cause ofthejihad. as "bin Laden is quite ekar
about what he wants" (9-1160). As we have discussed. his list is concrete and divt:rse.
By personalizing the "enemy's" goals. we olien ignore our own role. Chomsky nOles
(32). In this case. by positioning thejihadisl.\' as abstract. spectacular. and barbaric. wt:
absolve ourselves of responsibility for the violence of which bin Laden reminded us wt:
area critical part.
This message is eerily present in the video of Mohamed Siddique Khan. one of
the London bombers:
I'm going to keep this short and to the point because it's all bet:n said helort: hy 1~lr
more eloquent people than me. And our words have no impact upon you.
therefore I'm going to talk to you in a language lhat you understand. QUI' words
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are dead until we give them life with our blood. I'm sure by now the media has
painted a suitable picture of me. this predictable propaganda machine will
naturally try to put a spin on things to suit the government and to scare the masses
into conforming to their power and wealth-obsessed agendas. I and thousands like
me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesn't
come from tangible commodities that this world has to ofter. Our religion is Islam
- obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the linal
prophet and messenger Muhammad.... This is how our ethical stances are dictated.
Your democratically elected governments continuously pcrpetuate atrocities
against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you
directly responsible. just as I am directly responsible lor protecting and avenging
my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we leel security. you will be our targets.
And until you stop the bombing. gassing. imprisonment and torture of my people
we will not stop this light. We arc at war and I am a soldier. ow you too will
taste the reality of this situation. ('"London Bomber Text in Full.' BBC News
n.pag)
The audience is clear: the victims and a community to which Khan, with his Northern
English accent. clearly belongs. The appeal to "you" not only makes the audience the
witness to his act aftcr the evcnt, but also puts them in a position of responsibility lor it.
Sccond. Khan directly raised the issue of media representation of his stance. commenting
on how the media will represent him and how peoplc will blindly lollow this
intcrprctation. serving "powcr and wealth obsessed agendas:' and he noted that it is these
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agendas which causc the fear. not his act. Finally. his use of the pronoun "our" put him
in the position of mediator for oppressed Muslim communities: he spoke as a Muslim. lor
"my people:' disassociating himself from the community of victims to which he speaks.
lie clearly stated his goals are political as well as other-worldly; he made no mention of
"sacrifice" but instead focuses on his "responsibility" as a Muslim to obey only God and
institute these principles on earth. noting that he was a "soldier.·· Interestingly. his usc of
the term "by now" directly draws attention to the fact that his message will be receivcd
atier his death and after the media image and spectacle of him has bccn constructed. Ilis
message attempted to supply a counter narrative to this representation, as a mcdiator 1(11'
Muslims describing the reasons lor their actions. which may not be relaycd through
media analysis.
The desire to relate the ordinariness of his life and death isacccntuated by the
release of a second video. showing Khan as a father C' ew 7/7 Bomber Video:' Jl/5.'N
Nelt"s). Here we see Khan holding his daughter and talking to her while recording
himself. The viewer focuses on his message to his toddler. obviously too young to
understand a single word of what he is saying and not the real audience lor the video: he
tells her that he was "doing this lor the sake of Islam. nol lor materialistic or worldly
benefits."' The effect is to present himselfasa loving father. explaining his motives in the
mode of reality television. Ilowever. the video is also a video of Khan recording himself
and his daughter. holding the camera in front of him. which means that a second camera
is present. in order to record Khan recording himself. The audience can assume that this
second camera is somehow connected to the other three bombers. who appear on screen
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to Oex their muscles and make other playful gestures. Thus. the viewer is watching the
iihadis/ (Khan) enact a staged performance while he is willingly being l'iell'ed and
recorded. This playful home video. then. eommenls directly on his role as mediator. and
makes obvious the act of recording. and the synoptic and panoptic nature of the event.
Because thejihadis/ is deeply cognizant of the panoptic and synoptic nature of
viewing. he openly reOeets on this relationship. Shehzad Tall\,veer's video. released on
July 6. 2006 and broadcast by AI-Jazeera. is shot in the form ofa documcntary with
accompanying commentary by Ayman Zawhiri and Adam Gadahn. maps of London. and
a dcscription of the bomb-making process. as well as a message from Tanweer.(""Video
of7 July Bomber.'" BBe Neil's). In this way. Tanweer managcs both to documcnt thc
process of his own death and return to comment on it a year later. Ilis death has been
viewed. but it was as ifhe too were viewing the result of this death. as the observalll and
ever-present shahid. olTering answers one year on as to thc mcaning of the evcnt. In this
way.heactedasbothviewedandviewcr.
It is evident from Khan and Tall\veer's videos Ihat it is not a culture of lear that
Ihcy were trying 10 create. in which people withdraw into a world of private hystcria. but
a culture of shared responsibility. The spectacle ofviolencc. however. is real vioknce:
victims actually died. Unlike reality tclcvision shows. where real people become unreal
characters. thejihadisls' performances have real and political repercussions which cannot
be accounted for by merely seeing thcjihadisl"s role as perlormative. In fact. it can be
argued that thejihadisl engages in a mctanarrative. commenting on his role as mediator.
openly reflecting on his simultaneous exhibitionistic and voyeuristic role. In Realill" n·.
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7/7e Work oll3ein~ Watched, Mark Andrejevic refers to Zizek's descriplion oflhe savvy
audience and applies ilto reality lelevision by recounting Zizek's interpretation ora
Lacanian joke. He recounts Zizek's description of Laean's travelers who mcet each olher
on a street. when one man asks thc other "why do you lie to mc and say you arc going 10
Cracow so I should believe you'rc going to Lcmberg. when in reality. you ARE going 10
Cracow" (17). Andrejevie notes that the same applies to reality television which pretends
to be real. so that we can believe il is phony, while it "accurately portrays the reality or
contrivance in contemporary society" (18). This observation of the savvy walcher can be
applied to the situation ofthejihadist as performer. Why do you convince me you arc a
murderingjihadist. when I should believe you are only a performer. when in reality you
are ajihadist? In Ihis case. both the perlormance (of the actor) and the real action (death)
occur. The videos discussed here. with Khan acting as lovingjihadi.l'/ falher. and
Tanweer as panoptic slwhid, all seduce the audience with performance. In the end. the
viewer is seduced by a performance and Ihen shocked by Iheerisp reality orlransparency:
thc video is in (act what it says it is: despite its perlormative value. il is a testamenlto a
realjihad---with real dealhs.
A similar kind of Laeanian turn occurs in beheading videos. which starl out as
crude enactmenls ofa barbaric scene. but actual beheading docs occur. Devji argues thai
these videos arc namely perlormative:
It is as irlhejihad is rulfilling the desire orthe mass media lor real horror. bUI on
the same model as reality TV shows. So while this reality strives to achieve
authenticity by its very extremity. just as in reality television shows. il inl:\cl
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achieves exactly thc opposite by becoming a piccc of thcatre. (Landscopes 0(/111'
Jihad lOS)
While it is true that the videos play up to a fearful and barbaric imagc of Muslims. as
Devji claims. such performances did have real political clTects. Unlike Dcvji. Giroux has
noted that ··the political overshadows the aesthctic" and that ··the representation of
politics has not disappeared "into thc vortex of simulacra" (Spec/ode o(Terror 65).
Ilowever. he interprets the vidcos as a way to "sanction a rcnewcd commitment to
authoritarianism•... to promoting a view ofthc social delined almost cxclusively through
shared apprehension and distrust" (65). This notion of the social. he argues. used to
promote threatening religious orthodoxies function by "prohibiting the exercise of critical
thought and transforming citizens into automans" (66). Though this may be true. it is
important to add that these videos had real political value; lhe threatened beheadings of
Philippine workers in Iraq resulted in that government withdrawing all Philippine
contractors as perthejihadis/demands.
It is obvious that the American government recognizes the potential political
impact of such videos. thcir appeal to a real audiencc. not mercly their perlormative
value. The videos thcmselves arc distributed on websites which are regularly monitored
and shut down. 22 The debate around what is allowed to be shown in the war of terror
reached a pinnacle in 2006 when it became evident that the American government had
plans to bomb theAI.Jazeera headquarters in Qatar. a friendly and pro-American slate.
"Kahan and Kcllner. havcdoclIl11cnledhowlhe'"Tolallnlorlllalion Awarcness ProjectOOofthe
Blish adl11inistration. a govcrnl11cnt database.traccd the web aClivilies ofindividllals with a Big Brother
sllrvciliancecnlhllSiasl11("lnlernetSlIbcllllllresOO )
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accusing Al ./azeera of supporting terror because it aired variousjihadis/ messages. This
debale over access to the Internet and particularly access to AI./azeera raises a pertinent
question as to why access is denied to some violent materials and yet widely televised on
others. For example. the disturbing content of torture in Abu Ghraib was circulated rreely
on television and the Internet. while horrific content of beheadings byjilwdis/s was
banned. Kellner positions Abu Ghraib as a depiction of"brutal coionialmelllality" and
notes that that the archive. which was the work of young U.S. soldiers. included over a
hundred photos. not only or the torture but also or daily lire in Iraq: pictures or camels.
and scenes of Iraq were side by side with the photos of abuse. as irit were a document or
travel literature (Media Spec/acle and the Crisis o/Del//ocr{/()' 83). This spectacle lasted
(or a few weeks. and though much discussed in human rights circles. faded li'om
television screens. Immediately following this was the May 11.2004 beheading of Nick
Berg. The actual beheading was not shown on television. but deferred. Why was it that
the Abu Ghraib photos were so widely circulated but the Nick Berg beheading remained
unseen? Did audiences really identify themselves with the Abu Ghraib prisoners as they
did with ick Berg? Giroux would answer this by arguing that in today's global network
images cannot be stopped; this is true but this docs not mean they must be shown on
major television networks. Why was AI ./azeera·s airing or.Jihadis/ specchcs and
beheadings of such concern to the American administration while the major nctwork
broadcasts of the abusc conducted by this very administration were not? Perhaps images
or such colonialist abuse as evidenced in the Abu Ghraibarchivc intcntionally serve as a
kind orwarning to thejihadis/that this can happcn to anyone: perhaps the American
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administration had its tinger on the pulse of its citizens when it assumed the Ahu Ghraib
images would be less bothersome than the Nick Berg beheading because Muslim victims
remain less important and identitiablethanAmericanones. When the 1/01110 IslalllicllS is
the victim, his victimhood is both constructed and photographed by American soldiers,
whose performance is viewed by an international audience. These images were widely
distributed by the same satellite and cable networks which had not allowed viewing of the
bodies of American soldiers being sent home from Iraq. It is easier to see the Ilo/l/()
Islamicus denigrated. the objects of degradation and sexual abuse, and perhaps even
advantageous in the "spectacle of terror" than it is to see a fully human American body.
It appears evident then. that the American government. at least. is cognizalll of the
fact that spectacles have direct political implications both lor the recruitment of potential
followers and tor the general perception of the American public of their own government.
While. governments claim they will not negotiate with terrorists, it is common knowledge
that secret negotiations take place and there is ample evidence that terrorism works.
Gould and Klor, for example, after examining attacks in Israel from 1988-2006, conelude
that local attacks cause Israelis to be more willing to grant territorial concessions to the
Palestinians. and that terrorism appears to be an effective strategy in terms of shi rting the
entire political landscape to the left. Robert Pape claims that terrorists achieved
significant policy changes in six of the cleven terrorist campaigns that he analyzed and
argues that terrorism is particularly efTective against democracies because the electorate
typically is highly sensitive to civilian casualties from terrorist acts. Karol and Miguel
provide empirical support to voters' sensitivity to casualties by showing that American
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casualties in Iraq caused George Bush to receivc significantly fewcr votcs in scv~ral kcy
statcs in the 2004 elections. The March 11,2004 Madrid train bombings alter~d history
by installing a party in power that might not otherwise havc bcen elected. Justthr~e days
after the bombings. a government that was a strong supporter of America's global war on
terror and a participant in the war in Iraq was replaced with a government detennincdto
pull Spanish troops out (Jenkins n.pag)
The obvious connection between violence and achieving political goals allows us
to relurn to some of the major queries raised in this chapter as to lhe role ofthejilwdi.l'1 in
mcdiating his connection to his audience and his relationship to contcmporary lorms of
media expression. The evidence seems to suggest that thcjihadi.l'1 has directly intcrjcctcd
himscl I' into both the symbolic and real, raising serious questions about thc naturc of
mcdiation and performance and thc possibility of political action. Thcjihadi.l'1 is now
speaking for himsclfdirectly.though attimcs he docs use various other mediating liJrces.
lie operates in the same field as his Muslim interlocutors. oftcn employing the saillc kind
of engagement and terminologies to assert a voice. Though hc competes with thclll lill'
his pcrlormance. he is capable of real political action. Second. hc is a sophisticatcd and
savvy perlormer. who. however. docs not perlorm lor the sake of performing. hut docs so
to institute real political rcsult and changc. Third. hc operatcs within a faith-bascd fralll~
ofrcfcrcnce that rcfers to the will of the Divine. not to the authority of the nation state
nor cvcn the Sheikh. qucstioning thc nature of sovereignty and sacri licc which has com~
to dominate discourse on the war on terror. even that of the most astute observers. Ilis
acts of violencc on himsel I' and others arc an articulation for change. a rupturc in thc r~al
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and symbolic systems. Finally. his intentions may not be unitary. and may contain
personal. worldly, cthical and other-worldly motives; complicating thc binary bctwecn
secular and religious motives. for only in attaining secular justicc can his rcligious
motives be achieved. His actions blur thc very nalure of the rclationship betwccn
performance and real political action. as well as thc secular and the Divine. It is too soon
to know if the rupture as represented by thejihadisl can really offer an alternative to the
cxisting world order or ifit too will havc its intentions empticd and circulated baek only
as a tnI'm of Westcrn reflection on itsclf. Howcver, the possibilities cxist. and it is to
thcsc possibilities wc now turn.
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Conclusion:
The Arab Revolution. Postcolonial ism and the Revival of Theory
In this thesis I have argued that the figure ofthejihadi.l'l ofters a fertile area Ii'om which
to launch a discussion about the limits of current theory. particularly regarding the role of
interlocutors in interpretation and the limits of secularism as the founding doctrine of
postcolonial theory. The texts discussed throughout this thesis are diverse in lorm and theoretical
view and demonstrate persistent altempts to insert thejihadi.l'/. as a simultaneously exotic and
familiar figure. into a discourse on the future of democracy. humanism. capitalism. and
multiculturalism. Chapter One theorizes how Islam has been leli out of theory. particularly
postcolonial discussions on representation and radical challenges to metropolitan power. by
examining some of the antinomies in Said's work. Chapters Two and Three discuss howjilwd
has been inserted. across disciplines and political persuasions. into the discourse on
globalization. representation and political alternatives. These chapters examine the relationship
between the works of'"good" Muslims and the militarization of Muslim lands. as well as the
theorelicallravelling ofjihad to ijlihad. Chapters Four and Five examine the perceptions of the
intentionality of thejihadi.l'/. through theory. fiction. and the words and acts of inl~lmous
jihadisls. Particular altention is been paid to how Muslim interlocutors position themselves as
credible translators of their radical counterparts. and the competition in the field to explain
intentionality Ii'om various perspectives.
It is evident that jihad has ""travelled" a great deal over the past decade. and has aroused
the interest of many theorists and writers. but the conditions lor hearing are just beginning to be
created. One of the central queries which have been raised in this study is whetherjihad is a
commodity that is being circulated in a fully charged semiotic circuit. digested through First
World interpretation and moderate Muslim interlocutors and regurgitated baek in a new.
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digcstible form. or whetherjihad is seriously destabilizing the political paralysis and secular bias
of postcolonial criticism. Two critical conclusions can be madc. First. wc have seen how the
binary of secular and religious. prevalcnt in Said's own work. attachcs itself to the newly
established binary of "good" and "bad" Muslim. raising questions regarding the nature of
represcntation. particularly when the "bad" Muslims are c1carly spcaking for thcmselves. I have
argucd that it is evident that the global eruption ofjilwd has disruptcd the postcolonial
privilcging of the seminal rolc of Third World interlocutors in thc mctropolitan centers. as theory
has bcgun to shift to understanding thc internal differences within the lield of Islam. rather than
mcrcly thc relationship of Islam to thc metropolitan West. Secondly. jihad. with its insistence on
the right and need to use violcncc lor changc. has raised critical qucstions about how
postcolonialthcory has migratcd from its radical roots to its homc in sccular. First World
institutions. It is these two points as rclated to representation and violcncc which I wish to
explore further here.
Let me begin with representation. The focus of this thesis is not terror. butjil/(/d. a
specifically self defined form of religious violencc that has been at the very formation of
postcolonial thcory. and is also been rcsponsible for thc recent turn in thcory toward the
thcological and the ethical. I arguc that jihad prcsents a challenge to the secular bias of
contcmporary criticism. as wcll as subverts the underlying assumptions rcgarding the necessary
represcntation and mediation ofthc "subaltcrn" by Third World intcllectuals located in the
metropolitan centers ofpowcr. Inlhc rhetoric ofrcsistance onjihad. Muslims arc assigned value
by thcir position on the continuum ofradicality--- in other words. on how closc thcy arc to trying
to crase jihad as an embarrassing and misguided interpretation of their crecd. on one end. or
asscrting thc right to violenljihad to rcsist oppression. on the othcr cnd. There have been active
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attempts by both Muslims and non Muslims to assign the value of "good" to a/jihad a/ akhar
(the greatcrjihad) and align it with the need lor ijlihad. or perhaps sccularization and
modernization of Muslim societies. and thc value of "bad" to a/jihad a/ asghar (thc lesserjihad)
because of its violent and spectacular attacks. misnamed as "suicidc" bombings. Popular ligures
as diverse as Irshad Manji, Imam Abul Raul'. Ziaddiun Sardar. and Tariq Ramadan. lor cxample.
asscrt their individuality. by highlighting their credentials as practicing Muslims and staking
their familiarity with American and European traditions. On thc other hand. Osama bin Laden
and Adam Ghadan position themsclves in a tag team of Arabian knight and Amcrican stand-up
comic to dramatize thc role ofthc interlocutor in transmitting bin Ladcn's radical Third World
messagc to a First World audience. They dcmonstrate an awareness of Western discourse but
lirmly insist on the indigenous vocabulary ofthejihad. Without doubt. bin Laden's interventions
will resonatc long aftcr his death. This rathcr unstable continuum of "good" and "bad"
toregrounds the central problematic of the postcolonial thcory of representation. Do the "good"
Muslims rcprcsent thc "bad"? Who do "bad" Muslims represent? Who is thc majority'] Just as
Said's secular and religious criticism is a displacement of East and West. the binary bctwcen
"good" and "bad" Muslim is a rcllcction of the persistence of the perceived tension betwcen the
secular and thc religious. I arguc that a Muslim can casily become a Homo Is/amic/ls. thc
Muslim countcrpart ofllomo Sacer. ifshe slidcs too far toward the "bad" cnd of the binary.
Applying a contrapuntal approach. this thesis discusses how neo-Orientalists. the leti. and
libcrals havc usedjihad as a means tor reflection on the stale of dcmocracy in Wcstern societies.
without quitc hearing thc messages ofjihadisls themsclvcs. This is due. in part. to the liJct that
the conditions tor hearing are now only struggling to be born as the secular assumptions behind
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theory come under serious scrutiny. and various Muslim theorists become more articulate about
clarifying their indigenous theoretical vocabulary.
The 2011 Arab Revolution is playing a rupturous role in setting the conditions lor ht:aring
and seriously calling into question both the secular/religious binary which has Ii'amed debatt:s on
Muslim societies and the role of First World intellectuals in mediating revolution. particularly
violenl revolutionary change. At the time of writing. about four months into what is being
packaged as the "Arab" revolution. new generations of Muslims in Bahrain. Tunisia. Yt:men.
Syria, Libya and Egypt arc demonstrating a media savvy in presenting their revolutions to the
world. which clearly demonstrate lessons learned over the past decade when it comes to
positioning any protest originating in Muslim majority communities. All attcmpts. by both Arab
dictators and early attempts by American and European media. to label thc rcvolutions "Islamic"
have failed. thanks to the youth who initiated the movements. This generation grcw up in the
rhetoric of the "war on terror" and is familiar with the tcnuous catcgorization of "good" and
"bad" Muslims. They are aware thatthc binary of traditional Orientalism-Islam versus the Wt:st
- has becn replaced by a ncw binary of "good" and "bad" Muslims. They havc livcd in a world
whcre simply bcing Muslim has become a highly contcntious and visibly political stance.
Therefort:. the communication strategy of the youth movcments bcgan with a conscious decision
to articulate a revolution by Muslim masses in secular language. contrary to various movemt:l1ls
which pre-dated it which orten expresscd sccular. political ambitions in religious languagt:. This
nt:w communications plan is a direct attempt to create a counter-narrative to the predominant ont:
which has dominated Western discourse lor the past dccadc. The leli has becn particularly
euphoric with the youthful secular messaging of the "Arab" revolution and is hopeful that it can
be appropriated to universally invigorate the len. For example. Hardt and cgri. in a February
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24,2011 article in The Cuardian, place hope that the Arab revolutions will be this generation's
Latin American struggle, as a laboratory of political experimentation," a kind of"ideological
house-cleaning, sweeping away the racist conceptions ofa clash of civilizations that consign
Arab politics to the past." They argue,
This is a threshold through which neo-liberalism cannot pass and capitalism is put to
question. And Islamic rule is completely inadequate to meet these needs. Ilere
insurrection touches on not only the equilibriums of North Africa and the Middle ":ast but
also the global system of economic governance. (n.pag)
Hardt and Negri arc right to note that the revolutions rejuvenate some basic principles of the len
which had been discarded as outdated: principles ofjustice and universalism and popular power.
but they ignore that thesc principles which they praise are the very foundations of Islam itscl L
the cultural foundation from which these revolutions are being generatcd. In their haste to
condemn "Islamic rule'" without ever defining what that might mean, and in their nostalgia to
migrate thc revolution into a communist agcnda. they betray a need to leave Islam out of any
serious inquiry into both the reason behind the revolution and the future of its achievement. A
similar plea lor a type of Islamic socialism, which basically leaves Islam out. has been made by
7:i7.ek in a February 10'''.20 I I opinion editorial in The Cuardian titled "Why Fear the Arab
Revolutionary Spirit." and in his February 012011 appearance. with Tariq Ramadan, on Ri::
Khan on AI Jazeera.
In fact. the discussion which took place on Ri:: Khan in February 20 II where both Tariq
Ramadan and Slavoj Zizek oller their insights is representative of the lenses being used to
interpret this revolution and steer it away from the reality that it is a revolution by Muslims. but
not necessarily Islamists. Ramadan carefully argues that the revolution is not ideologically
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inspired and that we must be cognizant of the reality that Western power wants changes in the
region which at the same time enable the global situation to remain the same. Ramadan conli'onts
head on the concerns about the involvement of Islamist politics. now that Arab dictators arc
disappearing. and argues that the fear of a monolithieal. radical Islam is merely a guise upon
which the West and Israel maintain hegemony over Muslim populations. Using the example of
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. which he argues is diverse in ideologies. he longingly looks to
the example of Turkey. not Iran. where Islamismand political life has been successfully
integrated, be it. under the eye of very walehfulmilitary. Zizek uses the occasion to comment on
universalism. and expresses his admiration of the Arabs who hearguestruly understand
democracy much better than does the West. Echoing his arguments from Welcome to the Desert
oFthe Real. and not responding to Ramadan's contention of the diversity contained under thl:
umbrella of Islamist politics. he claims that the choices open to the revolution arc not .iust
"Muslim fundamentalist Islam" or liberal democracy, but must include a synthesis of Islamil: and
leliist ideologies. Unfortunately, however, Zizek's well-intentioned conclusions betray the saml:
bias as Ilardt and Negri ---that is that the Arab revolution must speak the language of the kli.
The reality is. right now. the revolution is speaking many languages. as it contains diversl:
aspirations. It is speaking the language ofuniversalisIl1. which is neither leli nor neo-libl:raL but
at the very foundation of pluralistic Muslim societies.
Perhaps what Zizek fails to mention, and Ramadan merely hints at. is that thl: silencl: of
Islamists of various stripes, andjihadist.l', has helped the revolution immensl:ly. That doesn't
mean. howl:ver. that the Muslim social structure of the societies under upheaval is not related to
the revolution itself. Few commentators have paused to note how the struggle against in.iusticl:,
indeed the much malignedjihad, is the root of Muslim civil life and the young revolutionaries
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have been raised in this tradition where live pillars organize both social and spirituallirc. Thl:
lirst pillar is to worship no God. but God and to recognize Muhammad as his ml:ssengl:r. This
pillar. when applied to a contemporary reality. puts spiritual lire and equality orall peopk as a
lirst priority over the striving 1'01' global capital and Western liberalism. To placl: morl: ntll:ntion
on the material at the expense of the good or the whole community is against the major principk
of lawheed in Islam. which always places God as the priority. Further. this vcry first pillnr. by
recognizing the role or revelation in the acquisition of knowledge. challcnges one orthl: mnjor
contentions of the Western metaphysical tradition - thaI knowledge is sccular. learncd in thl:
world. only. not transcendental. The recognition or the validity or both sl:cular and
transcendental knowledge poses a major philosophical challenge to this paradigm. The second
and third pillars of daily prayers and rasting. also roc us social lire on the spiritual nnd
identilication with the poor and the dispossessed. The rourth pillar or ::akal. institutes a systl:m
1'01' the distribution or community wealth. The lilih pillar. the hajj. is n spiritual and politically
symbolic ritual or the equality orall human beings. regardless or race or gl:nder. This rath..:r
rudimentary description or how basic pillars or Islam are related to an agenda for economic.
social. and political equality. as well as the right or sel I' governance. demonstrates how th..:s..:
pillars are present in the spirit of the contemporary revolutions. The point is that the
revolutionaries have been socialized in this Islamic context and thus they are articulating this
context. The revolution does not need to turn to the principks or secular liberalism or th..: 1..:1i to
express its vision. The roots or the revolution are in Muslim societies and as such contain th..:
roots or Islam which are now being articulated to Western audiences through action. in a mannn
which had been impossible over the past decade under the oppression or the "war on terror."
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I argue throughout this thesis that Muslim theorists demonstrate a keen knowledge or
Western discourse. in raet. so do some ofthejihadisis. while Western theorists. on the other
hand. arc willing to leave iilihad and reform in the hands of Muslims in .. their" societies. and
eonsidcr the ideas ofthejihadisis themselves too irrational or infantile to cven respond to.
Instead. with no interest in learning about the Islamic concepts that frame this debate. they
nullify the conditions or hearing and use thejihad only as a chance to reflect on the Slate or the
West - a derormed SelL reflected back in the postcolonialist mirror. The bias rcmains. as Mufti
has noted that ··thcy"· have literatures but only "we" have thcory (123). Unlil thc conditions lor
hearing exist. the debates between Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers remain limited. The absence
or these conditions are demonstrated not only in responses to the Arab revolution and can be
rurther exemplified by a lew allempts at "dialogue" between Muslim and non-Muslim theorists.
generated by issues which have erupted because ofjihad. over the past decade. The lollowing
brier examples or dialogues between Talal Asad. Saba Mahmood and Judith Butler; and another
belween Mustapha Chcrirand Jacques Den'ida further demonstrate the specilic kind or
intellectual barriers to true engagement.
1\11. interesting and inspiring debate on the nature or fi'eedom or spcech. and the role or
secularism versus religious thinking is undertaken by Talal I\sad. Saba Mahmood and Judith
Butler in a response to the Danish cartoon crisis 01'2005 in 1.1' Criliq/le ;;;ec/llar: BlasphelllY.
InjlllJl and Free Speech. 1\11 arguc that in the domain or power and governance. the blasphemy
debate rrames the secularism versus Islam debate. I\sad extends his interrogation or secularism
and argues that in Western societies dirrerent vocabularies arc used to place limits on
individuals' selrownership and the West is not as secular as it thinks. while Mahmood explains
the nature ormoral injury. rather than blasphemy. as derived from a dirferent semiotics or
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iconography in cultures. Asad refers directly to specific Islamic concepts of/ajdil(scofling at
God's bounty) and isao 'ah (insult. harm and offense) (38), while Mahmood applies Aristotk's
notion ofschesis to a Muslim's relationship to the Prophet Mohammed (76), Both critical
sections of these essays were entirely misinterpreted by Butler. For example, in extending his
explanation of what is considered blasphemous in Islam by usage of the above terms. I\sad askc:d
What would happen ifreligious language were to be taken more serious in secular Europe
and the preventable deaths in the South of millions from hunger and war was to be
denounced as "blasphemy", as the !louting of ethical limits for the sakc of what is
claimed to be fi'eedom? What is this wcre done without any declarations of"bcliel", and
yct done in all seriousness as a way ofrejceting passionatcly thc aspiration to totalized
global control? Of course Europc's proscription ofthcologieallanguage in the political
domain makes such a use of the word "blasphemy" inconccivable. But docs this
impossibility merely signal a secular reluctance to politicize "rcligion", or it is it the
symptom of an incapacity? (56-7)
Butlcr does not respond to this central argumcnt but instead focuses on how I\sad has nOl ckarly
difTerentiated between criticism and critique. When she docs engage with Asad's Islamic
terminology she concludes that bccause it is transcendent in nature, it cannot be accounted for by
law:
To situate blasphemy, or in this case, is~j'ah, insult. injury- in rclation to a way of life that
is not based on selfownership, but in an abiding and vital dispossession, changcs the
terms of the debate. It docs not provide an immcdiate answer to how thc question of
prohibition or ccnsorship should be legally decided, but shilts us to a modcl of
understanding thaI is not constrained by that juridical model .. It would seem we are
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being asked to understand this battle between. on the one hand. a presumptively secular
framework tied to an ontology of the subject as selfowned. and on the other hantl. a
nonsecular framework that offers an ontology of the subject as dispossessed in
transcendence. (118-119)
In effect. Butler argues. like Asad. that actually there is no such a binary between the secular and
religious. but she offeres no method for dealing with the issue under discussion. since I\sad's
terminology remains "transcendent." Similarly Butler's response to Mahmood docs not tackle
Mahmood's nuanced description of injury but tries to fit it into an existing normative framework
as she asks. "Where does Mahmood stand on the question of legal redress lor injuries
sustainedT(120) and then concludes that the issues of culture. ethics. the legal and political
domains arc unclear in Mahmood's essay. What Butler fails to notice is that it is not a normative
legal answer which Mahmood is looking for. but analysis of .. the structure of sensitivities.
alTeets and commitments (ethics) upon which the language of the public order rests" (148-149).
Though Butler makes interesting observations on Danish politics and valuable insights into
minority conflicts. she does not truly engage with the Islamic conceptions in I\sad and
Mahmood·sarguments. In fact she states.
These two anthropologists are trying to get us to expand our understanding of what was
at stake. but I gather they are doing this because they think not just that we should all
become more knowledgeable (and that the broader knowledge of our world is a moral
good) but also thaI the secular terms should not have the power to deline the meaning or
efkctofreligiousconcepts.(I05)
In fact onc of the central points in Asad and Mahmood's articles is that we should become more
knowledgeable of Islamic concepts in order to understand the logic and rationality behind the
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Muslim response to the Danish cartoons and other issues_ And what would be wrong with a little
didacticism in this case considering the real absence of knowledge in contemporary theory of
indigenous Muslim vocabularies and conceptual frameworks? It appears. unfortunately. that
Butler dismisses this conceptual framework. and instead focuses her attention on the secular
only_
A similar kind of disjuncture occurs in an equally engaging discussion between Muslapha
ChcriL a professor of philosophy and Islamic studies at the University of Algiers. and Jacques
Den'ida_ In the Foreword to Islam and the West: II Com'ersation with Jacques Derrida.
Borradori sets Cherif up as prominent politician. serving in the Algerian government as
secretary of higher education and ambassador to Egypt. in contrast to Den-ida. a
deconstructionist who dismantles institutions but works within them. unearthing the religious and
nonreligious functions which "entails a commitment to secularization" (xii). calling them an
"odd couple" (x)_ Den-ida uncharacteristically spoke of his own personal history:
I want to speak here. today. as an Algerian. as an Algerian who became French at any a
given moment. lost his French citizenship. then recovered it. Of all the cultural wealth I
have received. that I have inherited. my Algerian culture has sustained me the most. This
is what I wanted tosayasa testimony from the heart (30)_
The new. personalized Den-ida and CheriI' initiate a debate on the issue of l~lith and its role in
launching the politics of the future. though it soon becomes obvious that the vocabulary of l~lilh
both employ docs not intersect at any point. Cherifnotes that "Islam wants engagement with
regard to the "Mystery". loyalty to the "revealed message". and a specilic attachment to the
religious vision that the last life is the final aim (56) and asks Den-ida "What can philosophy say
today on the subject of the Mystery?" (56)_ In his reply. Den-ida is careful to separatc f~lith and
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religion. because for him faith is connected to a social bond. while religion remains exclusionary.
lie argues that since the relation to the Other presupposes faith. there is no contlict between the
secularization of politics and Cherifs "Mystery (57-8). Derrida displaces the dehate ahout faith.
or about religion. simply by refusing to talk about religion. with the cliche ··there arc many
Islams. there are many Wests" (39).65 There is no room for the faith-based values of which
Chcrifspeaks; indeed. Derrida docs not even explore them:
I believe that what we must consider as our first task is to ally ourselves to that in the
I\rab and Muslim world which is trying to advance the idea of secularization of the
political. the idea ofa separation between the theocratic and the political. this out of
respect for the political and for democratization and out of respect I()I" faith and religion
(53-4).
The problem briefly demonstrated by these two dialogues is that the basis lor such
discussion is largely absent. If even Butler and Den'ida could not be seduced to explore Islamic
terminologies and epistemologies. then what is the hope for a genuine contrapuntal discourse')
I\s I have argued throughout this thesis. cultural theorists do not seriously engage in the cultural
terminology which the Muslim cultural critics are introducing. let alone the arguments of the
jihac!isls. Therefore. will the contrapuntal discourse to come be only one with. to horrow an
;7,izekean term. "deeaneinated Others" ("Interview with Riz Khan: I\re We Living in the End of
Times"); in other words. Muslim interlocutors who speak only within the framework of Western
6' Ian Almond has noted Dcrrida'sviewoflslam shilled li·ollltilllclotillle.sol11clil11csconsidcringlslal11
likcChrislianandJewish lraditions. anothcr master narrative to bcdcconstrllclcd. and sol11ctil11csas sOl11cthingqllilc
diffcrcntandOther.as··apotcntial pool of violence and fanat icisl11 which SCCI11S todcscrvc special cOllllllcnl"t43)
Sometilllcs Derrida placed JlIdaism and Islam together"both JlIdaislll and Islal11 arcsccn as IWO pockctsof
resislanceagainst what Den·idacallslheglobalizationofthcworld.ancsscntiallyChrislian Anglo i\l11crican wave
ofl11odernitythat Dcrridajllxtaposcsagainst JlIdaisl11 and Islam" (49). Andothertilllcs. Dcn·ida.likeNictzschc
cOlildnoldccideiflslamisthcOthcrorthcbrother-brotherwhcnheconnects ittoal11onolheistictradition which
hc wants to deconstrllct andotherwhcn hc wants to lISC it tocriliqlle EliropeanChristianity. Allllondnoteslhatal
timcs Dcrrida's Islam takeson"anarchaicandoslensibly more savage radicalization of"rcligiolls"violencc faith
andknowledgc"(53)
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philosophy? It is too early to tell if the 2011 revolution, a living Muslim tradition of resistance,
will continue to be packaged in secular language which makes it digestible to Western theory.
There is hope that this new political space will be fertile ground for moving beyond simplistic
divisions of 'religious' versus 'secular' and allow us to return full circlc to Said's "democratic
criticism."
Ifdemoeratie criticism can be seen asaspace that deeply engages with diverse
frameworks, then following in the work of Asad's Forma/ions oj/he Secular, for example, it
must begin with a multicultural critique ofsccularism, including the dynamic relationship
between Islam and secularism. This effort to seriously consider the role of the Other in the
construction of the West's terminology, as well as to conduct a serious inquiry into the Other's
own specific vocabulary, will require genuine intellectual curiosity, bcyond rcflection on the
Self. This narcissistic trend in theory needs its own ij/ihad to take the intellectual risk of
venturing into new territory, thus far marked olTbounds as religious and irrational. Vincent
Pccora hopcs for "a more inclusive model of cultural criticism across the boundaries of religion
and nation even as it "provincializes" secularism per se" (204), but what arc the hopes for this
when our most radical critics avoid engaging with Islam and are bound by ambiguities when they
approach Islam's role in cultural criticism? When radicals likc Eagleton hold linn to the binary
of "good" and "bad" Islam: praising the benign and humanistic Islam and simultaneously
labeling it as "the creed which has become in our time the doctrine of oil-rich autocrats and the
stoners of women, racist-minded mullahs and murderous bigots" (Alier Thelll) , 178)?
Giroux, perhaps more than any of the theorists discussed in this thesis, notes that the
spectacle of terrorism illustrates the dcgree to which the statc and corporate power can be
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challenged while suggesting the importance of what it means to address audienccs through a
political discourse:
The spectacle of terrorism. ifexamined closely. provides some resourccs lor rethinking
how the political is connected to particular understandings of the social: how distinctiw
modes of address arc used to marshal specific identities. memories and histories; and how
certain pedagogical practices are employed to mobilize a range of affective invcstmcnts
around images of trauma and suffering. All of these issues raisc important qucstions
about how new circuits of power, technology, and visual production. rcarticulatc thc
relationships between meaning and action, modes of information and agcncy. affect and
collectivity. and the public and the private. (Beyond Ihe S/Jeclacle oj"Termri.\·/Il 72)
lie is quick to point out. however.lhat this social form must be reclaimcd from the
"nccropolitics" of the stateless terrorists (71). While Giroux applaudes dcmocratic usagc of
technologies and visual culture. it is only thejimn of this message which interests him. notthc
contenl ifit comes fromjihadisis since it "has no vision of the future outside ofthc culturc of
lear and the discourse of risk" (77). Giroux's oppositional politics obviously docs not include the
jilladisis. While he argues therc is need ofa sober assessment of democratic tcndencics in Latin
America. particularly. Argentina. Brazil and Venezuela. he makes no reference to any
movcmcnts across diverse Muslim countries. even those which do not include thc statcless
jihadisis. His failure to recognize the potential of Muslim societies to spearhead cxactly thc typc
of revolution which is currently sweeping the Arab world displays a deadcning dcafilcss to the
multiplicity of messages thaI have been contained in the radical stancc ofthcjihadisl.\· ovcr the
past decade. Are Giroux's solidarities 10 be formed through Baudrillard's "ruptural evcnts:'
whcrc the real irrupts into the virtual as ..the internal convulsion of history:' evcnts which
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"appear inspired by some power orevil. appear no longer the bearcrs ol"constructive disorder.
but oran absolute disorder"? (7'l1e Intelligence o{El'il 126) Arc thc cvents 01"2011 examples 01"
such ruptural events? Can they generate Giroux's planetary oppositional politics as Ilardt and
egri hope? What is the placc or Muslims. "good" and "bad" in this global transformation')
Thc argument for a gcnuinc engagement with Islam docs not mean that cultural critics
have to become Orientalists. in the traditional use ol"the tenn. but it docs rcquire a commitment
to Icarn about Islam's metaphysical and cthical rrameworks. Thc reality is that a true
contrapuntal discourse cannot take place through Western Muslim interlocutors alone. who arc.
as I have highlighted in this study, conl"ronted with the dilcmma ol"articulating the radical
dcmands ol)ihadi.\'t,I' andlslamist politics. in general. to a rather secular and unsympathetic
audiencc. I\s long as the category 01" "bad" Muslim remains so broad based. genuine engagement
between Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers. and even betwcen Muslim thinkers themselves. will
not be I"ruitrul. On this point Olivier Roy's categorization of four major idcological players in the
Middlc East has been particularly useful. These categories contain Islamists who campaign lor a
political entity: rundamentalists who want to establish Shariah law:jihadi.l,t.\' who undermine the
pillars ofthc West through symbolic targeted allack: and cultural Muslims who advocate lor
multiculturalism or community identity (7/1e Politic.\' o(Chao.\' in tile Middle ElISt 51). Roy
points oul that often the lour movcmcnls contradict each othcr. rc(lecting "a tension belween
dcterrorialization and deculluration on the one hand (terrorists and multiculturalists). and
reterrorialization and acculturation on the other (Islamisls and fundamentalists) (52), The
dil"ICrenccs between the Islamist groups and nationalist ones. such as Fatah and llamas. arc not
idcological. nor can the allianccs betwecn Hezbollah and Aoun's Christians in Lebanon be
cxplaincd. Roy argues. by maintaining the conservative binary of a secular and religious divide,
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In fact. the tolerance of Islamic movements has been demonstrated by nationalist intellectuals in
Egypt and Pakistan. as both define and defend social and cultural norms and mobilize popular
support: --In short. there are countless examples. but nowhere in the Middle East is there a war
with Islamists on one side and the secular democrats on the other. whereas media debates in
Europe give the impression that this is the main difference'" (60).
This is becoming increasingly obvious through the recent events of the Arab revolutions.
The real division is not between secular intellectuals and religious intellectuals. but between the
lorees pulling belween de-eulturation. which I argue takes the form ofa universalism olien
associated with secularism and nco-liberalism. and acculturalization. which argues lor a
del inking from the universal of globalized liberalism. It is this tension that best explains the
current stress between Muslim multieulturalisl interlocutors and the crowded group of--bad"
Muslims to which the West does not speak or hear. And it is this tension that needs to be
dissected before the conditions of hearing are born. In this regard. Alastair Crooke's
Resistance: The Essence o(the !slalllist Revolution is a unique and valuable contribution as it
concentrates on systematically analyzing the philosophical. ethical. cultural. religious. economic.
psychological. national and political values of Islamism. Crooke locused on philosophical and
ethical differences between Islamism and Western traditions which have been translated inlo
operational politics by a number of powerful personalities. including Sayyed Qutb. Mohammed
Baqer al-Sadr. Musa al-Sadr. Ali Shariati. Sayyed Mohammad Ilussein Fadallah. Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. and Khaled Mesha·al. Crooke argued that
Islamists seek to recuperate an alternative consciousness. one drawn from their own intellectual
traditions that would stand in opposition to the Western paradigm and as such represent a
complete inversion of secular capitalist liberalism. Instead of the pre-eminence of the market. lor
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example. to which other social and community objectives are subordinated. the making of a
society based on compassion. equity and justice becomes the overriding objective to which oth-:r
objectives. including markets, are subordinated. Instead of the individual being lhe
organizational principlc around which politics. economics and society arc shaped. it is lh-:
collective welfare of the community in terms of such principles. rather than the individual. that
becomes the index of political achievemcnl. Thus. for Crooke. as cvidcnccd in his practical work
in the Conflicts Forum which practices dialoguc with Islamists. and other "bad' Muslims.66 The
Islamist revolution is much more than politics:
It is an attempt to shapc a new consciousness - to escape from. and challenge. the most
far-rcaching prc-suppositions of our time. It has many shortcomings and setbacks - the
radical suicide bombings might be one manifestation of it- but its intellectual insights
olTer Muslims (and Westerners too) the potential to step beyond the shortcomings of
Wcstern material consciousncss. ("Why Can't Muslim Societies be More like the
Globalized West"n.pag)
Faisal Devji makes a similar plea lor hearing when he claborates on the gap between the
last two of Roy's groups- multiculturalist Muslim interlocutors andjihadisls. Devji argues that
the role of moderate Muslims is minimized because they have not been able to assume any
leadership role globally because the frame of their debate. which remains mainly theological. is
wrong. Devji argues "These epistles mark an imaginary alliance between Muslims. Christians
and.Jews by displacing violence and going against thc geographies of the glohal world with
Hindus and Buddhists bcing the real neighbors of Muslims (The Terrorisl in ,"'earch o/lIIlIl/{lIIill'
,", The Conllicts Forum was founded in 2004 by Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry. 10 encourage dialogue
wilh a wide range of leading Islamists. The Forum works through Ihree channels: the Roherls ('elller Dialagues. Ihe
Islamic Ecollomics Program and the Media alld I'uhlic Discuurse Program to engage Western policy11lakers and the
leaders of political Islam in discussions. Seehtp:!!conllictslorum.org
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198). Instead. for Devji. the real hope to carry change forward lies in thc radicals who arc
capable of revolutionizing Islam more than their liberal counterparts because militaney to Devji
represents a kind of democratization. an acting without authority. He claims "militants arc much
more creative in their religious thinking and much more imaginative in their means of
propagating it" (200). In fact. the 2011 militancy across the Arab world has requircd no
mediation from Muslim interlocutors living in the West; it proves that Muslims living in
predominantly Muslim countries are not only capable of representing themselves. but of leading
global revolutionary. whieh is sometimes violent. ehange.
It is fair to argue that cultural criticism needs to manage its "dcnial of the rationality of
Islam" (Crooke. Resistance 3) and stop dismissing fundamentalism. Islamism. andjihadislII as
irrational. refusing engagement. except with moderate interlocutors in a debate framed in
Western terminology. However. it seems few theorists are yet up to the task. This avoidance
leads to the second point I wish to argue here regarding how far postcolonial theory. in
particular. has travelled from its radical roots.
To begin this reOection. recall. lor example. a photograph taken on July 3. 2000. of
Edward Said in South Lebanon throwing a stone across the Lebanon-Israel border in a contest
with his son. He received so much criticism that Said was compelled to explain. "It was a
pebble. There was nobody there. The guardhouse was at least haifa mile away."I>] Nevertheless.
the media frenzy that erupted was enough to have Said uninvited as a lecturer at the freud
Society of Vienna. How far has postcolonial theory travelled when a simple rock (or pebble)
thrown by one of its progenitors stirred so mueh negative publicity? The Western support lor the
20 II Arab revolutions has been tenuous as long as the protesters are "peaceful:' while at the
("Dinitia Smith. "A Stone's Throw is a Freudian Slip." Nell' }'ork Tillles. 10 March 2000. Web. 16
December 20 I O. http://www.nytimes.com/200 1/03/1 O/arts/a-stonc-s-lhrow-is-a-frcudian-
slip.htmJ?scp l&sq=%22cdwardI saidO o22&sl nyt
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same time it has virtually ignored the violent catalyst of these revolutions. the act of testimony
by Mohamed Bouazizi. a Tunisian street vendor who set himsel f on fire on December 17.20 IO.
now hailed as a shahid throughout the Muslim world. The "revolutionaries." as the Western
media labels them. in Libya freely speak of their struggle as jihad . and indeed it is an armed
struggle. Postcolonial theorists now look with hope to the Arab region because its revolution is
articulated in a language with which they can identifY. Will the revolution. remain in favor once
Islamist andjihadist clements enter the formations of these new societies?
The response of Western theorists. such as those discussed here. to the formation of
governments across the region which will. no doubt, contain strong Islamist and eveniihadist
clements will highlight whether or not postcolonial ism has already lorgotten lhat its l~llher.
Frantz Fanon was an active member of the Algerian ational Liberation Pront (FLN) and was
buried in Algeria under the name Ibrahim Fanon in a graveyard for shahid. We have already
noted Said's discomfort with Fanon's advocacy of violence in Chapter Three. as well as how
other Muslim interlocutors try to manage the issue of violence as they discuss a/jihad a/ ak/wr
(the greaterjihad). and iitihad instead of a/jihad a/ asxhar ( the lesserji/wd) and its ofien
violent manifestations. Sardar for example. in his foreword to Wack S'kin White II/asks. calls
Fanon's violence "problematie" and in an interview with Naked Punch notes that "Violence is
where I depart fi'om Fanon. Panon thought violence was necessary to resist imperialism. Gandhi
proved him wrong" (n.pag). Perhaps it is this abhorrence of violence in First World
posteoloniality that prevents true engagement with radical Islamic politics. It did not stop Franti'.
Fanon, however. from borrowing greatly from the Islamic resistance in dcveloping his theory of
violence known through The Wretched otthe Earth. an argument which Slisi has developed and
which has been pUI forth in Chapter One of this thesis.
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Fanon himselfwas clear about the Islamic influence on his ideas and actions in one of his
lesser known books A Dying ColonialislII. first published as L'an cinq de 10 rem/ll/iol1
algerienne in 1959. It is in this book that Fanon wrote directly of his "Moslem comrades" (165)
and recounted an interesting meeting he had with Muslims and .Jews in Algeria which provoked
the development of his ideas on violence as an "excess made possible by the excess of
colonialism" (165). Fanon wrote about his inner struggle with accepting violence as a necessary
part of the Algerian struggle and how. in the end. he was convinced by a .Jewish speaker at the
meeting who seduced him with a "profession of faith" that was "patriotic. lyrical and
passionate" (166). Interestingly, Fanon also reflected on his own biases and the fact that he was
more easily convinced by a .Jew than a Muslim, noting "1 still had too much unconscious anti-
Arab ICeling in me" (166). Throughout A Dying Colonialism. Fanon elaborated how his theory
of the necessity of violence dccpened through his discussions with Muslims and referred to their
"conscientiousness and moderation:' noting that "little by little I was coming to understanding
the meaning of the armed struggle and its necessity" (167). The most convincing evidence li)r
Fanon came from the fellahen (peasants) who the media had branded as "extremists and highway
bandits" (167). Reflecting on his confusion in becoming a member of the 1-'1, . Fanon wrote.
My leliist leanings drove me toward the same goal as Muslim nationalists. Yet I was too
conscious of the dilTerent roads by which we had reacheclthe same aspiration.
Independence yes I agreed. but what independence? Were we going to light to build a
fCuda\. theocratic Moslem state that was frowned on by foreigners? Who would claim
that wehada place in such an Algeria? (168)
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His answer to this question came brilliantly from a fellow comrade ofthc FLN who retorted that
it was up to the Algerian people to decidc. That same answer is being heard throughout lhe Arab
world today as the West strugglcs to catch up to revolutions (or which it was not prepared.
In the end. Fanon's analysis of colonialism began and ended with thc question of
violencc. which he devcloped through his cngagement with the Islamist rL . Through violence.
as Said noted as discussed in Chapter Thrcc. Fanon was looking (or a way to brcak completely
from thc past and seek a new humanity: not only to ovcrthrow the colonizers. but a new
consciousness based on cquality and justice. For Fanon violcnce played a critical role in the
reconstruction of self and nation. but it accompanied an cpistcmological rcvolution that pit the
colonizer dircctly against thc colonized. In The Wrelched (i/lhe £arlh. Fanon argued that an
cntirely new world must come into being. This utopian desire. to bc absolutely free of the past.
required total revolution. "absolute violence" (37). and this true revolution could only cOllle frolll
the peasants. or "fellahecn" who must also overthrow thc bourgcoisie in their own society who
cooperate with the colonizcrs. In short. for ranon. violcncc was both "instrumental" and
"absolutc." Samira Kawash notcs that instrumental violencc in Fanon's text is the violence of
revolt and of reversal. thc violence whcrcby thc colonized challenge and attempt to upend the
domination that has opprcsscd them. At thc same timc. another violence (perhaps alongside or
unleashed by instrumental acts ofviolencc) emerges as the world-shattcring violence of
decolonization. Decolonization destroys both colonizer and colonized: in its wake. something
altogether differcnt and unknown. a "new humanity" will risc up. This is absolute violence (235).
Kawash argues that "whilc the violencc ofrcvcrsal ean be identified in terms of its material
manilcstations. the absolute violence ofdccolonization can only be 'symbolic violcnce.· violence
that threatens the symbolic order. violence that bursts through history" (143).
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This concept of violence as scrving a creative role to revive indigcnous thought and
throw ofT the chains of colonialism and occupation rcsonates well with some of thejihwlisls I
have discussed in Chaptcr Five, as well as with Tariq Ramadan's social jihad, as discussed in
Chapter Three. I have noted throughout this study that jihad has both inner and outer
dimensions. for individuals and societies. The inner dimensions. on a societal level. involv.: a
restructuring of knowledge and a creative challenging and reclaiming of tradition; it is the greater
iihad. aljihad al akhar. the fight against the desire of oneself and the desires of greed inside
one's own society. The outer dimension involves translating this ethics into action in the fl)l'lll of
engagement with global issues. and. ifneccssary. defending oneself. through violence. from
occupation and colonization. the lesserjihad then or aljihad al asghar. It is easy to see the
translonnation of these ideas in Fanon's thought. Instrumental and absolute violence relCr to the
reciprocal relationship between the greaterjihad and lesserjihad in the process of decoloni/.ation
and reconstruction. And for Fanon, like thejilwdisls discussed in Chapter Five. both processes
are important. For example. bin Laden employed both instrumental and absolute violence,
attacks on the bourgeoisie of predominantly Muslim countries in Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan.
lor example, as well as spectacular attacks on the nco-colonizers in America and Europe. I'he
symbolic role of bin Laden's absolute violence was due to the enormity of the rupture in
epistemologies that he was trying to achieve. asking citizens to transform from being subjects of
capitalist nation states to subjects ofOod only. While the fellaheen are the hope Fanon posits for
the leaders of his revolution. it is the masses of Muslim countries. the 11mI/O Islwl/icl/s. Muslims
in Western countries. and even oppressed non-Muslims to whom bin Laden spoke. bin Laden's
vision was toward a completely new society that broke from secular Western liberalism and
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capitalism, similar to the complete break which was directly referrcd to in Fanon's text. Neither.
of course, lived to see their dreams realized.
The new man that Fanon envisioned. fi'ee from the shackles of colonial oppression and
inner limitations on his desire for equality and justice. is similar to thc rcconstructed lIoII/(}
Islamicl/s, the true Muslim. in thc utopian Muslim state as envisioned by bin Laden and writers
such as Qutb and Shariati. For cxample, Fanon argued. "Let us combinc our musclcs and our
brains in a new direction. Let us try to create thc wholc man. whom Europc has been incapable
of bringing to triumphant birth" (The Wretched olthe Earth 253). Thcse words werc cchoed by
Ali Shariati. as discussed in Chaptcr Five. lllill '11,<, l"llII ahllralL'l1 Ililli llil'\I~cri~111 I,' \I ~llld
Ir~lIbl~l1l'd all ,1I11lilllll~1 lll" !',lllllll', lIllI''' illill I\:r,iall: "In this way. man becomcs absolute man,
bccausc he is no longer a pcrson. an individual. He is "thought." (n.pag). A similar vision was
cxhortcd by Qutb:
Indced the capacity exists in human nature to changc complctcly I"rom one way or liiC to
another. and this is muchcasicr from it than many partial changcs. And ifthccoillplete
change were to be from onc systcm of life to anothcr which is higher. morc periCct and
more pure than thc former other. this complcte change is agrecable to human psychology
(112).
This hope for a new humanity, which nccessitatcs both decolonization and the generation 01" a
new socicty. instrumcntal and absolutc violcncc, involvc both thc grcater andlesserjihw.l.
Perhaps. then, it can be argucdthat the notion ofjihad is atthc very essence of Fanon's theory
of liberation. and as such thc vcry cornerstonc of postcolonial theory itself. By extension,
perhaps the "oppositional politics" of Giroux and the "democratic criticism" of Said. which
rcprcsent the great neo-humanist projects ofthc West. arc not Wcstcrn at all. but have becn
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formed through the encounter of the West with the Islamic tradition, which to this day, thc West
is unable to recognize.
At the time of writing the world looks anxiously at the unfolding Arab revolutions.
fi'ctting as to whether they will turn intojihad and becomc unfriendly to the Wcst. while
simultaneously rejoicing that the assassination of Osama bin Laden will signal an end tojihad.
What it doesn't realize is that these revolutions are jihad in the truest sense. and that bin Laden
was merely one manifestation ofa tradition established long before him. One critical reality of
thc current Arab revolutions is that the Muslim masses are not only revolting against Arab
dictators. but against the humiliation Muslims have been facing in the post 9/11 global
landscape. In other words. the Arab/Muslim people are not just cnraged with political. social and
economic oppression. they are also angry with their rulers' complicity with imperialism.
particularly Amcrican and Israeli. In short. the revolution has erupted from Muslim socicties as a
result of internal oppression and as a response to political. ceonomie and cultural imperialism.
with which the post 9/\1 youth are intricately familiar. In this regard, the international
community must get thc message that this revolution is as much against its hypocritical and
condescending manner of dealing with Muslim societies as it is against Mubarak, Bcn Ali or
Gaddafi. The uphcavals arc violent, with death tolls rising evcry day. and the violence is both
instrumental and absolute. This violence contains all the elemcnts of jihad. rcprcsentative in the
outcr strugglc to overthrow opprcssion of Icaders who thrivcd by pcrpetrating injustice on their
people for personal gain in turn for protccting Wcstcrn cconomic and sccurity interests. and of
the innerjihad of conquering fear and testifying to thc possibility of thc birth of a new
consciousness ora Fanon's "'whole man."
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In a February 2011 opinion piece titled "Dclayed Defiance," Hamid Dabashi, loyal fricnd
of Edward Said, expressed optimism that wc are at a crossroads ofpostcoloniality:
After Gaddafi's speech on February 22, the discourse ofpostcoloniality as we havc
known it over the last two hundred years has come to an end -- not with a bang but with a
whimper. After that speech we need a ncw language -- the language ofpostcoloniality,
having had a false dawn when the European colonial powers packed and lelt hasjust
started. After forty-two years of unsurpassed banality and cruelty, he is among the last
vestiges of a European colonial destruction of not just world material resources but far
more crucial ofa liberated moral imagination. There are a number ofthcsc rclics still
around. Two of them have been deposed. But stililhe criminal cruelty and thc idcntical
gibberish of many more -- from Morocco to Iran, from Syria to Yemen -- arc to bc taught
the dignity ofa graceful exit an ennobling silence. (n.pag)
Dabashi goes on to argue that what we are witnessing in the recent rcvolutions across thc Arab
world is a "deferred postcolonial defiance" and the liberation of the Arab states, particularly
North Africa, li'om thc oppressive remnants of postcolonialism will open "a new imaginativc
geography of liberation, mapped far fi'om the false and falsifying binary of "Islam and thc Wcst"
or "the Wcst and the Rest." He rightly argucd that this liberating gcography goes far bcyond thc
Arab and even Muslim world:
From Senegal to Djibouti similar uprisings are brcwing. Thc commcnccmcnt ofthc
Green Movement in Iran almost two ycars bcforc the uprising in thc Arab world has had
far-reaching implications deep into Afghanistan and Ccntral Asia, and today as far as
China there are official fears of a "Jasmine Revolution. (n.pag)
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o doubt Dabashi's observations are right on target. but onc critical point nceds to be
added: political Islamism. and cvenjihadists, will. no doubt. playa defining role in the "ncw
imaginative geography of liberation." And even morc importantly. this "imaginative geography"
will bc mapped within the rcality of Muslim societies out of which the revolutions arc being
generated. There is an unprecedcntcd opportunity for Muslim societies to have a debate on the
rolc of Islam in the lormation of their civil and political life. a conversation which has been
deterred since their break from their colonial masters. We must not forgct. as well. the role of the
"war on terror" has played in stiOing this convcrsation sincc all of the autocrats now being
dcposcd wcrc partncrs in the Cli\'s controversial "extraordinary rcndition program" and used the
threat of insecurity to supprcss political expression. For example. Martin Seheinin, the UN
spccial rapporteur on the protection of human rights. has detailed how Tunisia's counterterrorism
laws and policies played a central part in the former government's crushing of po litiea I
opposition. The same argumcnts uscd by Bcn Ali were employed by Mubarak and, more
rcccntly, Qaddafi in discounting the popular revolution. accusing radicals. Islamists and al Qaeda
of brainwashing and drugging thc youth into action. It is evident that the shameful and awkward
baggage of the "war on tcrroL" particularly in orth Africa. is coming to haunt the West. The
decision to assassinate bin Ladcn. rather than bring him to trial. also illuminates the fact that the
Unitcd Statcs, particularly. is cagcr to kccp this baggage buricd lor good (at sea).
There is also evidcncc in Egypt and Tunisia, that the pcople. having eome this 1~lr. will
not aeccpt the replaccmcnt of one dictator with another, compliant to American interests. and arc
eager to cxplore diverse alliances which includc political Islamists. In Egypt protests are
continuing with the populations demanding accountability andjustice and the Muslim
Brotherhood has become a vocal pari of this negotiating process. In Tunisia Rashid Ghanooshi's
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AI Nadha Party has been legalized. The situation in Libya is much more complcx because of the
absence ofa strong civil society, like that promoted and sustained by thc moderatc Islamist
politics of the Brotherhood in Egypt for example. due to the extreme suppression of Islamism of
all sorts by Qaddafi. For this reason Libya runs a greater risk at falling prey to the agendas of
more radical Islamic andjihadisl factions. And ccrtainly we can predict that any acts of violence
byjihadisls in the region are bound to be highlighted as evidence that Muslims are simply too
medieval and infantile to determine the destinies of their own societies. The realitics ofthc past
dccade have shown that a true contrapuntal discourse between the "West" and Muslim societies
cannot take place through the interpretations of Western Muslim interlocutors and academics
alone. who are confronted with the dilemma of articulating the demands of Muslim societies to a
rathcr secular and unsympathetic audience. As long as the category of "bad" Muslim remains so
broad based. and includes all Islamists from AI Qaeda to the Muslim Brothcrhood in the same
ferocious tribe. genuine engagement between Muslim and non-Muslim socictics, and cvcn
between Muslim thinkers thcmselves, will not be fruitful. And the moment for Dabashi's "new
imaginative geography of liberation" will once again be delerred.
As neo-colonialism is thrcatened, Muslims will now finally have the conversations they
necd to have in ordcr to create the typc of postcolonial society Fanon envisioncd for Algeria
This thcsis has argued that the Homo Is/amicus. central to the formation of postcolonial theory.
as thc fellahcn in Fanon's rcputed work, is at the foundation of the postcolonial tradition. as well
as the concept of jihad. Thoughjihad continues to travel through theory and literature.
becoming reformulated. digested and repackaged along the way. the embrace of jihad and
postcolonial ism is. no doubt. one of the most challenging and intcrcsting contributions to
contemporary theory. The Muslim masses, which now include nOl only the youth. but opposition
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ligures. rebels. peasants. the cosmopolitan middle class and evenjihadi.l'/.I'. arc well awarc of the
international politics at playas well as the impending world economic crisis of historic
proportions. They are spearheading a social and cultural revolution. organizing across class and
ideology from within their own indigenous Muslim social fabric which provides the universality
of such an enabling mobilization. Thc revolution may have been started by media savvy youth
who led the way in framing the argument in a secular narrative. understandable to the accepted
discourse of the West. It will be carried forward. however. by Muslim societies which have truly
come of age in giving birth to a new political space that the entire world is watching being born.
As Muslims become more and more articulate at introducing their vocabularies. aspirations. and
political and philosophical ri'ameworks to the West, and since the West is now pushed into a
corner where it is forced to listen. perhaps genuine "democratic criticism "can emerge. Such an
engagement must rejil.l'e to leave Islam out of the discussion about the future ofthc Arab
revolution. the formation of genuine post postcolonial stales. and indeed the brewing universal
rcvolutions yet to be born. If the "democratic criticism" that Said envisioned is ever to take roOI.
both Muslim and non-Muslim critics. as well as others from diversc traditions. will have to
invest immense energy in learning each other's languages and rediscovering the origins of their
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